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Abstract 
Why do mainstream center-right parties in Western Europe seek the votes of 
immigrants at some time and not others? What are the implications of party strategies for 
immigrants’ future political incorporation? Dominant explanations focus on these parties’ use 
of immigration and race issues to attract anti-immigrant rather than immigrant voters. Yet 
considerable spatial and temporal variation in center-right party strategy toward ethnic 
minorities challenges this view. The explanation offered in this dissertation is that rather than 
treat all ethnic minorities the same, center-right parties distinguish between those with 
citizenship and those without, and this difference drives their outreach strategies. Specifically, 
they may pair exclusive positions toward non-citizens with inclusive stances toward citizens. 
Yet in retaining core voters by antagonizing non-nationals, these parties forfeit the support of 
future ethnic minorities citizens, thus introducing a second, inter-temporal trade-off in 
addition to the broadening versus mobilizing dilemma. The severity of both trade-offs varies 
with the ratio of ethnic minority citizens to non-citizens. Moreover, these trade-offs are not 
fixed; parties may seek to mitigate them through electoral outreach and policy. Statistical 
analysis of party positions from the Comparative Manifesto Project combined with data on 
naturalization rates from Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK, 
from 1970-2010 show that changes in this citizenship ratio best account for variation in 
center-right party outreach despite differences in institutional, competitive, and economic 
conditions. It is when the number of citizens relative to the number of foreigners is growing 
that center-right parties seek to redefine the nation.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Why do some mainstream, center-right parties in Western Europe seek the votes of 
ethnic minorities, or non-Western immigrants and their descendants, at some times and not 
others? This question is pressing in light of the challenges presented by post-war migration. 
Between 1950 and 1970, approximately 30 million people entered Western Europe, making 
this wave of mass immigration among the largest in recorded history (Castles et al. 1984, 1). 
Immigration of this magnitude can radically and permanently affect a population’s 
composition. Indeed, according to official state projections, by 2050, between 15 to 30 
percent of national populations in Western Europe will be of foreign origin (Coleman 2006, 
415). This wave of migration is also remarkable for its composition. Unlike previous inflows 
to Europe – to the extent there was any – most migrants came from non-European countries 
(Lucassen and Laarman 2009, 53). It is this consequence of immigration – cultural and ethnic 
diversity – that captures the majority of political and public attention (see e.g., Koopmans et 
al. 2005; Bleich 2003).  
What is of interest here is how mainstream center-right parties respond to these 
demographic and cultural changes. The majority of these parties trace their origins to the 
time of nation building during which their progenitors engaged in a systematic effort to build 
a nation through cultural homogenization and standardization. These parties have since 
portrayed themselves as national, rather than sectional, parties, and have built reputations of 
protecting “us” from “them.” Thus, the conventional wisdom is that these parties would rush 
to defend their visions of nationhood from the threat posed by the presence of millions of 
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culturally, religiously, and racially diverse immigrants. Specifically, as more ethnic 
minorities enter the national electorate, observers would predict that these parties would 
forgo their votes. They would concentrate instead on mobilizing native voters, perhaps, in 
part, by expressing some antagonism toward ethnic minority groups. After all, the 
preservation of the nation-state and national identity are critical components of these parties’ 
identities, and thus the retention of “core supporters.” 
Yet substantial temporal and spatial in outreach strategies confounds these 
expectations. Some of these parties have championed anti-discrimination and even 
affirmative action policies. In the Netherlands, the center-right Party for Democracy and 
Freedom (VVD), governing in coalition with the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), 
proposed and passed the 1987 Ethnic Minorities in Public Service Act. This measure 
established quotas for the number of ethnic minorities in the public service to increase their 
representation.1  
Others have actively recruited ethnic minority candidates, and restructured their 
organizations to boost ethnic minority participation and representation. Beginning in 1976, 
the British Conservatives have created internal party divisions to increase ethnic minorities’ 
support for and representation within the party. By the 2005 general election, the 
Conservative Party had the highest proportion of ethnic minority candidates, surpassing even 
Labour (Norris 2005a).  
Center-right politicians have also delivered high profile, symbolic speeches lauding 
ethnic minorities’ contribution to the country. In 2006, the governing German Christian 
Democrats (CDU), proposed the “Germany Islam Conference – Prospects for a Common 
                                                
 
1 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1986-1987 09 December 1986, p. 33-1842. 
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Future.” Wolfgang Schäuble, CDU-member and Minister of the Interior, declared in his 
parliamentary speech introducing the conference, “Islam is a part of Germany...Muslims are 
welcome in Germany. They should develop their talents and they will drive our country 
further.”2 This statement stood in stark contrast to the party’s former strategy of “no 
recognition” of ethnic minorities as either present or future German citizens during the Kohl 
government, i.e., the CDU/CSU-led ruling coalition government of 1982-1998 (Joppke 1999).  
These examples demonstrate that center-right parties have appealed to ethnic 
minorities, and that they employ a diversity of methods in doing so. Such variation raises 
questions regarding these choices’ determinants. These differences matter as they have 
distinct policy correlates as well as implications for immigrant political incorporation. My 
explanation is center-right parties recognize the difference between ethnic minorities with 
citizenship and those without in their policy positions, and this distinction drives their 
outreach strategies.  
Although the immigration and party literature addresses the differences in the politics 
of immigration control and integration, it overlooks the pressures specific to those policies 
targeting citizens versus non-citizens, obscuring the powerful effect minorities’ legal status 
and voting rights have on party strategy. Specifically, center-right parties may pair exclusive 
positions toward non-citizens with inclusive stances toward citizens. Yet in retaining core 
voters by antagonizing non-nationals, these parties forfeit the support of those ethnic 
minorities who become citizens in the future. Center-right parties thus face an inter-temporal 
trade-off as well as a broadening versus mobilizing dilemma. The severity of both trade-offs 
varies with the ratio of ethnic minority citizens to non-citizens. Changes in this citizenship 
                                                
 
2 Deutscher Bundestag. 2006. Stenografischer Bericht. 54 Sitzung. 28 September. 
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ratio best account for variation in center-right party outreach strategy. Moreover, these trade-
offs are not fixed; parties may seek to mitigate them through electoral, organizational, and 
programmatic tactics. Critically, under certain conditions, parties may enact policies to alter 
the boundaries and content of citizenship, and thus seek to redefine the nation. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section I, I marshal theoretical and empirical 
evidence to demonstrate why this research question does indeed constitute a puzzle. I then 
provide an overview of the observed variation on the dependent variable. Section II reviews 
the set of explanations offered to account for such variation, namely those that emphasize 
party competition, the sociological climate, and the institutional environment. Given that 
these explanations are ultimately unsatisfactory, in Section III, I propose an alternative way 
of looking at the puzzle. I posit that the answer to this dissertation’s guiding question lies in 
recognizing the way that politicians see the complexity of the ethnic minority population in 
light of their goals. Section IV describes the case selection and methodology. Finally, Section 
V concludes with an overview of the dissertation. 
I. Presenting The Puzzle And Variation in Party Strategy 
Center-Right Parties As Unlikely Suitors 
Why does this research question constitute a puzzle? That is, why are center-right 
parties unlikely suitors for ethnic minorities’ electoral support? After all, current 
demographic trends suggest that ethnic minorities will constitute a non-negligible proportion 
of the population in Western European states by 2050, as evident in Figure 1.1. Moreover, 
parties would want to mobilize immigrant voters in particular because they are relatively 
“blank slates” – they enter the electorate without being socialized by family experiences or 
having had experienced the major national events that has marked the voting patterns of the 
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rest of the electorate. In this sense, they are far more ‘available’ for mobilization by all major 
political parties, and their electoral impact can alter balances within the party system for 
generations to come (Schain 2008, 466). Yet despite such incentives, there are two reasons 
why center-right parties are still unlikely to court ethnic minority voters. 
Figure 1.1 Projected growth of the foreign origin population, 2000-2050 
 
Source: Coleman 2006. Note: “Medium variant” reflects a moderate level of in-migration. 
First, outreach is a puzzle in light of these parties’ ideological identity. The majority 
of dominant center-right parties are the successors of early nation-building elites. As a result 
of their lineage, the rhetoric of patriotism and the nation-state is thought to be the preserve of 
the political right (Taylor 1990). Moreover, their philosophies include “a rigorous defense of 
the ‘national interest’ against threats from without and from within” (Taylor 1990, 972). 
Ethnic minorities and their increasing demands for cultural recognition would seemingly 
constitute such a threat (see e.g., Koopmans et al. 2005). Mainstream parties of the right thus 
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face a mobilizational dilemma. By pursuing ethnic minority votes, they dilute their positions 
on central issues thereby diminishing their ability to mobilize core voters. 
By contrast, ideology facilitates center-left party outreach toward ethnic minorities. 
The genesis of social democratic parties lies in the wake of industrialization as proponents of 
the working class (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Their historical origins make them credible 
champions socioeconomically disadvantaged, the politically vulnerable, and the socially 
marginalized (Messina 2006, 481). As a result, both party elites and rank-in-file members 
favor eradicating social inequalities and extending immigrant rights (Lahav 2004).    
Second, reaching out toward ethnic minorities is also puzzling because the immediate 
payoff is expected to be low, incurring high costs – in terms of votes lost – and meager 
benefits – measured in number of ethnic minority votes gained. Regarding the latter, ethnic 
minorities in Western Europe overwhelmingly vote for left-of-center parties, which decreases 
the total number of votes center-right parties’ efforts will generate. Indeed, ethnic minorities’ 
support for center-left parties has been referred to as an “iron law” (Saggar 2000). Table 1.1 
presents the vote intentions of ethnic minority citizens by nation of origin for France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. It is immediately apparent that across all groups and 
all countries, the center-left disproportionately benefits from ethnic minorities’ support.  
The Netherlands provides a notable exception. By the late 1990’s, Turkish and 
Antillean voters supported the Dutch VVD at rates similar to natives (Penninx et al. 1998, 
471). Yet in 2006, the VVD lost much of its ground among ethnic minority voters, especially 
Turks, as a result of the party’s increasingly strident tone regarding multiculturalism. The 
Labor Party (PvdA) was the primary beneficiary of these defections, receiving a full 84 
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percent of their support (Heelsum and Tillie 2006). Of the Turkish VVD voters, 62 percent 
switched to the PvdA (Tillie 2009).  
Table 1.1  Vote intention of ethnic minorities by country 
France: Vote Intention by Country of Origin, in %  
2005 
 Far-Left Communists Greens Socialist Party UDF UMP 
       
North African 8.3 5.7 15 52.4 3 8 
Turkey 6.4 1.6 20.6 52.4 3.2 4.8 
Other Africa 6 6.7 15.3 56.7 2.7 8.7 
Native 5.1 5.4 14.8 42 6.7 16.1 
 
Germany: Vote Intention by Naturalized Turks, in % 
1999–2009 
Year Left Alliance/PDS Greens SPD FDP CDU/CSU 
1999   74  12 
2002 3 22 62 3 11 
2005 7.8 9.2 77 1.2 4.8 
2009   55  10 
 
United Kingdom: Vote Intention by Ethnic Group, in % 
1983–2005 
 Labour Conservatives Labour Conservatives 
Year Asian Black 
1983 81 9 88 7 
1987 67 23 86 6 
1992 77 11 85 8 
1997 70 25 86 8 
2005 49 10 79.5 2.5 
 
The Netherlands: Vote Intention by Country of Origin, in % 
2006 
 Socialist Party Green Left PvdA D66 CDA VVD 
       
Turkey 22 21 36 12 7 3 
Morocco 18 5 69 2 3 1 
Surinam 21 8 43 6 13 7 
Dutch Antilles 24 11 35 7 10 7 
Overall Electorate 16.6 4.6 21.2 2 26.5 14.7 
Sources: France (Brouard and Tiberj 2005); Germany (Wüst 2006; Alonso and Da Fonseca 2011a); UK (Anwar 2001; 
Messina 2007); Netherlands (Tillie 2009).  
This support for center-left parties appears to be more than simply an artifact of 
economic interest. On the whole, the majority of ethnic minorities have below average 
incomes, are concentrated low-skilled occupations, and have higher than average welfare 
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state dependence – all which align their economic interests with those of center-left 
constituencies (Koopmans 2010; Messina 2007). Yet even when their socioeconomic status 
improves, ethnic minorities continue to vote for center-left parties. Such inelasticity in vote 
choice suggests that in their evaluation of political alternatives, identity trumps class for 
ethnic minorities. From this perspective, shared experiences of discrimination and 
interactions with dominant groups make it efficient for individual ethnic minorities to use 
their perception of the interests of ethnic minorities as whole as proxy for their own interests 
(Dawson 1994; Ireland 2000).  
Outreach is also likely to be costly given center-right partisans’ opinions regarding 
immigrants and ethnic minorities. Figure 1.2 displays the distribution of opinion by partisans 
regarding the statement “people who do not share the country’s customs cannot become fully 
(country’s nationality).” The source of this data is the International Social Survey taken in 
2003. The mean response by partisans of center-left parties is also “agree”; however, the 
inter-quartile range encompasses “agree” to “disagree”. The mean response for center-right 
partisans is “agree”, with an inter-quartile range extending from “agree strongly” to “neither 
agree nor disagree.” Those center-right party identifiers who “disagree strongly” are outliers. 
The only other party family with a constituency exhibiting the same distribution is the far-
right. In fact, the electoral rise of radical right parties across the continent raises the costs of 
appealing to ethnic minorities by offering disgruntled constituents a viable exit option 
(Alonso and da Fonseca 2011b). 
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Figure 1.2 Partisan opinion on national belonging 
 
Source: International Social Survey Programme 2003. Question: How much do you agree or disagree with the following 
statement? It is impossible for people who do not share [Country’s] customs and traditions to become fully [Country’s 
nationality].  
In light of these challenges, the use of the following incendiary slogan is 
unsurprising: “If you want a nigger for a neighbour – vote Labour.” In the general election of 
1964, Peter Griffiths, a Conservative candidate for Parliament, bucked national trends and 
defeated the Labor incumbent no doubt by running an anti-immigrant campaign featuring this 
infamous 10-word slogan. Posters with this racist slogan were displayed prominently around 
the area. Approximately 20 years later, the Conservative Party’s posters were remarkably 
different. During the 1983 General Election campaign, the Conservative Party launched an 
ambitious bid to capture the ethnic vote.  The party ran a series of poster campaigns focused 
on images of second generation Asians and Black Caribbeans. Accompanied by he claim that 
“Labour says he’s Black – Tories say He’s British.”  The campaign aimed to court 
Conservative sympathizers among the black electorate (Layton-Henry 1984). While 
criticized for being heavy-handed, the party’s effort demonstrated a clear departure from its 
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The center-right Dutch VVD exhibited a similar trajectory, although in reverse. While 
party leader Frits Bolkestein did use inflammatory language in his discussion of Islam and 
the West in the early 1990s, the VVD was careful to temper this rhetoric with the promotion 
of anti-discrimination policies. As such, the party criticized the center-left government for 
not spending enough money on helping minorities nor including sufficient plans to help 
decrease the unemployment levels of ethnic minorities.3 Indeed, the government’s policy to 
reduce ethnic minority unemployment consisted of a non-binding agreement made by a 
cooperative body of employers and workers.4 The plan’s failure, due, in part, to its lack of 
enforcement mechanisms, prompted the VVD, along with the liberal D66 and the 
GroenLinks (Greens) to propose and pass a much tougher law, the 1994 Law to Promote 
Proportional Employment for Minorities. This law required employers to report annually the 
number of ethnic minorities hired. Non-compliance resulted in economic penalties and jail 
time.5 Despite the mixed findings regarding the policy’s effectiveness, it was favorably 
described as “wide ranging” and “proactive” (Joppke 2007, 260). By 2004, not only did the 
party allow the law to expire, but it also tried to repeal any affirmative action provisions in 
existing antidiscrimination laws.6 Moreover, Bolkestein’s earlier language was magnified 
and adopted in the party platform of 2004, in which the VVD emphasized the superiority of 
western civilization (van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008). 
  
                                                
 
3 NRC. 18 June 1991. “Opposities kritisch over opvangbeleid voor buitenlanders.”  
4 NRC. 3 October 1990. “Kritiek op vage afspraken sociale partners; Akkoord over WAO en banen voor 
migranten.”  
5 Trouw. 30 June 1992. “Akkoord minderhededen in wet vastleggen.”; Trouw. 20 January 1994. “GroenLinks: 
Bedrijven omzeilen neiwe baenwet allochtonen Werkegevers in Canada Klagen neit, er heerst geen vrees voor 
de schandpaal.”.  
6 Stemmingen. Handelingen. Tweede Kamer, 2002-2003, 12 665. 
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Variation in Center-Right Strategy toward Ethnic Minorities 
The aforementioned anecdotes of center-right parties reaching out to ethnic minority 
voters challenge the conventional wisdom that these parties either solely ignore ethnic 
minority voters or mobilize against them. Yet how widespread are these efforts, and to what 
extent do center-right actors promote public policies that address ethnic minorities’ common 
concerns and further their interests? I take each in turn.  
There are a variety of methods by which parties may seek to mobilize ethnic minority 
groups to participate in national elections. Indeed, the ways in which a party may appeal to a 
potential constituency are so diverse that it is difficult to operationalize.  Party collaborations 
with community organizations, visits to areas with a high concentration of ethnic minorities, 
and features of diverse images in campaign materials all signal that the party welcomes 
ethnic minority support. For instance, in the run up to the 2002 French presidential election, 
the incumbent and candidate for the center-right, Jacques Chirac, made a point to increase his 
interactions with mothers of families in djeballas, a traditional North African garment, 
included images of himself with young people of North African descent on his campaign 
posters, and made highly-publicized visits to the Grand Mosque of Paris.7 In 1992, the Dutch 
VVD launched “Talent Management”, a candidate recruitment strategy to increase the 
number of ethnic minorities and young people on its list of candidates for the 1994 
parliamentary elections. Candidate selection rules accompanied this initiative to ensure 
                                                
 
7 Le Monde. 27 January 2001. “Jacques Chirac prône une approache equilibrée des questions de sécurité; A 
l’inverse du RPR, le chef de l’État abandonne une vision sécuritaire.”; Le Figaro. 26 January 2001. 
“COHABITATION Le Chef de l’État, qui s’est rendu à Dreux, et le premier ministre, en visite à la Réunion, on 
poursuivi hier, à distance, leur polémique.”; Le Figaro. 10 April 2002. “Le vote beur est l’objet de toutes les 
convoitises; ‘Sans nous, vous pouvez gagner. Pas contre nous’” 
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broader representativeness.8 Having said that, one thing that these parties may all do to win 
ethnic minority votes is appeal to them in their party manifestos.  
I draw on data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) to determine parties’ 
general level of electoral outreach (Volkens et al. 2012). This dataset records a party’s 
support for and prioritization of a set of issue positions. Outreach toward ethnic minorities 
can be measured by subtracting the total proportion of negative statements regarding ethnic 
pluralism from the total percentage of positive statements on this topic.9 Favorable mentions 
toward underprivileged minorities and support for multiculturalism capture the latter, while 
opposition to multiculturalism and promotion of a nationalistic way of life encapsulate the 
former. Figure 1.3 shows the general trajectory of parties’ outreach strategy from 1970 
through 2010. Strategies of these center-right parties’ counterparts to the left are included to 
contextualize the level of outreach. The blue triangles represent the center-right’s position 
and the red circle the center-left’s position, respectively. Points above the x-axis represent 
inclusive positions toward ethnic minorities and those below exclusive positions.  
As Figure 1.3 demonstrates, there is considerable variation in both center-right and 
center-left parties’ positions toward ethnic minorities. At some times, the center-right is more 
inclusive than the center-left, while other times the center-left clearly is more welcoming. 
Moreover, at some times, the two parties move in tandem, whereas in others they are 
polarized. The Danish and Dutch mainstream parties appear to move in similar directions. By 
contrast, the parties take opposing tacks in Germany and Sweden. Diverging positions 
                                                
 
8 NRC Handelsblad. 30 November 1992. “Blazergehalte bij liberalen moet omlaag; “TALENTBELEID’ BIJ DE 
VVD.” 
9 To ensure the validity of this measure, I checked the trajectory of the constructed indicator variable against 
contemporary news sources and secondary literature. It appears to capture whether or not the party did reach out 
to ethnic minorities, and the general level of its efforts.  
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characterized the French mainstream from 1970 through 1994. In the ensuing years, however, 
the UMP and the Socialist Party (PS) have largely moved in sync.  
Figure 1.3 Outreach as proportion of party manifestos, 1970–2010 
 
Source: Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2012).  
 
 While the focus of the empirical portion of this dissertation is on the center-right’s 
electoral activities, it is worth noting that its efforts extend beyond the campaign trail. Rather, 
once in office, or even while in opposition, center-right parties have also implemented 
policies that benefit ethnic minorities, namely anti-discrimination policies.10 Figure 1.4 
shows variation in the proposal and passage of all anti-discrimination policies between 1970 
and 2007. It is based on original data collected by an international team of research assistants 
                                                
 
10 In accordance with Givens and Luedtke (2005), the definition of policy is kept as broad as possible, 
encompassing executive regulations, decrees, administrative rulings, and acts of parliament. 
 
  14 
who were familiar with the language and politics in each of the six cases. These laws are 
weighted to capture their relative importance. Those policies that amended existing 
administrative and criminal law in minor ways warranted a 1, whereas those amending the 
civil code received a 2. Major criminal and civil policies, meaning that they were stand-alone 
laws, were coded 3 and 4, respectively. This coding scheme accords with the general 
consensus in the literature that civil law is a more effective method of fighting discrimination 
as convictions are easier to achieve.11 Blue indicates that policies were passed by the center-
right and red the center-left. Yellow represents those policies passed by governments 
comprising both parties of the center-left and center-right. 
Figure 1.4 Anti-discrimination policy by partisanship of proposing party 
 
As the data in the graph clearly show, center-right parties have proposed and 
implemented major pieces of anti-discrimination legislation. The French UMP, the Dutch 
                                                
 
11 The research assistants first coded each law on their own and then consulted with the author to get a second 
opinion on their judgments. 
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VVD, and the Danish Conservative People’s Party (KF) have been especially active in this 
regard, outpacing the efforts of the center-left. Conversely, the Swedish Moderates and 
German CDU have been much less active in this regard. The British Conservatives are 
especially weak in this regard. The party passed only one piece of antidiscrimination 
legislation – and a minor one at that – despite being in government from 1979 through 1997.  
Of course, one may be tempted to dismiss these efforts because anti-discrimination 
laws align with the universal-liberal values characteristic of many parties on the right. Yet 
there is a surfeit of evidence that even these policies are met with staunch resistance within 
center-right parties’ ranks. For instance, in 1999, Gaullist party leader Alain Juppé advocated 
the creation of an independent authority that would examine discrimination cases in an effort 
to assist victims without means to seek legal redress. The governing Socialists decided 
against this proposition, in favor of creating an advisory board to study discrimination and 
establishing a telephone hotline for victims of discrimination (Geddes and Guiraudon 2004, 
345). It was only until 2004, under the aegis of the Gaullist government and direction from 
the European Union, that such an equality body came into being. Nevertheless, according to 
Frédéric Salat-Baroux, the anti-discrimination body’s original proponent in 1999 and 
President Jacques Chirac’s chief-of-staff at the time of the bill’s proposal and passage, many 
of the party’s legislators initially balked at the legislation and only grudgingly voted for it.12 
Even more costly are the type of antidiscrimination measures that include elements of 
affirmative action on the basis of group membership, which, as we have seen, the center-right 
has championed in the Netherlands.  
                                                
 
12 Interview with Frédéric Salat-Baroux, 8 December 2010, Paris.  
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II. Potential Explanations And Their Limitations 
What are the explanations offered to account for such variation? The literature 
overlooks the majority of center-right parties’ efforts, but insofar as it has examined this 
puzzle, there are three sets of explanations generated.  
Party Competition 
The first focuses on the structure of competition, namely the presence of a radical 
right competitor. Formed around immigration and ethnic minority issues, these actors 
initially functioned as single-issue parties, addressing immigration and minority issues that 
established parties commonly neglected (Meguid 2005; Betz 2002; Kitschelt and McGann 
1995). Anti-immigrant parties thus not only raised public concern about these issues (Kresi 
1999), but also forced mainstream parties to assume and/or change their positions on these 
topics (van Spanje 2010; Norris 2005b). Specifically, established players responded by 
shifting toward the right (Norris 2005b; Bale 2003; Harmel and Svåsand 1997; Pettigrew 
1998), and co-opting the radical right’s positions and rhetoric (Minkenberg 2002; Schain 
1987, 2002). The size of this movement depends on a party’s position on the left-right 
ideological continuum, with right-wing parties more likely to react quickly and decisively. 
Parties on the right are more susceptible to anti-immigrant parties for multiple reasons: they 
are anti-immigrant parties’ primary competition for votes (Carter 2005; van der Brug et al. 
2005), immigration and integration have long preoccupied center-right parties’ core voters, 
even prior to a far-right threat (Perlmutter 1996), and their ownership of issues such as 
national unity and pride make it relatively easy to appropriate anti-immigrant parties’ stances 
(Bale 2003).  
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Two implications follow. First, mainstream parties are less likely to compete on the 
immigration and integration issue absent an anti-immigrant party. Although anti-immigrant 
parties undoubtedly played an important agenda-setting role, parties have long campaigned 
on these issues. For instance, immigration and integration has been a politicized issue in 
Germany since 1973 (Thränhardt 2000). Table 1.2 shows the total number of electoral 
programs between 1960 and 2010 in which a mainstream party made no reference to 
minorities, as measured earlier using CMP data.  
























Denmark CL 18 8 44.4 25 75 CR 18 8 44.4 37.5 62.5 
France CL 12 0 0 -- -- CR 12 1 8.3 100 0 
Germany CL 14 4 28.6 100 0 CR 14 3 21.4 100 0 
Great Britain CL 12 1 8.3 100 0 CR 12 0 0 -- -- 
Netherlands CL 14 1 7.1 100 0 CR 14 1 7.1 100 0 
Sweden CL 16 7 4.4 85.7 14.3 CR 16 6 3.8 83.3 16.7 
Note: The first national election in which an anti-immigrant party competed is 1973 for Denmark, 1978 for France, 1990 for 
Germany, 1974 (February) for the UK, 1982 for the Netherlands, and 1991 for Sweden.  
 
The data suggest that parties do highlight these issues in the absence of an anti-
immigrant party. In two-thirds of our countries, less than 10 percent of all electoral 
manifestos in this time period neglected these issues. While roughly a quarter to a third of 
Danish party manifestos that make no mention of minority issues occur prior to the 
emergence of an anti-immigrant party, the majority occur after the emergence of the anti-
immigrant party. In contrast, the German parties largely conform to expectations. Yet given 
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that the German Republicaner’s did not make its national debut until relatively late, in 1990, 
it is unsurprising that all instances of neglect mention fall prior to its breakthrough. 
Second, as anti-immigrant parties improve their electoral performance, center-right 
parties are less likely to engage in ethnic minority outreach and promote ethnic relations 
policies. However, center-right parties have supported inclusive ethnic relations policies not 
only when anti-immigration parties are present, but even after these parties’ most impressive 
electoral performances. For instance, following the electoral breakthrough of the Swedish 
anti-immigrant party, New Democracy, in 1991, when it managed to score seats in 
parliament, the governing Swedish Moderates proposed and ushered through Sweden’s first 
law prohibiting discrimination in the labor market (Graham and Soininen 1998). Similarly, 
beginning in 1997, the French center-right dramatically altered its strategy toward ethnic 
minorities, even as the radical right National Front (FN) took progressively more of its vote 
share (Meguid 2005). After the surprising appearance of FN candidate Jean Marie Le Pen in 
the second round of the 2002 presidential election, the party orchestrated a series of appeals 
to ethnic minorities, including the implementation of the French Council of the Muslim Faith 
in 2002 and promotion of programs with elements of affirmative action (Geisser and 
Zemouri 2007).13 Finally, there appears to be no relationship between prior anti-immigrant 
party electoral performance and whether or not a center-right party adopts a negative or 
positive stance position toward ethnic minorities (see Figure 1.5).  
                                                
 
13 Jerôme Cordelier and Christophe Deloire. 2003. La Croix. “Nicolas Sarkozy s’engage personellement sur 
tous les fronts et invite sa majorité à l’audace.” June 21. 
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Figure 1.5 Center-right outreach and anti-immigrant party electoral performance 
 
Source: Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2012); vote shares from “Parties and Elections in Europe”: 
http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/.  
Similarly, while there are many examples of the mainstream right adopting radical 
right rhetoric, there are also many reports of the mainstream left engaging in the same 
behavior. For instance, both the Danish Social Democrats and the French Socialist Party have 
shifted to the right on immigration and minority issues following strong electoral 
performances by anti-immigrant parties (Bale et al. 2010). Such movements indicate that the 
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Figure 1.6 Center-left outreach and anti-immigrant party electoral performance 
 
Source: Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2012); vote shares from “Parties and Elections in Europe”: 
http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/. 
A modified understanding of party competition, then, has arisen to provide leverage 
on these puzzling outcomes. The modified spatial theory of party competition expands 
parties’ strategic responses to include tactics that influence the competitiveness of potential 
political dimensions (Meguid 2005; Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989; Budge et al. 1987). By 
emphasizing or ignoring an issue in an effort to increase or decrease its salience, parties are 
thus able to affect the electoral performance of opponents anywhere on a policy dimension 
(Meguid 2005). According to this framework, center-left parties adopt divergent positions on 
immigration to increase the issue’s salience and force the center-right to compete with the 
new entrant for voters (Meguid 2005). When center-left parties pursue the opposite strategy 
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right’s support. The use of this tactic suggests that the center-left considers its voters to be 
susceptible to far-right appeals.  
This approach still raises questions regarding party behavior on immigration and 
integration. First, it is not immediately obvious that an adversarial strategy provides center-
left parties enough votes to justify deploying it. As previously discussed, center-right parties 
are credible proponents of more restrictive immigration and integration policies. Such 
restrictive positions are in line with public opinion, namely the average voter (Ivarsflaten 
2005). All else held equal, increasing these issues’ salience may ultimately help the center-
right, not hurt it. By that logic, why would the center-left choose to adopt a divergent policy 
stance if it knows that public opinion is against it? The ensuing loss of support to parties on 
its left flank is minimal (Bale et al. 2010). Second, the theory provides little insight into 
center-right’s choice to ignore the radical right, or adopt an adversarial position. For instance, 
the Gaullist’s and Swedish Moderate’s embrace of anti-discrimination policies following the 
spectacular electoral performance of the radical right suggests that short-term vote 
maximization may not have been the driver of party behavior.  
Sociological Climate 
The second set of explanations emphasizes the sociological climate in which parties 
compete. First, the economy’s health is thought to matter by creating conditions under which 
ethnic intolerance swells. When the economy is contracting, the demand for exclusionary 
politics grows (see e.g., Golder 2003; Jackman and Volpert 1996). Parties are thus more 
likely to refrain from courting ethnic minority votes, and may adopt antagonistic positions 
instead. By the same token, arguments in favor of diversity are more convincing to native 
voters during times of economic expansion (Quillian 1995). For instance, Blalock (1967: 
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184-186) viewed improved economic conditions as a possible source of improved relations 
between Whites and Blacks in the United States.  
Second, the prevalence of immigrants has been posited both to decrease and increase 
the likelihood of mainstream parties seeking ethnic minority votes. In the first scenario, a 
large immigrant population is said to evoke anti-immigrant sentiment. Sociologists have long 
speculated that prejudice and discrimination increase as the relative size of the subordinate 
group increases (see e.g., Hjerm 2009; Quillian 1995). Blalock (1967) offers two reasons for 
this connection: (1) competition for scarce resources increases, and (2) potential for political 
mobilization. Blumer’s (1958) “group threat” theory suggests that prejudice should also 
increase in tandem with growth of the minority group. According to this theory, prejudice is 
a defensive reaction against explicit or implicit challenges to the dominant group’s exclusive 
claim to privileges. The greater the sense of threat to their prerogatives, the more likely 
dominant group members are to express prejudice against outsiders. For members of a 
majority group, the presence of a large ethnic minority population acts as an information cue 
of group threat, resulting in an increase in anti-minority attitudes and mobilization on anti-
minority issues (Leighley 2001; Kunovich 2002; Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; 
Semyonov et al. 2006, 2008; Schneider 2008; but see Hello et al. 2002; Hjerm 2007; Sides 
and Citrin 2007).  
In the second scenario, parties are said to see a sizeable immigrant population as a 
potential source of votes. This explanation suggests that parties will be more likely to adopt 
inclusive positions when this population is larger. The mere existence of a group in electoral 
space ought to move the median voter towards the group’s interests (Benoit and Shepsle 
1995; Key 1949). Further, the need to secure a majority creates the incentive for parties to 
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reach out and represent any and all groups (Dahl 1967; Holden 1966; Schattschneider 1942). 
The identity of the group is of little importance as “parties are remarkably hospitable to all 
points of views and to all manners of interests and people” (Keefe 1972, 10, quoted in 
Frymer and Skrentny 1990, 130). Yet parties’ behavior toward African-American voters 
contradicts these conclusions. First, party platforms were found to move further right as the 
African-American proportion of a district grew (Glazer et al. 1998). Second, Democrats 
largely ignored African-American interests while Republicans constructed a coalition on the 
basis of opposition to policies associated with African-Americans (Frymer and Skrentny 
1998, 131-132). In light of these results, a variant of the Downsian model of party 
competition argues that relationship between party outreach and the size of the minority 
group in question is non-linear. An increase in the number of disliked voters should result in 
movements of party platforms away from the group; however, beyond a certain point the 
number of disliked numbers comprise an important share of the electorate and party outreach 
should occur (Glazer et al. 1998). 
Evidence for these arguments have been mixed. The lack of a definitive answer may 
be a product of the way by which the presence of minorities is modeled. In empirical models, 
both explanations accounted for by measures of a country’s foreign population as a 
percentage of the total population. This oversight is surprising given that growing 
percentages of ethnic minorities within Europe become citizens through birth or 
naturalization. Party positions on ethnic relations issues may defy conventional expectations 




  24 
Institutional Factors 
The final class of explanations highlights institutional factors, a state’s citizenship 
regime and electoral system. Both have implications for the puzzle examined here: the 
variation in degree to which center-right parties reach out to ethnic minorities and support 
policies that benefit them.  
First, configurations of nationhood and citizenship affect the form and intensity of 
political parties’ strategies to incorporate ethnic minorities. These models have an enduring 
impact on immigration policies and migrant incorporation (Brubaker 1992; Joppke 1999). 
Nation-specific traditions, crystallized in concrete policies, thus influence the opportunities 
for immigrants and their descendants to participate and be represented by political parties 
(Bleich 2003; Freeman 2004; Koopmans et al. 2005). For instance, national citizenship 
structures shape the type of identities ascribed to immigrants and their descendants, such as 
racial identities, ethnic and national identities, or policy-status identifiers (Koopmans et al. 
2005).14  
Two particular dimensions of citizenship – ease of access to the national community 
and level of group rights – are thought to influence the receptiveness of political parties to 
ethnic minority incorporation. The first concerns the ease of access to the national citizenship, 
and captures the degree to which citizenship acquisition emphasizes ethnic bonds or the 
territorial principle. The second concerns the amount of cultural difference citizenship allows, 
ranging from the insistence of cultural conformity, or assimilation, to cultural pluralism, or 
multiculturalism (e.g., Koopmans et al. 2005; Koopmans and Statham 1999; Safran 1997). 
                                                
 
14 Similarly, traditional patterns of state-church relations impact the extent to which states recognize the 
religious claims of Muslims (Soper and Fetzer 2007).  
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Where policies emphasize shared descent and assimilation, opportunities for mainstream 
parties to reach out to ethnic minorities as such (rather than as members of a social class for 
instance) decrease. In contrast, where the programs and policies of a country integrate civic-
political elements, mainstream parties intensify their outreach efforts. Policies that 
acknowledge group difference and emphasize civic forms of citizenship are said to facilitate 
the political incorporation of ethnic minorities for several reasons: immigrants enjoy easy 
access to citizenship and voting rights, ethnic minorities are recognized as possessing a 
distinct culture and set of interest, parties may explicitly target ethnic minorities in both 
policy offerings and electoral appeals, these solutions are more likely to resonate with the 
wider values and culture of the population, and finally, if parties do not engage in outreach, 
multiculturalism provides the symbolic and material resources that ethnic minorities need to 
agitate for inclusion (Bloemraad 2006, 236; Bird 2005; Geddes and Guiraudon 2004).  
This model relies on two questionable assumptions. First, it assumes that citizens in 
states with ethno-cultural ideal types of national identity have strong preferences for cultural 
homogeneity and restricted access to membership. Politicians are thus constrained in the type 
of frames and policies they may advocate given the preferences of the electorate. Yet public 
opinion data show that there is simply little relationship between mass attitudes and 
citizenship policies (Howard 2006). In fact, the relationship between citizenship policies and 
attitudes is in the opposite direction than this theory would suggest, with the public more in 
favor of cultural monism in countries with less restrictive policies (Citrin and Sides 2008).  
Second, this model assumes that existing integration policies predict ethnic political 
cohesion. Mobilization is easier in states with multicultural policies as ethnic minorities are 
more likely to exhibit a strong collective identity. While multicultural policies may provide 
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incentives for political entrepreneurs to adopt and maintain a certain identity, other factors, 
such as extensive social networks, shared cultural socialization, high levels of trust, and 
similar class interest (Zuckerman 1999). Furthermore, ethnic political cohesion and division 
are also functions of political institutions, especially political parties that stake positions that 
mobilize ethnic groups into their electoral coalitions or de-mobilize them out of an existing 
coalition (Kotler-Berkowitz 2001, 648). Bloc voting and mobilization on a specific identity 
should be seen as a consequence of group and party politics (Benoit and Shepsle 1995).  
The electoral system acts as another set of institutional constraints on party strategy. 
In fact, their ability to structure the party system and offer elites incentives to behave in 
certain ways render them one of the most important institutional mechanisms for shaping 
political competition (Reilly and Reynolds 2000, 425). Three parameters characterize the 
electoral system: the number of votes cast per voter, the number of seats awarded in the 
typical district, and the level of proportionality by which votes are converted into seats. 
These elements, in turn, influence whether party leaders choose to adopt a persuasion 
strategy, or develop moderate programs aimed at attracting the greatest number of voters, or 
a mobilization strategy, or offer extreme programs that appeal to core constituents (Cox 
2005).15 This distinction between mobilization and persuasion strategies helps structure our 
thinking of how electoral systems affect center-right parties’ likelihood of pursuing ethnic 
minority support. We can assume that center-right party outreach toward ethnic minorities 
constitutes a form of persuasion because ethnic minorities are not a “natural” center-right 
constituency. Electoral systems with single-member districts and plurality or majoritarian 
                                                
 
15Another possible strategy is coordination; however, I omit it from this analysis as it is peripheral to the 
dissertation’s primary questions. Moreover, since the number of votes per voter is one for each of our cases, I 
only examine district magnitude and electoral formula.  
 
  27 
electoral formulas tend to whittle down the number of viable parties in a district to two and 
incentivize parties to converge on the median voter (Cox 1999). Two-party systems thus 
breed moderate and inclusive parties. The conventional wisdom is that single-member, first-
past-the-post (SMD) electoral systems facilitate the incorporation of new groups, and 
immigrant groups in particular, as both parties seek to increase the size of their coalitions in 
order to win legislative representation (e.g., Dahl 1967; Downs 1957; Schattschneider 1942).  
Conversely, when parties compete in proportional systems (PR) with higher numbers 
of seats per district, the likelihood of center-right party outreach should decrease. 
Proportional systems with high district magnitudes impede outreach by center-right parties at 
the national level for two reasons. First, an increase in both the number of seats per district 
and the degree of proportionality leads competitors to cater to narrow clienteles and to focus 
on mobilizing these core constituents’ support. Second, it is risky to mobilize new voters in 
PR systems. It is unclear whether they will support the mobilizing party or a spatially 
adjacent competitor (Cox 2005, 1999, 1990). The intuition behind the prevalence of 
persuasion and mobilization in different systems is as follows. When there are many seats to 
attain and they are allocated proportionally, parties only have to acquire small vote shares to 
win representation. Thus, parties may carve out ideological niches and still be successful. 
When parties vie for a single seat that is given to the plurality winner, they may win seats 
only if they can amass the largest shares of votes. Consequently, “appealing to a narrow 
ideological niche is insufficient to win seats and a broader appeal must be fashioned” (Cox 
2005, 82).   
Yet if the persuasion versus mobilization theory is right, then outreach is more likely 
in systems with plurality or majoritarian electoral formulas, or, in proportional systems with 
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lower district magnitudes. However, the correlation between the number of positive appeals 
in a party manifesto and average district magnitude is -0.12 and insignificant. This may be 
the result of the lack of consideration of the countervailing effect of the size and spatial 
concentration of ethnic minorities. On the one hand, when groups are small and spatially 
concentrated, single-member districts enhance representation because at least one of the 
ethnic minority groups will constitute a majority in at least one electoral district (Reynolds 
1995). On the other hand, small groups are disadvantaged in proportional systems because 
they are not large enough to constitute a significant voting bloc. In contrast, when the ethnic 
minority group is both large and spatially concentrated, competitors in both PR and SMD 
systems ought to pursue ethnic minorities votes (given that in the SMD systems ethnic 
minorities constitute a large enough number of votes to affect the outcome in a relatively 
large number of districts) (Moser 2008). Finally, a large, geographically dispersed ethnic 
group should be a more attractive constituency in PR systems as the group can marshal a 
sizeable voting bloc. In SMD systems, the group’s spatial scattering renders them a less 
attractive constituency as it may not be large enough to be pivotal in many districts. It is 
worth noting that this final scenario is also the most rare given the well-established fact that 
immigrant communities are geographically concentrated (see e.g., Money 1997; White 1993).  
In fact, given the spatial concentration of most minority groups, some scholars fault 
the lack of geographic accountability in proportional electoral systems for the lower level of 
political incorporation of ethnic minorities in Europe as compared to the United States. As 
district magnitude increases, the link between parties and their geographic electorate weakens 
(Cox 2005; Reilly and Reynolds 2000). Thus, in the United States, parties “gain power by 
mobilizing geographically concentrated ethnic and other interest groups to support candidates 
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allied with the party”, whereas in Europe, “most nations have some form of proportional 
representation only loosely linked to specific places” and “parties make appeals more in 
terms of class and ideology than group membership” (Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2010, 33). 
This explanation suggests that center-right party strategy toward ethnic minorities in 
majoritarian systems depends more on minority group spatial concentration than size, 
whereas the strategy of their counterparts in proportional systems hinges on the size of the 
minority group more than their spatial concentration.  
Studies of minority representation reach a different conclusion; in fact, the consensus 
is that proportional representation provides better representation of ethnic minorities than 
SMD systems (see Moser 2008 for a review). First, minorities may create their own parties if 
they feel underrepresented by larger ones (Holden 2008). Second, larger parties may seek to 
place candidates on the party list who reflect minority constituencies to keep groups from 
straying (Holden 2008; Moser 2008; Reynolds 1995). The greater proportionality of the 
system encourages all parties to try to capture voting blocs, since even small increases in 
party’s vote share could translate into more legislative seats (Holden 2008; Moser 2008; 
Reynolds 1995).  
The argument that the fewer the number of votes required to win an additional seat 
increases the value of minority votes is essentially one about competition. Across electoral 
systems, competition encourages parties to mobilize the greatest number of voters possible 
given that the probability of their effort translating into a parliamentary seat is much higher. 
Because every vote counts in PR, parties have an incentive to mobilize everywhere, resulting 
in more competitive elections (Gosnell 1930; Tingsten 1937). As Togeby (2008) states, “The 
intense competition among parties in a PR system creates incentives for the political parties 
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to place ethnic minority candidates on the list” (329). In contrast, the number of additional 
votes required to attain an additional seat is more variable in SMD systems (Blais and Lago 
2009). When a district is uncompetitive, elites will neither engage in mobilizing support nor 
persuading voters. The probability of their efforts affecting the outcome is low (Cox 1999). 
In contrast, where competition is intense, parties will seek to mobilize a constituency if they 
perceive its support as being decisive. Minorities may become the object of party competition 
if they reside in hotly contested districted and if parties view their votes as deciding the 
winner (Leighley 2001; Saggar 1998). Thus, competition is the critical condition under which 
such claims that SMD generates highly integrative and accommodating parties obtain (see 
e.g., Key 1949).  
Limitations to Existing Approaches 
Ultimately, however, solely focusing on this set of existing explanations is 
problematic as they share the following three limitations. First, they tend to focus on only 
one or two parties over a small sliver of time. We are thus limited in our ability to understand 
the general factors, if any, are responsible for center-right parties’ strategic choices. Second, 
most studies treat short-term vote maximization as a given goal. Yet there are notable 
instances of center-right parties acting in ways incompatible with this goal. One need not 
look further than the Dutch VVD and French UMP’s aforementioned support of affirmative 
action and anti-discrimination policies. Rather than simply adopt policy positions in an effort 
to gain votes, parties may also adopt sub-optimal positions as an electoral investment in the 
future (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). We cannot take short-term vote maximization as a 
given goal. Instead, we should examine the totality of party goals and the role that pursuing 
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ethnic minorities have among these, as well as the short- and long-term trade-offs that would 
occur between these goals and the pursuit of a new constituency.   
Finally, these dominant approaches tend to conflate two distinct categories of ethnic 
minorities: those who are citizens and can vote in national elections, and those who are not 
citizens and cannot vote. Instead, most scholars assume that parties adopt undifferentiated 
strategies toward immigrants regardless of their citizenship status. Similarly, much of this 
literature lumps together those integration policies that are aimed exclusively at non-
nationals, such as citizenship laws, and those aimed at ethnic minorities more broadly, 
namely anti-discrimination policies. These studies assume that a party’s level of 
restrictiveness on immigration correlates positively with its opposition to policies that seek to 
retain or even stimulate cultural heterogeneity. Thus, a party’s position on one dimension is 
indicative of its position on the other. For instance, to measure a party’s stance on the 
immigration issue, scholars often employ Lubbers’s (2001) expert survey, which asks 
participants to provide an “immigration restriction” score for parties by placing them on a 
scale concerning “which runs from not very restrictive concerning immigration (0) to very 
restrictive (10)” (2001, 9). Rightward movements on this scale have been interpreted both as 
indicating a party’s withdrawal of support for the ideal of a multicultural society as a political 
ideal as well as a shift to a more restrictive immigration policy (Van Spanje 2010).  
Thus, it is assumed that the same political logic guides party behavior on both issue 
dimensions, leaving us unable to explain why several center-right parties’ have shifted away 
from the ideal of cultural unity (Van Spanje 2010, 580). Previous work on immigration 
policymaking has shown that immigrant control and integration ought to be considered as 
two separate policy areas, with different political logics (Money 1999; Givens and Luedtke 
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2005); however, the literature has yet to agree upon a definition of integration (Bleich 2008). 
At a basic level, it comprises those policies designed to deal with the longer-term 
consequences of migration and settlement that aim to construct a “successful, well-
functioning multicultural or multi-racial society” (Favell 2003, 14). Given that the present 
ethnic diversity in Europe is due to large-scale postwar immigration, policies seeking to 
manage the issues that arise from racial and ethnic diversity “must in part be seen as linked to 
issues of immigrant integration” (Bleich 2003, 3). Bleich argues that while concerns about 
race cannot be completely separated from issues regarding immigrant integration, “they must 
often be seen as semi-autonomous, because race policies are not simply targeted at 
immigrants” (Bleich 2003, 4). He hypothesizes “as growing percentages of ethnic minorities 
within Europe become citizens through birth or naturalization, race and racism will stake out 
increasing independence from concerns about immigration and integration” (4). Thus, unlike 
immigration policies and certain integration policies, ethnic relations policies dealing with 
managing the consequences of diversity directly implicate a segment of the electorate. Parties 
may then weigh a different set of costs and benefits when formulating their strategies on 
these issues as opposed to those affecting non-nationals. For these reasons, these 
explanations are unsatisfactory, prompting us to ask, what is another way to look at this 
puzzle?  
III. An Alternate Explanation 
My explanation focuses on party strategy and the trade-offs parties face, specifically 
those between ethnic minority and core constituency support. The emergence and severity of 
this trade-off, I argue, is a function of a party’s historically rooted identity. For center-right 
parties, their historic association with the nation and the subsequent reputation as its 
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guardians means that to target and promote the interests of groups outside the nation, namely 
non-citizens, will cost them core voters’ support. After all, foreigners, who are not citizens, 
are, by definition, outside the national political community.  
By contrast, the relationship between social democratic parties and the nation is more 
problematic (Taylor 1990). In fact, it has been described as one of “mutual rejection” (Van 
Ginderachter 2007, 215). Given their internationalist provenance, these parties do not face a 
citizen-versus-foreigner constraint. That is not to say that appealing to ethnic minorities is a 
costless venture for the center-left. Yet while they may still lose voter support as a result of 
approaching certain ethnic minority groups, the legal status of the targeted constituency will 
not be the cause.  
The source of the electoral trade-off provides the theoretical foundation for the 
following two empirical claims. First, center-right parties distinguish between ethnic 
minority citizens, who can vote in national elections, and ethnic minority foreigners, who 
cannot. To appeal to ethnic minorities with citizenship is to reach out to a constituency and 
potentially gain votes. By contrast, courting ethnic minorities without citizenship only 
threatens the party’s identity while failing to offset any loss in core voter support with 
compensatory ethnic minority votes.   
 Second, center-right parties distinguish between those immigration and integration 
policies that pertain to ethnic minorities broadly and those that apply exclusively to 
foreigners.  Pairing inclusive positions on the former with restrictive positions on the latter 
thus allows the party to expand and maintain its base simultaneously. That is, the party can 
cater to its base by adopting exclusionary positions on those policies that affect denizens. It 
 
  34 
may also burnish its reputation among ethnic minorities by staking highly inclusive positions 
on those measures beneficial to them.  
 Yet as a result of distinguishing between citizens and non-citizens, center-right parties 
introduce an additional electoral trade-off: the intertemporal choice between preserving their 
present coalition and securing the votes of ethnic minorities in the future. This second voting 
bloc comprises current ethnic minority citizens, foreign nationals who naturalize, and 
members of ensuing generations who are able to become citizens. Those newly enfranchised 
ethnic minority who were once the object of the center-right’s more vitriolic rhetoric and 
draconian laws are unlikely to cast their first ballot for these parties. Thus, a dual-strategy 
may improve the center-right’s electoral performance in the short-term, but may cost them 
the support of a whole generation of voters in the long-term. Conversely, center-left parties 
do not face this brand of intertemporal trade-off. Their positions on integration and 
immigration policies are not constrained by the citizenship status of their intended 
beneficiaries.  
  Not all center-right parties face equally daunting challenges when considering 
reaching out to ethnic minorities; there are appreciable variations in the severity of these 
trade-offs. Yet what, exactly, renders these trade-offs more or less severe? I argue that it is 
the size and expected trajectory of the relative number of ethnic minority citizens to non-
citizens, or the citizenship ratio, that determines their objective slope. This ratio affects the 
number of ethnic minority votes currently at stake and the potential size of the ethnic 
minority voting bloc in the future.  
 While changes in the citizenship ratio alter the severity of the trade-offs inherent in 
ethnic minority outreach, it is party leaders’ perceptions of this ratio that accounts for 
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variation in parties’ strategic choices. I posit that there are three means by which party 
leaders are made aware of the citizenship ratio: precipitous shifts in the ratio’s value, its 
effects on internal and external constituencies, and focusing events. Changes in the 
naturalization rate, or the number of citizenship acquisitions relative to the number of 
foreigners, is the primary driver of changes in the ratio, and thus those seismic shifts that 
garner party leaders’ attention and affect their relevant constituencies.  
 Party leaders are not helpless in the face of these trade-offs or the citizenship ratio. 
Rather, center-right parties may alter them through two tactics: outreach and policy. Outreach 
represents an electoral strategy by which a party seeks to increase its vote share among ethnic 
minorities while maintaining core voter support in the proximate election. This tactic has two 
goals. By explicitly targeting ethnic minorities, the party signals to ethnic minorities that they 
are welcome in the party. The party also aims to contain vote loss by influencing how its core 
supporters perceive diversity. It does this by highlighting social and cultural diversity’s 
advantages, as well as its compatibility with national identity.  
In contrast, policy is an electoral investment intended to redefine constituencies. 
Rather than rely solely on the reputational benefits such policies may bestow in the short-
term, parties implement these measures to diminish the differences between ethnic minority 
voters and the native population, and current non-citizens and the native population. Through 
these policies, the party intends to integrate ethnic minorities, whether it is in the domain of 
economic or educational achievement, so that individuals within this category vote based on 
their social values or economic interests, rather than on ethnic group concerns. The party is 
essentially diffusing a potential political cleavage, one that would be most likely to support a 
competitor. It is also minimizes the trade-off between current immigrants and future citizens 
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of immigrant descent, as well as its core clientele and ethnic minority voters. Namely, 
policies that improve the socio-economic status of ethnic minorities diminish the differences 
between citizens of foreign descent and the rest of the party clientele, and thus reduce this 
party trade-off. It also ensures that those immigrants who do become citizens will have the 
opportunity to improve their socio-economic position to the best of their individual abilities, 
which raises the probability of these voters supporting center-right parties bases on their 
economic interests or value-based concerns. 
IV. Testing the Propositions: Case Selection and Methodology 
To understand the how and the why of center-right party outreach toward ethnic 
minorities, this dissertation explores the strategic trajectory of center-right parties in six 
Western European countries from 1970 through 2010: Denmark, France, Germany, the UK, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden. This case selection provides variance on key environmental 
factors (see Table 1.3). For instance, the electoral formulas range from majoritarian - France, 
UK - to mixed - Germany - to proportional - the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden. Within 
these types of electoral systems, there is also variation in the peak performance of the radical 
right, the average size of the foreign population, measured as a percentage of the national 
population, and the ease by which foreigners may become a citizen, as indicated by the 
citizenship regime.   
Within these countries, I examine variation in efforts by the following six center-right 
parties: the Danish Conservative People’s Party, the French Gaullists, the German Christian 
Democrats, the Dutch People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, the Swedish Moderates, 
and the British Conservatives. I selected these parties based on their electoral dominance of 
the right ideological bloc in their respective country, which I defined on the basis of their 
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ideological position on the Left-Right economic axis as measured by expert surveys (Castles 
and Mair 1984). Moreover, I have examined these parties’ histories to confirm that they are 
the “guardians of the nation” in their respective countries.   
Table 1.3 Case selection and values on key environmental variables 











France Majoritarian 14.9% 5.6 Liberal 0.27 
UK Majoritarian 1.9% 4.1 Liberal; Medium -0.07 
Germany Mixed 4.1% 8.2 Restrictive; Medium -0.24 
Netherlands PR 17.0% 4.2 Medium 0.29 
Denmark PR 13.9% 3.8 Restrictive -0.02 
Sweden PR 6.7% 5.5 Medium; Liberal 0.28 
Source: Migration Policy Institute Country Profiles; World Bank; OECD. Note: Mean percent foreign is measured as the 
average between 1970 and 2010. Peak radical right performance is taken from 1980 and 2010. 
 I evaluate my theory using three complementary research methods. First, an analysis 
of Eurobarometer, European Social Survey, and International Social Survey data 
corroborates the theory’s propositions regarding the structure of partisan opinion toward 
minorities and immigrants. Second, I analyze an original dataset including naturalization 
rates, anti-discrimination policies, and citizenship policies from Denmark, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK between 1970 and 2010 to test the effect of changes in 
the citizenship ratio on the likelihood and choice outreach tactics. These cross-sectional time-
series analyses confirm that changes in the composition of the ethnic minority population 
better accounts for variation in center-right strategies than party competition and 
socioeconomic conditions. Third, in the theory chapter, I assess the evidence for the theory’s 
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proposed mechanisms and processes by examining the center-right party’s decision to engage 
in outreach in France and the Netherlands. I systematically investigated internal party 
documents and conducted structured interviews with senior party officials and members as 
well as minority organizations to help evaluate whether explanatory factors and outcomes are 
correlated in ways consistent with the theory.  
V. Outline of Dissertation 
The dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I develop more fully an 
explanation for center-right party outreach toward ethnic minorities is more nuanced than 
standard treatments of their strategy in the immigration and integration literature posits. 
Rather than treat all ethnic minorities the same, center-right party leaders distinguish between 
those with citizenship and those without. Several ramifications follow, leading to a 
conception of party strategy toward ethnic minorities in which center-right parties can stake 
contrasting positions immigration and integration policies writ large based on their target 
population. I conclude with the theory’s testable hypotheses regarding the effect of 
citizenship status on center-right party strategy.  
In Chapter 3, I test the theory’s empirical claims and implications. First, an 
exhaustive analysis of survey data supports the claim that center-left partisans hold consistent 
views on issues regarding minorities and immigrants whereas the opinion structure of center-
right partisans differs based on the citizenship status of the intended beneficiaries. Second, I 
use evidence of party strategy toward ethnic minorities in six Western European countries 
from 1970 through 2010 to test the effect of changes in the citizenship ratio on the likelihood 
and form of outreach. I also measure the explanatory power of my model against that of 
competing explanations. These cross-sectional time-series analyses confirm that changes in 
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the composition of the ethnic minority population better account for intertemporal variation 
in center-right party outreach strategy. 
Chapter 4 presents a summary of the dissertation’s argument and its main findings on 
the electoral strategies of center-right parties toward ethnic minorities. I then discuss future 
avenues of research. The chapter then concludes with a discussion of the larger implications 
of this study for the future incorporation of ethnic minorities in Western Europe.
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Chapter 2: A Theory of Ethnic Minority Outreach 
Mainstream center-right parties appear to be unlikely suitors for ethnic minority votes, 
even in light of record levels of international migration and minority naturalization in 
Western Europe (Coleman 2008). After all, these parties have proved willing to stoke voters’ 
anxiety about immigration to boost their vote share. Some have governed in coalition with 
fervently anti-immigrant parties to fulfill their office ambitions. Once in power, many have 
implemented restrictive citizenship policies consistent with their ideological vision of state 
membership.  
Given the compatibility of anti-minority stances with a variety of their goals, why 
would center-right parties abandon this strategy of exclusion in favor of inclusion? Ethnic 
minorities’ low rates of political participation combined with the public’s general aversion to 
diversity render this strategy risky for any mainstream party, let alone the center-right. The 
odds of success grow even longer the more a party historically relied on a strategy portraying 
the presence of cultural diversity as a threat to national identity. Such a party’s about-face 
would most likely be greeted with suspicion and derision from ethnic minorities and hostility 
from core constituents. As a result, observers would predict that center-right parties would 
forgo seeking ethnic minority votes, choosing either to ignore this constituency or to 
mobilize native voters, perhaps, in part, by expressing antagonism toward these groups. 
Yet as Chapter 1 shows, mainstream center-right parties do pursue ethnic minority 
support and in a variety of ways. They have created national consultation structures for 
immigrants and their descendants to influence policy, established quota systems to combat 
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minority unemployment, appointed ethnic minorities to high-level (and highly visible) 
ministerial posts, and canvassed votes in primarily ethnic neighborhoods. What accounts for 
such variation in positions toward ethnic minorities? Put differently, when and why do 
center-right parties view ethnic minorities as potential friend or foe?  
The existing literature is much better at explaining the latter than the former. By 
taking short-term vote maximization as a given goal, the literature provides many reasons 
why center-right parties use immigration and race issues to attract anti-immigrant rather than 
immigrant constituents. Given the well-known electoral purchase of a hardline stance on 
immigration, outreach toward immigrant voters ought not to occur often, if at all (see e.g., 
Thränhardt 1995). More precisely, by assuming a single party objective and focusing on 
immediate electoral imperatives, current approaches are unable to account variation in 
center-right parties’ strategies toward immigrants and their descendants. Two questions thus 
remain. First, how do center-right party leaders perceive the challenges outreach presents? 
Second, what general factors affect the likelihood of center-right parties reaching out, despite 
differences in their competitive and institutional environments?  
To answer these questions, I provide a theoretical framework, briefly reviewed here, 
that supports the following two empirical claims. First, center-right parties distinguish 
between ethnic minority citizens, who have the right to vote in national elections, and ethnic 
minority foreigners, who do not. Across Western Europe, only citizens are permitted to vote 
in national elections.16 To appeal to ethnic minority citizens is to reach out to a constituency 
and possibly increase the party’s vote share; to appeal to ethnic minorities without citizenship 
                                                
 
16 The UK is the sole exception. Citizens from the 54 Commonwealth and immigrants from 15 Dependent 
Territories are eligible to vote in national elections once they have established residency and registered to vote 
(Schain 2008) This eligibility is explained on the UK Electoral Commission: www.electoralcommission.org.uk.  
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threatens the party’s identity without the potential vote gain. Second, center-right parties 
distinguish between those immigration and integration policies that pertain to ethnic 
minorities broadly, and those that apply only to foreigners. Pairing inclusive positions on the 
former with restrictive positions on the latter allows the party to expand and maintain its base 
simultaneously.  
By making these distinctions, center-right parties face two challenges when appealing 
to ethnic minorities. The first is an immediate electoral trade-off between mobilizing core 
constituents and broadening their base of support to include ethnic minorities. The second is 
an intertemporal electoral trade-off between maintaining their present electoral coalition and 
winning the support of ethnic minorities with citizenship in the future. The objective severity 
of these trade-offs, in turn, depends on the current and projected number of ethnic minorities 
citizens relative to ethnic minority non-citizens. This ratio’s magnitude and trajectory 
determine the current and future number of ethnic minority votes at stake. A growing number 
of ethnic minorities citizens to non-citizens translate to milder current electoral trade-offs and 
steeper intertemporal trade-offs by providing a pool of votes in the short-term and the 
potential for even more votes in the next five to ten years. By contrast, a decreasing ratio 
renders a mild inter-temporal trade-off, eliminating the specter of a sizeable ethnic minority 
vote. Parties may maximize their current vote share without fearing its potential effect on 
winning minority votes in the future.  
While changes in the citizenship ratio alter the severity of the trade-offs parties face, 
such shifts may only account for variation in party strategy to the extent that party leaders 
perceive them and modify their strategy accordingly. There are countless reasons why party 
leaders may notice these changes; however, I posit that the majority falls into one of three 
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categories. First, the change’s size may be large enough to garner party leaders’ attention, 
such as a precipitate rise in the number of naturalizations in the wake of citizenship reform. 
Second, internal constituencies may inform party leaders of a sharp disjuncture in the ratio’s 
value. Local party officials reporting the strain on public services resulting from a surge in 
the number of foreigners is one such example. Third, party leaders may also perceive 
changes to the ratio via focusing events highlighting the social or political ramifications of 
the evolving ethnic minority population. One example of this mechanism is a riot by second-
generation immigrants in response to widespread discrimination and chronic unemployment, 
which draws party officials’ attention to the size of the ethnic minority population with 
citizenship. Once aware of changes in the composition of the ethnic minority population, 
party officials may update the relevant trade-off parameters, and, quite possibly, their parties’ 
stance toward minorities.  
These trade-offs are neither exogenous nor constant but rather amenable to two types 
of party tactics – outreach and policy. Outreach encompasses the set of appeals a party 
makes in its capacity in the electorate, as an organization, and as a governing institution to 
win a constituency’s electoral support. Policy includes those provisions that define 
citizenship’s boundaries and content. These two tactics have distinct time-horizons. Outreach 
is a short- to medium-term strategy. When a party engages in outreach, it aims to bolster its 
share of the vote in the next election while also setting the ground for new voters over the 
next five to ten years. The time horizon for policy is much lengthier. Parties do not enact 
such measures solely for their reputational benefits but also to redefine the boundaries, rights, 
and duties of belonging to the nation, thereby reshaping the character of the electorate. 
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Consequently, these policies may smooth the expected trade-off between core and ethnic 
minority voters.  
In brief, the theoretical framework I develop here is build upon the obstacles center-
right parties confront when appealing to immigrants and their descendants. The ratio of 
citizens to foreign nationals accounts for variation in the pay-offs associated with outreach 
strategies. This variable captures the rate at which ethnic minorities are passing through 
rather than huddling outside the ‘entrance gates’ of state membership (Hammar 1990). Party 
leaders’ perceptions of this ratio’s size and expectations of its trajectory affect both their 
decision to target ethnic minorities and the degree to which they appeal to ethnic minorities 
versus their core clientele. Such assessments also influence the set of tactics parties employ. 
Thus, the leadership’s estimation of the citizenship ratio’s actual and future size explains the 
likelihood that parties appeal to ethnic minorities and the mix of tactics they use.  
This chapter presents in greater detail the theoretical framework sketched above. I 
elaborate on both types of trade-offs, their nidus, and their indicators in Section I. In Section 
II, I expatiate on the determinant of these trade-offs’ parameters, the citizenship ratio. I 
provide a more complete definition of the citizenship ratio and its component parts, present 
how it shapes parties’ environments, and explicate the ways it affects party leaders’ strategic 
choices. Having considered party strategy in terms of ‘whom’ to recruit, in Section III, I 
address the ‘how’ of strategies by connecting party leaders’ goals at different time horizons 
to the mix of tactics they employ. Section IV concludes with a list of this explanation’s 
observable implications.   
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I. The Challenges of Seeking Minority Support 
Center-right parties reaching out to ethnic minorities face immediate and 
intertemporal electoral trade-offs. I begin by examining why and how appealing to ethnic 
minorities may hamper parties’ ability to maintain core constituent support. I argue that a 
party’s ideological identity is the source of the potential conflict between these two 
constituencies. It is this identity, in turn, that distinguishes center-right parties’ challenges 
from those confronting their counterparts on the center-left. I then describe both trade-offs’ 
observable features and consequences.   
Electoral Trade-Offs and Their Determinants 
The concept of an electoral trade-off rests on the assumption that, on a very general 
level, political parties cannot appeal to all social groups successfully. For a trade-off to occur, 
pursuing one constituency results in losing support from another. As Przeworski and Sprague 
(1985) note, “[A]n electoral trade-off can be found between any two groups” (63). This 
observation rings particularly true when ethnic minorities comprise one of these groups in 
light of the “strong hostility to immigrants on the party of many, if not most, Europeans” 
(Howard 2009, 55). One such manifestation of public antipathy to immigrants is the rise of 
anti-immigrant parties. These parties’ ability to garner support across social groups, most 
notably blue-collar workers and small-business owners, suggests that outreach poses 
significant challenges to mainstream parties on the left and right alike (Ivarsflaten 2005, 465). 
While minority outreach may affect parties’ performance among many constituencies, the 
focus here is on the interrelationship between core constituencies and ethnic minorities.  
I posit for an electoral trade-off to occur, party leaders must consider ethnic 
minorities divisive. By appealing to ethnic minorities’ interests, party leaders undermine their 
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ability to maintain their current coalition’s support (Frymer and Skrentny 1998). As Chapter 
3 will demonstrate, divisiveness is primarily a function of a party’s historically rooted 
identity. After all, “[P]olitical parties are not empty vessels into which issue positions are 
poured in response to electoral or constituency pressures; rather, they are organizations with 
historically rooted orientations that guide their response to new issues” (Marks and Wilson 
2000, 434). According to Lipset and Rokkan’s theory of party system formation, parties of 
the center-left and center-right mobilized under similar historical circumstances to represent 
the same interests (Marks and Wilson 2000; Mair and Mudde 1998). These parties 
consequently share core identities. Concordantly, the expectation is that leaders of the same 
party family encounter similar challenges when considering reaching out to minorities. Party 
identity influences the difficulties outreach presents by establishing core constituencies and 
defining the now long-standing agendas that mobilize intense commitments among party 
leaders and activists (Marks and Wilson 2000; Panebianco 1988; Budge et al. 1987). The 
range of potential strategies is therefore a product of foundational ideologies and endogenous 
organizational constraints (Marks and Wilson 2000, 434). On those issues evoking values 
central to their identity and the retention of core voters, parties have less flexibility.  
Thus, mainstream parties face tough choices between enlarging and maintaining their 
base, but center-right parties’ core ideological feature, namely their historic relationship with 
the nation, distinguishes their challenges from the center-left’s. For the center-right, defense 
of tradition and the nation are integral to its identity. These parties are the “political 
guardians” of society’s set of core values that give the nation its defining characteristics 
(Parkin 1967, 279-280). The majority of these parties’ progenitors were “active nation-
building elites” who mobilized to build a nation through cultural homogenization and 
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standardization “at the eve of the breakthrough of democratization” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 
35-37). The continued association of these parties with cultural conceptions of the nation is 
captured in a description of the type of resistance nation-building elites faced from corporate 
claims of the church. What was at stake “was far more than a matter of economics…the 
fundamental issue was one of morals, the control of community norms” (Lipset and Rokkan 
1967, 15). The two parties whose inceptions were much more recent – the German Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) and French Gaullists – have no less of a claim to the role of 
“political guardians” of national interests (see e.g., Wiliarty 2010; Lachaise 1994; Haegel 
1990).  
By contrast, the historical relationship between social democratic parties and the 
nation has been less harmonious. Simply put, “nationalists were deaf to class appeals and 
socialists had no fatherland” (Van Ginderachter 2007, 215). Socialist parties emerged in the 
wake of early industrialization to promote the working class’s interests. Rather than acting as 
the grounds for mobilization, the nation, and national identity in particular, served a potential 
foil. Indeed, Marx deemed nationalism a bourgeois contrivance created to divide 
emancipatory movements (Berger 1999). Early party leaders echoed this sentiment, 
denouncing national identity as a false consciousness obstructing the proletariat’s class 
awakening (Van Ginderachter 2007). ‘Class-consciousness’, on the other hand, a 
distinctively proletarian value-system, embodies principles that, at many points, opposed the 
capitalist order (Parkin 1967, 284-485). As a result, Parkin notes that in capitalist societies, 
the values and symbols historically associated with parties of the left are “at odds with the 
dominant institutional orders and central values of the society” (1967, 280).  
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Socialist parties’ orientation toward the nation at the time of their emergence stands 
in sharp contrast with that of the center-right. The modern center-right and center-left’s 
predecessors initiate and close Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) account of the formation of the 
European party system. In describing its development, the authors observe: 
 “There is an intriguing cyclical movement in this scheme. The process gets 
under way with the breakdown of one supranational order and the 
establishment of strong territorial bureaucracies legitimizing themselves 
through the standardizing of nationally distinct religions and languages, and it 
ends with a conflict over national versus international loyalties within the last 
strata to be formally integrated into the nation-state, the rural and the 
industrial workers” (47-48).  
Both historical relationships with the nation have implications for the type of 
challenges appealing to immigrant voters poses for the center-left and center-right. The 
center-left’s ideological identity does not preclude reaching out to ethnic minorities without 
citizenship. Appealing to denizens is consonant with the mainstream center-left’s historical 
origins. These parties’ predecessors mobilized to equalize living conditions, promote social 
rights, and create formal legal equality (Markovits 2005; Hobsbawm 1996, 43; Marshall 
1950).  
By contrast, reaching out to groups considered outside the national community places 
considerable stress on center-right parties’ identities. Citizenship, understood simply as a 
legal category, institutionalizes this trade-off. By sharply delineating the boundaries of 
national membership, citizenship demarcates “who is included in the concept of ‘the 
people’…[and] at least an implicit understanding of who is excluded” (Howard 2009, 3).  
The possession of a passport does not automatically translate into full-fledged 
acceptance as an equal member of the nation. Cultural notions of belonging also matter. 
Recognition by the majority population, and center-right partisans in particular, varies with a 
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group’s perceptual distinctiveness and its salience (Sniderman et al. 2004). Some minorities 
in Western Europe may stand out by virtue of skin color, religious dress, language skills, or 
educational and labor market handicaps (Hagendoor et al. 2003, quoted in Sniderman et al. 
2004). Phenotype and religious dress provide visual cues about group membership are 
particularly conspicuous in many Western Europe countries, precisely because of their 
homogeneity (Bail 2012, 54). These cues may limit positive contact between groups, 
allowing racial and religious stereotypes to persist unchallenged (Allport 1958).  
External events and collective memories may increase a minority group’s salience. 
For instance, following the 2002 and 2004 murders of two strident and prominent critics of 
Islam, filmmaker Theo Van Gogh and populist politician Pim Fortuyn, Muslim minorities’ 
perceived distinctiveness in the Netherlands soared (Andeweg and Irwin 2009). Surveys 
since have shown that the general public regards the Surinamese the minority group most 
integrated into Dutch society. While their phenotype makes them one of the Netherland’s 
most visible minority groups, those of Surinamese descent are considered more Dutch than 
the “white-but-not-quite-so-white” Moroccans and Turks (Andeweg and Irwin 2009, 47; 
Essed and Trienkens 2008, 58).   
Two implications follow. First, center-right party outreach toward minorities 
recognizes the difference between immigrants who are not citizens, and thus ineligible to 
vote in national elections, and immigrants who are citizens and consequently can vote.17 To 
appeal to ethnic minority citizens is to reach out to a constituency and potentially boost the 
party’s vote share. To appeal to ethnic minority non-nationals threatens the party’s identity 
                                                
 
17 Non-nationals do have the right to vote in local elections in some Western European states, including 
Denmark, Sweden, and The Netherlands (e.g., Howard 2009; Koopmans et al. 2005).   
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while failing to offset a loss in core voter support with a potential gain in votes. Second, 
parties differentiate between immigration and integration policies that do not apply to 
citizens, and those that do. Party strategy on these two policy dimensions ought to follow 
different logics as the latter directly implicates part of the electorate while the former does 
not (Wilson 1986). At a minimum, it renders center-right parties’ positions on these policies 
less manifestly contradictory.  
From the perspective of these distinctions, center-right parties confront two electoral 
trade-offs. The first is the immediate choice between the support of ethnic minority voters 
and that of its core clientele. Although these ethnic minorities are citizens, seeking their votes 
is not without cost, especially if voters hold consistent policy attitudes on immigration and 
integration, and lump “foreigners”, “immigrants”, and “ethnic minorities” into one category 
(Crowley 2001, 104). In this case, parties may employ outreach methods that explicitly 
acknowledge their legal status. They may also attempt to uncouple immigration issues from 
those arising as a result of cultural and ethnic diversity, such as anti-discrimination policy, 
which affect ethnic minorities regardless of their nationality.  
The treatment of such policies as “semi-autonomous” would benefit center-right 
parties in two ways. First, it would free them from competing for ethnic minority votes on 
existing immigration policies – a risky endeavor given many center-right parties’ historical 
support of more draconian measures. Second, this strategy would help persuade voters that 
immigration and integration are better perceived as two separate issue domains based on the 
intended beneficiary’s citizenship status (Druckman and Lupia 2000, 6). If successful, core 
voters may be less likely to view outreach efforts as aimed at foreigners and thus anathema. 
Such attempts to create new axes of competition by separating diversity-related issues from 
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immigration, termed “heresthetics” by Riker (1986), would benefit the party if successful by 
setting the standards on which it and other parties compete for minority votes. Of course, the 
diversity issue must not have recently, or ever, the basis of competition for this strategy to 
work.  
For example, the French Union for a Popular Movement’s (UMP) ardently promoted 
diversity and equal opportunity issues, topics the political class rarely touched. Beginning in 
2004, the party implemented a series of measures to foster diversity in the private and public 
sectors, the media, and in higher education (Bereni and Jaunait 2009; Simon 2008). Not only 
did these efforts lead scholars and public alike to view the UMP as ‘owners’ of diversity 
issue (Simon 2007), but the party also managed to supplant foreigner integration with 
recognition of ‘visible minorities’ as the dominant framing of diversity-related issues in 
politics (Escafré-Dublet and Simon 2009, 142).  
The second trade-off center-right parties encounter is the intertemporal choice 
between preserving their current coalition and securing ethnic minorities’ votes in the future. 
This second group comprises those ethnic minorities who are currently citizens, those who 
are non-nationals but naturalize in the future, and members of ensuing generations who are 
able to become citizens.18 To maintain the countenance of their present coalition, these 
parties may engage in exclusivist rhetoric toward foreigners and stake restrictive positions on 
immigration policies. Yet by mobilizing core constituents on the basis of anti-foreigner 
rhetoric and policies, the party sets in motion a nonlinear electoral performance – short-term 
                                                
 
18 There is significant variation in how states attribute citizenship to second- and third-generation immigrants. 
Some allow for citizenship at birth while others provide for citizenship upon reaching majority, either as an 
entitlement or at the bureaucracy’s discretion (see Howard 2009, 20-22).   
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benefits – while potentially losing the future support of a whole generation of voters – long-
term costs.  
Conversely, the center-left does not face as steep an intertemporal trade-off because 
these parties’ self-definition does not include defining and preserving national identity. Party 
leaders’ policy positions on integration and immigration policies are not constrained by the 
citizenship status of the intended beneficiaries. Thus, while mainstream center-left and 
center-right parties risk losing core constituent support by appealing to minorities, they do so 
for different reasons, and this distinction based on citizenship produces an additional, 
intertemporal trade-off for the center-right.  
The Diverse Manifestations of Electoral Trade-Offs 
The trade-off between mobilizing and broadening the party’s base may assume a 
variety of forms. Some may have a specific tactical fillip, occurring as result of the use of 
programmatic or organizational methods to acquire minority support. Others emerge by sheer 
virtue of deciding to target ethnic minorities and are thus more commonly observed. In this 
section, I review two forms this trade-off may take, specifically between satisfying activists 
and new constituents, and maximizing vote and office aspirations.  
One form the trade-off may take is as a conflict between catering to party activists 
and potential new constituents. Emphasizing the benefits of securing future electoral 
successes holds little sway over ideologically-motivated activists as they unlikely ever to 
hold office themselves, and will thus care little about these long-term strategic considerations 
(Hirschman 1970). Moreover, the party’s “identity” wing will most likely be the source of 
this strategy’s most vociferous opponents. These supporters are most inclined to see 
immigrants as a challenge to national identity (Bale 2008, 324; Schain 2008, 154). Resistance 
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from these internal constituents is likely to the extent that outreach threatens core ideological 
principles.  
This variant of the broadening-mobilization predicament is especially pernicious for 
two reasons. First, when activists fiercely cling to extreme views, they effectively obstruct 
compromise (see e.g., Aldrich 1995; Wilson 1962; Hirschman 1970). Second, activists may 
directly influence strategy through formal mechanisms of intraparty democracy and their 
provision of personnel- and campaign-related services (Carty 2004; Scarrow et al. 2000; 
Strøm and Müller 1999; Mair 1994). It follows that activists raise the costs of outreach when 
they have both the capacity and opportunity to affect party strategy, such as in candidate 
selection and in the drafting of electoral programs.  
First, nominating ethnic minority parliamentary candidates may prove costly given 
that activists increasingly wield influence over candidate selection (Carty 2004; Scarrow et al. 
2002). Activists may undermine outreach efforts by ignoring or opposing outright any central 
office orders to nominate more ethnic minorities. For instance, local constituencies, normally 
charged with candidate selection, greeted the British Conservatives’ “A-list” initiative of 
preferred parliamentary candidates consisting of minorities and women with considerable 
resistance. The party quietly dropped the program in 2010.19 
Intra-party tensions will likely be on full display when the policy program is subject 
to vote at the party conference. Its vaunted status as the “authoritative statements” of party 
policies makes the electoral program a natural focal point for activist mobilization 
(Klingemann et al. 2006; Strøm and Müller 1999, 10). The public airing of dissent is a 
                                                
 
19 Financial Times. 07 August 2006. “Cameron adds 100 names to ‘A-list’ Conservative Candidates.”; Channel 
4 News. 08 May 2010. “David Cameron’s A-list MPs.”  
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potential electoral liability insofar as it causes voters to discount the future implementation of 
the party’s policy commitments (Dunleavy and Ward 1981, 378). Such rancor was on full 
display at the 2005 UMP symposium on integration. As reported by the media, “activists in 
the room booed several times” as invited speakers held forth. Notably, an audience member 
interrupted a speech on the value of increasing the number of visible minorities in the media 
by exclaiming, “I, too, am a minority! I have blue eyes and I’m blonde.” At one point, an 
activist’s statement caused panelist Kacet Salem to marvel, “But what party am I in! This is 
not a debate; this is a smear campaign!”20  
In countries with multi-party systems and where intense strategic interactions 
characterize government formation, this trade-off may manifest as a choice between 
maximizing votes and coalition potential. Simply put, coalition governments create 
differential strategic incentives for parties. Mainstream parties may refrain from mobilizing 
certain issues because the potential electoral gains cannot be guaranteed outweigh the costs 
associated with the loss of future coalition partners (De Vries and Hobolt 2012, 251). 
Positions on issues of societal diversity may affect the center-right’s ability to secure the 
support of small liberal parties of the center. These parties are the most likely coalition 
partners of the mainstream center-right, but in the case of an ideological conflict over social-
cultural issues, may drift to the left (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008; Harmel and 
Svåsand 1997). For example, in the 2006 election, the Swedish Conservatives adopted a 
more centrist position on integration issues, emphasizing the importance of Swedish 
language education, combating discrimination, and providing equal opportunities in the labor 
market. The party adopted these positions as part of its overall effort to form a center-right 
                                                
 
20 Le Monde. 11 June 2005. “M. de Villepin rejoint M. Sarkozy sur la gestion de l’immigration.”  
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‘Alliance’ with the Liberal People’s Party, the Center Party, and the Christian Democrats to 
stand united against the Social Democrats (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008). 
Furthermore, by moderating its positions on ethnic minority issues, the party may multiply 
the number of potential coalition partners so as to include less common partners, such as the 
center-left. As a result, its chances for entering government grow, especially in countries with 
many political parties (Strøm 1990).  
For mainstream parties accustomed to governing, such an outcome is highly prized. 
After all, votes have no intrinsic value in and of themselves. Politicians pursue and cling to 
electoral coalitions as means of winning office (Müller and Strøm 1990; Riker 1962). Joining 
a bi-partisan government fulfills these ambitions, but the cost may be steep. Participating in 
“grand” coalitions may prove to be an electoral liability, saddling the members with policies 
their supporters abhor (Hillebrand and Irwin 1999), and potentially stranding the party in the 
opposition for the foreseeable future (Strøm 1990; Laver 1989). In fact, party activists and 
core voters may prefer a coalition with the untested radical right to the mainstream left. For 
example, during the 2010 Dutch cabinet negotiations, activists deluged the VVD’s Rotterdam 
office with emails and letters opposing the party entering government with Labor (PvdA). 
Only two activists objected to the party cooperating with the anti-immigrant Party for 
Freedom (PVV).21  
The first indicator that the party perceives a trade-off between pursuing ethnic 
minority voters and preserving core constituent support is the ratio of the party’s symbolic to 
substantive programmatic appeals. Symbolic policy proposals comprise those highly visible 
measures designed to have little or no real effect (Mazur 1995; Elder and Cobb 1983; 
                                                
 
21 Interview with Jean-Paul Frishert, 19 April 2011, Rotterdam, the Netherlands.  
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Edelman 1964). Once in office, center-right parties may recourse to symbolic policy to 
appear responsive to ethnic minorities while maintaining core constituent support.  
Indeed, European center-right parties have championed symbolic policies targeted 
toward ethnic minorities. In 2005, French prime minister and member of the center-right 
UMP, Dominique Villepin, created the Ministry of the Promotion of the Equality of 
Opportunity and appointed the first-ever person of North African descent as governmental 
minister (others before him had been secretary of state), Azouz Begag.22 Later, in his tell-all 
book, Begag reported his constant frustration at the lack of resources available to implement 
any policies (Begag 2007). In Sweden, the center-right coalition passed the country’s first 
comprehensive law forbidding ethnic discrimination; however, the law was limited in scope 
and poorly implemented. Indeed, the government stated outright that the law’s primary 
purpose was to alter the public sense of justice as to prevent discrimination by means of its 
‘signal effect’ (Graham and Soininen 1998). Thus, the center-right government promulgated 
a law that was clear and concrete, arguing that too complex a law may irritate the majority 
population and thus lead to resentment against the very people the law was designed to 
protect.23  
Another indicator of the short-term trade-off is the symbolic use of the party’s 
organization. Traditionally, a party’s organization is a mechanism used during electoral 
campaigns to reach voters and increase turnout. The symbolic use of the party organization, 
in contrast, is not to mobilize voters but to present diversity among its members as a method 
to attract new voters (Philpot 2002; Rohrschneider 2002). The German CDU’s pursuit of 
                                                
 
22 Agence France Presse. 2 June 2005. “Azouz Begag, nouveau ministre délégué à la Promotion de l’égalité des 
chances.”  
23 Regeringens Proposition 1993/94, 6.4:37. 
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Turkish-origin voters’ support exemplifies this tactic. In 1997, the party created the German 
Turkish forum. Ten years later, its website highlighted their shared conservative values 
(Donovan 2007, 467-468).  
 Yet why, exactly, do symbolic gestures reveal party leaders’ sense that appealing to 
ethnic minorities will be divisive? Through such efforts, the party appears to accommodate 
new demands all the while remaining loyal to its traditional agenda. This strategy is difficult 
to execute. To be successful, the party must simultaneously convey to core voters that it has 
not changed while convincing ethnic minorities its efforts are sincere.  Conversely, adopting 
policy positions that clearly benefit ethnic minorities signals the importance of securing 
ethnic minority support to the party (Meguid 2008, 48). Where the leadership perceives a 
conflict between ethnic minorities and core constituents, it will concentrate its efforts on 
symbolic gestures to appeal to ethnic minorities. 
Assuming that substantive policy positions are indicative of the sincerity of party 
efforts, and thus more effective in winning ethnic minority support than symbolic policies 
and gestures carries two important caveats. First, events heavy on symbolism but light on 
symbolism but light on everything else have proven capable of repelling and attracting voters 
(Basler 2008). Second, individuals incorporate both affective and substantive components 
when forming their image and evaluations of a party, with some people missing greater 
weights to certain aspects than others (see e.g., Philpot 2004, 249-250; Petrocik 1996; 
Matthews and Prothro 1962). Assessments of the sincerity of party efforts based on the 
relative use of symbolic and substantive appeals should keep these provisos in mind.  
Evidence of Intertemporal Trade-Offs 
The theory advanced here stipulates that party leaders consider outreach strategies’  
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diachronic and synchronic costs and benefits before making a final choice. In particular, 
party leaders considering pairing outreach with restrictive positions on immigration must 
recognize this dual strategy’s long-term consequences, and incorporate intertemporal costs 
and benefits in their decision calculus. Such a requirement renders this theory far more 
exigent than typical explanations of party strategy. By positing that party actors make choices 
on the basis of their long-term consequences, as well as their immediate effects, this theory 
stipulates that party elites behave in a way that flies in the face of the known “democratic 
myopia” (Nordhaus 1975, 188). Yet there are theoretical reasons to suggest and empirical 
evidence to suggest that political actors are capable of seeing beyond the short-run.  
First, the prolific literature on party behavior abounds with explanations predicated on 
the capacity of key actors to think beyond the short-term (see e.g., Tavits 2006; Cox 1997, 
158-159; Laver 1997, 137; Strom 1990). Indeed, one prominent theory attributes the very 
origin of parties to political actors’ foresight. Legislators would still be constantly negotiating 
new winning coalitions instead of investing in the formation of durable legislative coalitions, 
that is, political parties, if not for their ability to weigh the potential future benefits against 
current costs (Aldrich 1995; Schwartz 1989). The long-term evaluations of party actors even 
feature among studies examining party behavior during electoral campaigns, one arena in 
which short-term outcomes are arguably the most consequential. For example, researchers 
explain why parties adopt extreme positions that may not be electorally optimal in the short 
run by referencing long-term incentives to increase the party's likelihood of winning 
elections and effect social transformation (Iversen 1994a, 1994b; Gerber and Jackson 1993; 
Przeworski and Sprague 1986).  
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Empirically, instances of policy investment, such as pension reform and carbon taxes, 
evidence the ability of political actors to make intertemporal choices. These measures 
comprise policy investments, choices that require the extraction of resources in the short term 
in the service of outcomes only manifest in the long-term. Simply put, policy investments 
would be unthinkable if elected officials only responded to the myopic pressures of electoral 
politics (Jacobs 2011, 3). Many valued outcomes, such as a skilled workforce, are only 
generated through slow-moving processes (Jacobs 2011, 2008; Grzymala-Busse 2011; 
Garrett 1993). Similarly, policies enacted to intervene early in slow-moving processes that 
generate public “bads” require that leaders value these policies’ future benefits more than 
their short-term costs (Jacobs 2011). Voters, in turn, are either unaware of such costs if they 
are diffuse, or are willing to accept them on the basis of the future benefits these policies are 
expected produce (Jacobs 2011, 2008; Moravcsik 1993, 487-488).  
Having established that party leaders do have incentives to consider the long-term 
consequences of their strategic choices, we must then ask what observable features do such 
types of decisions generate. At heart, choices that take on an intertemporal structure in the 
context of center-right party outreach are defined by a comparison between expected vote 
share gains in the near-term and vote share losses in the long-term. Thus, evidence that a 
long-term trade-off is occurring is most readily apparent in settings where strategic choices 
emerge, namely party deliberations, and have implications for the arguments participants 
employ, the way in which they frame the choice, and the type of information they marshal.  
First, the arguments participants call forth when debating the merits of the dual 
strategy should explicitly reference the consequences of maintaining an anti-foreigner 
position on the party’s future share of the ethnic minority vote. Second, the lines of reasoning 
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elites will employ will often be predicated on the assumption that the party has little chance 
of improving its future electoral position without current sacrifice or preemptive action. This 
implication reflects the general tendency for influential actors to include long-term 
considerations in their decision-making when they perceive a certain outcome to be 
unavoidable and feel constrained in their ability to avoid it (Jacobs 2011, 23). Third, actors 
should draw on information that points to the expected size of the ethnic minority population 
or features of this population that would render it unlikely to support the party on the basis of 
objective criteria. For example, they may show that ethnic minorities’ current level of 
educational attainment or labor market position suggest that they will continue to constitute a 
natural base of support for their competitors.  
Finally, there are implications for the set of policy choices that emerge when the 
trade-offs party leaders face take an intertemporal form. Party leaders may seek to mitigate 
the potential costs of its position on immigration by enacting policy reducing the future size 
of the ethnic minority citizenship population. One method is to make it more difficult to 
acquire citizenship. The spate in civic integration tests required for citizenship, and even for 
entry, does just this. In Denmark, the center-right government raised the level of difficulty of 
a citizenship test whereby applicants demonstrate their knowledge of Danish culture, history, 
and society in 2008 resulted in a sharp drop in the naturalization numbers even though the 
number of immigrants enrolled in the preparatory program increased (Ersbøll 2010).  
Another method by which parties may decrease the number of ethnic minorities with 
citizenship is to reduce the number of second-generation immigrants eligible to acquire 
citizenship through deportation. We may now understand why during the French presidential 
elections in 1981, the Gaullist party’s candidate for the presidency, Jacques Chirac, 
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supported the deportation of children born in France to immigrant parents, many of whom 
would automatically become citizens at the age of 18.24 The public outcry these more 
draconian measures historically provoke may lead parties to choose to limit the number of 
second-generation immigrants eligible for citizenship by modifying the citizenship code. For 
instance, in 1996, the Dutch center-right majority blocked a law formalizing a policy instated 
by the Minister of Justice four years earlier that permitted dual-citizenship, and thus enabled 
many second-generation Turks to become Dutch citizens. The argument was that the increase 
in the number of naturalizations was evidence that the process was too easy. The center-right 
prevailed, and naturalization rates subsequently fell (Böcker and Thränhardt 2006, 82-84).  
The feasibility of potential policy, both in terms of its effectiveness and the party’s 
ability to pass it, depends on elite perceptions of two temporal processes: the speed at which 
the processes producing a second generation population are unfolding, and the amount of 
time left before it is prohibitively costly to reverse this process. The latter consideration is 
critical as these public policies are designed to intervene early in slow-moving processes, 
while the former affects the choice between policies based on their temporal horizons, with 
rapid growth demanding an immediate response. By contrast, these policy choices should be 
absent if party leaders view these processes as nearly complete and irreversible, and their set 
of feasible actions most likely oriented at reducing the pool of potential citizens, i.e., 
foreigners. This situation is most commonly observed when the center-right has previously 
implemented measures to restrict growth of the second-generation population. The 
subsequent reversal of these policies and the aging of the second-generation population both 
                                                
 
24 17 April 1981. Le Monde. “15ème jour de la grève de la faim illimité de Hamid B., Jeune ‘immigré’, 
Christian DELORME, prêtre, et Jean COSIL, pasteur à Lyon pour l’arrêt immédiat des expulsions de jeunes 
‘immigrés.’”  
 
  62 
raise the costs of this tactic and narrow the scope of its impact. Such a process characterizes 
the French case, whereby the second generation’s right to French citizenship was cemented 
in a 1998 law and is no longer contested. As one scholar notes, “Sarkozy and the right are 
turning their attention to questions of entry (and exit, as they actively push for the deportation 
of undocumented immigrants), without putting into question the citizenship rights of the 
second generation born in France” (Howard 2009, 153 fn. 18).  
In such cases, when the number of ethnic minority citizens is too large, and when the 
number of ethnic minorities is increasing steadily, parties may implement measures to 
diminish the differences between ethnic minorities and the native population, and thus the 
salience of ethnic identity. Such policies would include anti-discrimination measures, aimed 
at improving ethnic minorities’ socio-economic position by removing artificial barriers to 
social mobility, as well redistributive policies, a more aggressive method whereby the 
government reduces inequality between the native and ethnic minority population by 
redistributing economic, political, or cultural rights. The former policy is less politically 
costly than the latter in that it is less likely to stir up resentment among native voters. After 
all, anti-discrimination policies provide ethnic minorities (as individuals) access to the equal 
treatment that citizenship formally promises, whereas affirmative action or positive 
discrimination policies is explicitly unequal in its treatment of citizens. While anti-
discrimination policy is more politically palatable for this reason, targeted redistribution is 
often considered more effective (de Zwart 2005). Yet parties are acutely aware that targeted 
programs, especially those that designate minority groups as beneficiaries, entail recognition 
and accentuation of the very social distinctions considered to be the root cause of the 
inequality these policies seek to eliminate. These policies may potentially cause resentment, 
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“entrench ethnic divisions, stimulate ethnic conflict, and thus be an even greater threat to the 
nation” (de Zwart 2005, 138). Parties may advocate this type of policy design out of 
administrative pragmatism, or opt to construct less polarizing criteria for inclusion, such as 
geographic location. The benefit of the latter type of provisions is that its costs tend to be 
diffuse, indicating that voters are largely unaware of these redistribution schemes. Given that 
electoral considerations are not the sole rational for adopting these policies, it is worth 
reiterating that the arguments party leaders use to advocate for their implementation must 
include those features delineated earlier. Table 2.1 summarizes the discussion above.  
Table 2.1 The Intertemporal Trade-Off and its Policy Implications 
II. Understanding the Citizenship Ratio and Its Effect on Party Strategy 
Having established the trade-offs that center-right parties face, I turn to the 
determinants of their slope: the ratio of ethnic minorities citizens to non-citizens. I describe 




Reduce number of 
ethnic minority citizens 
Growth in ethnic minority citizen population; 







acquisition for second 
generation 
Rapid change in the number of citizens;  
early stage of development. 
Repatriation 
Reduce size of second 
generation population Rapid change in the number of citizens;  early stage of development. 
Anti-Discrimination 
Policy 
Reduce size of electoral 
trade-off in the future 
Growth in ethnic minority citizen population; 




Reduce size of electoral 
trade-off in the future Rapid change in the number of citizens;  medium to late stage of development. 
Affirmative Action – 
Non-Ethnic 
Categories 
Reduce size of electoral 
trade-off in the future 
Medium to rapid change in the number of 
citizens; any stage of development. 
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the citizenship ratio in more detail, explaining the factors driving its trajectory, and thus, the 
conditions that objectively render the trade-offs outreach presents center-right parties more or 
less severe. Based on identifying these determinants and their potential impact on parties’ 
strategic choices, this section advances a set of conditions under which party leaders are 
likely to perceive, and thus act upon, the citizenship ratio and its expected trajectory. In 
particular, the citizenship ratio is most likely to affect party strategy when there is a sharp 
disjuncture in the ratio’s trajectory, when its features affect center-right parties’ internal 
constituencies, or when focusing events make certain features of the citizenship ratio salient.    
The Citizenship Ratio’s Impact on The Expected Payoffs of Strategic Appeals 
While the distinction between citizens and non-citizens is key to identifying the set of 
trade-offs center-right parties face, the ratio of ethnic minorities citizens to non-citizens, or 
the citizenship ratio, determines their slope. Precisely because it captures the number of 
ethnic minority votes at stake in the proximate election and the pool of ethnic minorities still 
available to enter the electorate, the citizenship ratio is an important consideration. In essence, 
the ratio’s magnitude and general direction of growth renders the environment in which a 
party operates more or less hospitable to reaching out to ethnic minorities. I take each in turn.  
The magnitude of the citizenship ratio and its component elements influences center-
right party strategy in the following ways. First, the numerator, or the number of ethnic 
minorities with citizenship, indicates the upper bound of potential votes to be won in the 
proximate election. This value is crucial for establishing the magnitude of the electoral trade-
off, representing the benefits against which parties compare the potential costs of an outreach 
strategy. Few ethnic minorities with citizenship imply that the immediate payoff of ethnic 
minority outreach is slight, all else equal.  
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Second, the denominator, or the number of ethnic minority foreigners, represents the 
stock of foreigners at the present time that are potentially eligible to enter the electorate.25 
The number of non-citizens also provides a value against which the consequences of short-
term strategies are evaluated. For instance, the long-term costs of pursuing an exclusionary 
strategy on immigration policy in the proximate election would be a function of the stock of 
number of foreigners eligible for naturalization.  
For illustrative purposes, Table 2.2 presents the citizenship ratio and its component 
parts for Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK.26 As is readily 
apparent, the number of ethnic minority citizens indicates that there are more incentives for 
parties to reach out to ethnic minorities in countries like the UK and the Netherlands than for 
those in Denmark, where ethnic minorities with citizenship comprise just 1.3 percent of the 
population aged 15 and older. Examining the number of non-citizens suggests that the stock 
of potential voters is larger in Germany and Denmark than in the other four countries. Note 
that this value only provides the information to evaluate strategies implemented in the 
present.  
                                                
 
25 Not all ethnic minority foreign nationals at a given time point are eligible for naturalization, most notably 
illegal migrants, and asylum and refugee seekers awaiting decisions on their applications.  
26 I utilize the 2002 European Social Survey to calculate the citizenship ratio, wherein ethnic minorities include 
first-generation migrants and second-generation migrant-origin individuals from non-EU countries. Drawing on 
the coding procedure employed by Maxwell (2010), first-generation migrants are individuals born abroad with 
both parents also born abroad, and second-generation individuals have at least one parent born abroad.  
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Table 2.2 Ethnic Minority Citizens and Non-Citizens as Proportion of Population 
 Sweden Denmark Netherlands France Germany UK 
Ethnic Minority 
Citizens 2.3 1.3 4 3.3 2.2 5.8 
Ethnic Minority 
Foreigners 0.6 1.3 0.7 0.6 2.1 0.7 
Citizenship Ratio 3.8 1 5.7 5.5 1.1 8.3 
Source: European Social Survey 2002; data weighted. Note: Figures includes only those individuals 15 years old older. 2 
Measured as proportion of the population, aged 15 and older. Ethnic minorities with citizenship comprise first-generation 
migrants and second-generation migrant-origin individuals from non-EU countries (Maxwell 2010).  
Finally, the value of the ratio as whole indirectly affects the trade-offs of outreach by 
indicating the divisiveness of ethnic minorities. Specifically, it suggests the image core 
constituents may conjure when presented with the term “ethnic minority” and the degree to 
which they perceive this group as threatening to national self-understanding. After all, while 
party leaders have an incentive to differentiate between ethnic minorities based on their 
citizenship status, core constituents do not. Instead, they are apt to judge messages based on 
salient clues and attend to broad and superficial similarities between objects (Petty and 
Cacioppo 1981; Chaiken 1980).  
Citizenship status is one indicator of the level of integration of immigrants into the 
host society, and thus the degree to which the term “immigrant” evokes the “other”  (Hanson 
1998). For instance, many scholars have argued that immigrants who become naturalized 
citizens are likely to become much more integrated in their new country than those who 
remain noncitizen residents. Naturalized citizens tend to have better command of the host-
country language, to experience more loyalty to the new country, and to be relatively 
accepted by their fellow citizens (see e.g., Howard 2009, 7-8; Hansen 1998; Bratsberg et al. 
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2002).27 By contrast, new arrivals are less likely to be culturally fluent and more visibly 
different in appearance, customs and values (see e.g., OECD 2010). Not surprisingly, popular 
conceptions evoked by these terms will differ if the ethnic minority population with 
citizenship dwarfs the denizen population and vice-versa. Thus, the indirect effect of a 
smaller ratio value is to produce a more severe electoral trade-off. 
The general direction in which the ratio is changing affects the slope of the 
intertemporal trade-off. Growth in this ratio suggests that more ethnic minorities are 
becoming citizens than contributing to the denizen population; decline is evidence that the 
number of ethnic minorities attaining citizenship is outpaced by net immigration flows. 
These trends are thus indicative of the future costs of ignoring ethnic minorities or 
simultaneously targeting ethnic minorities and core constituents.    
The mechanisms at work and their effects can be clarified with the use of some 
symbols. Note that the symbolic representation of the citizenship ratio above is primarily for 
illustrative purposes, serving to identify the factors that systematically affect the citizenship 
ratio. The citizenship ratio, c, is equal to v/n, where v is the number of ethnic minority 
citizens and n is number of ethnic minorities without citizenship (where v is a function of 
citizenship policy, the maturity of the migration process, and status as a former colonial 
power, and n is a function of net migration, irregular and forced immigration, and foreign 
nationals’ access to social and political rights).  
The birth rate of ethnic minorities also contributes to this ratio, although whether it 
contributes to the number of citizens or foreigners depends on how or whether citizenship is 
                                                
 
27 This outcome is not surprising considering that most countries’ naturalization requirements include a 
minimum of five years residency and competency in the host language.  
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attributed to children born on its soil. The birth rate contributes to the number of citizens 
where states grant citizenship automatically, whether at birth or by majority. In those 
countries where the provision of citizenship is subject to the arbitrary discretion of the 
country’s bureaucracy, the birth rate disproportionately affects the number of foreigners.  
The general form of numerator, v, and denominator, n, at time t is 
vt = 𝑓 𝐴,𝑀,𝑃,𝐵!          
nt = 𝑔 𝑁, 𝐼,𝑅,𝐵!  
where  
A = citizenship acquisitions, 
M  =  maturation of immigration, 
P  =  former colonial power, 
N  =  net migration, 
I  =  irregular and forced immigration,  
R =  foreign nationals’ access to social and political rights, and 
B    =  attribution of citizenship automatically (𝐵!) or at the discretion of          
state bureaucracy (𝐵!). 






The number of ethnic minorities with citizenship is represented by a function f that is 
positively increasing with A, M, and P. That is, an increase in the openness of citizenship 
policy, the length of experience with migration, and experience as a former colonial power 
all expand the relative number of ethnic minorities with citizenship. The number of ethnic 
minority foreigners is defined by a function g that increases with N, I, and R. When the 
inflow of migrants exceeds the outflow, asylum seekers and illegal aliens represent 
increasing large portions of immigration (rather than from labor, secondary and permanent 
immigration), and foreign nationals have increased access to social and political rights, the 
foreigner population is likely to become larger.  
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The logic behind the final two factors contributing to the growth of the foreigner 
population is as follows. First, not all ethnic minority foreign nationals at a given time point 
are eligible for naturalization, most notably asylum and refugee seekers awaiting decisions 
on their applications. Despite the low asylum recognition rates in Europe – hovering around 
9 percent at the end of the 1990s – asylum seekers find ways to reside in the country while 
their applications are pending and often ever after they have been officially rejected. Thus, 
they “provide migrant-receiving states with a large and seemingly inexhaustible supply of 
permanent immigrants” (Messina 2007, 44; emphasis added). Second, empirical analysis has 
found that in countries where foreign residents have access to a substantial bundle of social 
and political rights, there are fewer incentives to acquire citizenship and naturalization rates 
fall (Baubock and Cinar 1994).  
The key indicator of the ratio’s growth is the number of citizenship acquisitions 
relative to the size of net migration, or the naturalization rate. In turn, net migration and 
citizenship policy are the factors that account for variation in the naturalization rate. These 
two elements are both subject to government influence, and its impact volatile. In general, 
population increase in Europe is driven primarily by international migration, not by the other 
two components of demographic change, births and death (Coleman 2008). It is also the only 
of the three to be under substantial and direct policy influence (Coleman 2009, 2008; 
Hollifield 2000). With regards to naturalization rates, analyses find that the overall openness 
of a state’s citizenship policy is empirically more important than automatic or facilitated 
attribution of citizenship for second-generation immigrants. Moreover, among destination 
country characteristics, only citizenship policy and net migration rate have a significant 
effect on immigrant citizenship status in Europe (Dronkers and Vink 2012, 18-19). Thus, 
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while other components of the ratio are products of policy, such as foreign nationals’ access 
to social and political rights, their impact on the citizenship ratio pales in comparison to the 
sheer inflow of migrants or restrictiveness of citizenship policy (Baubock and Cinar 1994). 
The implication is that the citizenship ratio constitutes both the determinant and potential 
target of party strategy (Coleman 2009, 2008; Hollifield 2000; Baubock and Cinar 1994).  
By contrast, the maturation of immigration flows and experience with colonialism 
account for cross-national differences in the magnitude, though not dynamics, of the ratio.  
For example, postcolonial migration infused early and unprecedented levels of ethnic 
diversity into former colonial powers’ societies, and migrants were often admitted as citizens 
with legal status (Goodman 2010). While former colonial powers may begin with larger 
ethnic minority populations with citizenship, long-standing differences among countries that 
result from colonialism are unlikely to change. That is, there is an expectation that the rate of 
growth associated with these changes will be constant, and thus not the source of diverging 
patterns. Table 2.3 summarizes the discussion above.  
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Table 2.3 Aspects of the Citizenship Ratio and Their Impact on Trade-Off 
 
Elite Perceptions’ of the Citizenship Ratio 
If the citizenship ratio sets the potential payoffs of distinct strategic choices, it is party 
leaders’ perceptions of the changes in the citizenship ratio, namely its size and expected 
trajectory, which affects variation in the outcome of strategic choices. Party elites simply 
have too many demands on their time and attention to track every dip and rise of the 
citizenship ratio, update the current and long-term payoffs of possible strategies accordingly, 
and then alter their strategic course if necessary. Instead, I posit that party elites will only act 
upon developments in the citizenship ratio when they recognize those changes modifying the 
electoral payoffs associated with the current strategy relative to alternative courses. They 
may then adjust their strategy if it is no longer optimal, assuming, for now, institutions, party 
competition, and prior decisions do not constrain party leaders’ actions. Yet what types of 
changes are most likely to catch a party leader’s eye? Although there are numerous reasons 
CITIZENSHIP RATIO TRADE-OFF MECHANISM IMPACT ON PAYOFF 
Size of Numerator 
(Number of Ethnic Minority 
Citizens) 
Short-Term Number of votes outreach may capture.   
Larger Values → 
Increase Potential 
Payoff 
Size of Denominator 
(Number of Ethnic Minority 
Non-Citizens) 
Long-Term 
The pool of potential future 
voters, and thus the number 
of votes a hardline stance 
may cost. 
Larger Values → 
Decrease in Potential 
Payoff  
(Higher Costs in Long-
Term) 
Size of Ratio Short-Term Suggests voters’ image of “ethnic minority”. 
Smaller Values → 
Decrease in Potential 
Payoff 
Trajectory of Change in 
Numerator vs. Denominator 




Number of future votes that 





Decrease in Potential 
Payoff  
(Higher Costs in Long-
Term) 
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why party leaders would notice their countries’ changing demographics, I argue three in 
particular are likely to emerge in the context of the ethnic minority population.   
There are three ways in which party actors notice changes to the citizenship ratio. 
First, movements in the citizenship ratio itself may be sufficient to catch the attention of 
party leaders, with critical actors most likely to perceive sharp discontinuities, rather than 
incremental shifts (Harmel and Janda 1994; Deschouwer 1992). While environmental 
changes may register through party actors’ own observations of the world around them, such 
information is routinely shared in a variety of ways. Governmental policy papers, internal 
party research departments’ memos, and reports developed by municipal governments 
commonly include population data. Information on the size and composition of the country’s 
population are regularly produced via statistical bureaus and census reports, and constitute 
the subject of academic inquiry. Yet only those numbers that vary dramatically from previous 
estimates or prevailing perceptions are likely to draw and maintain the attention of party 
elites.   
Second, the citizenship ratio may be brought to the party’s attention though its effects 
on center-right parties’ constituencies, both internal and external. Internal pressure to change 
strategy are likely when shifts in the citizenship ratio present members of the lower 
organizational strata with new institutional or electoral demands, or by members of the party 
with longer time horizons, such as younger members (see e.g., Alesina and Spear 1988). For 
example, lower-level elected officials tasked with governing are most likely to relay the 
demands and strains on public services generated by a growing ethnic minority population 
(see e.g., Samuels 2004). By contrast, subnational party leaders and candidates confronting 
the demands of electoral competition may transmit the electoral exigencies resulting from 
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demographic change. Younger party members are also likely to put a break on antagonizing 
immigrants. Such was case in the Netherlands when the controversial Frits Bolkesteins lead 
the VVD. The youth organization, a traditional breeding ground for the VVD’s parliamentary 
candidates, routinely criticized the party’s inflammatory statements and policies toward 
foreigners, stating, “Not only must immigrants adapt, but the Dutch as well”.28  
The effect of changes in the citizenship ratio on external constituencies may also 
constitute a mechanism of transmission (Schain 2008). For instance, business interests, 
typically favorable to immigration, may draw the leadership’s attention to their increasing 
need for qualified workers. They may lobby for more expansive immigration policies. 
Alternatively, facing an aging population and scarcity of the labor force, they may advocate 
policies to restore the employability of immigrants’ descendants so as to not to depend on the 
adjustment of immigrant labor (Simon 2007). Such was the case in France when business-
oriented think tanks began to the lobby the center-right to adopt diversity policies (Simon 
2007, 160). These requests may result in the party supporting policies targeted toward ethnic 
minorities. They also may draw the party’s attention to the composition of the citizenship 
ratio and its electoral implications in light of its current trajectory.  
Third, social crises associated with ethnic minorities draw party leaders’ attention to 
the citizenship ratio as well as to the potential ramifications of how the ethnic minority 
population is evolving (Keeler 1993). Like focusing events, both are sudden, relatively 
uncommon, and can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of 
                                                
 
28 See e.g., NRC Handelsblad. 15 May 1992. “JOVD boos om uitspraak Bolkestein.”; NRC Handelsblad. 22 
June 1992. “Beckers wil ‘code van fatsoen' voor omgang met extreem-rechts’.”; NRC Handelsblad. 30 
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potentially greater future harms (Birkland 1998). They stand out against the background of 
social life, generating rare, punctuated signals of trouble, and “concentrate outcomes that are 
otherwise highly diffused” (Jacobs 2011, 48). These features also make this method of 
transmission the most likely to prompt party leaders to reevaluate the long-term payoffs of 
their current strategy. The emphasis on potential losses and the presentation of outcomes as 
certain may lead actors to develop longer time horizons and to adopt hyperbolic discount 
rates, whereby the immediate future is heavily discounted and more weight is given to the 
distant future (Streich and Levy 2007). Negative focusing events also provide leaders a 
powerful set of rhetorical tools to justify the pain of short-term costs by signaling the 
prospect of future losses of inaction.  
Social crisis afflicting one particular segment of the ethnic minority population – 
citizens or foreigners – draws the attention of party leadership to the citizenship ratio. Those 
primarily involving second-generation youths with citizenship, for example, may highlight 
the size of this population and the potential risks of not seeking policies and strategies of 
social and political incorporation. If such social difficulties are concentrated among non-
citizens, then center-right parties may attempt to reduce the non-citizen population through 
the management of migrant inflow. To minimize the potential costs associated with a great 
number of these non-citizens entering the electorate, the party may opt to alter citizenship 
laws. Conversely, manifestations of social unrest among ethnic minority citizens will most 
likely draw attention to the size of the citizenship ratio’s numerator and its trajectory, that is, 
whether it is growing or decreasing.   
Yet what types of events are most likely to catch the eye of center-right party elites? I 
argue that those negative events that pose a security threat are most likely to garner their 
 
  75 
attention given these parties’ issue handling-reputations. Across Europe, center-right parties 
have carefully cultivated an image of ensuring law and order is maintained and national 
security is protected (Bale 2008, 319; Bélanger 2003, 540; Budge and Farlie 1983). These 
areas of issue ownership have two implications for center-right party strategy. First, the 
center-right may be swift to offer a programmatic response to instances of social instability 
rather than to other negative focusing events, such as mass protests or strikes, in an effort 
protect its reputation. Second, policies in response to social instability among ethnic 
minorities allow the party to pursue a twin strategy through emphasizing and implementing 
policies to keep order. It allows the party to appease core constituents while setting the 
ground for ethnic minorities, either by conveying that the party cares about them or through 
the long-term effects of such policy on the socio-economic status of minorities.  
III. Party Goals and Repertoires of Strategy 
The citizenship ratio and its effects on the trade-offs outreach presents are powerful 
determinants of center-right parties’ strategy; however, neither are constant nor wholly 
exogenous constraints. In this section, I present the two strategic tactics parties deploy to 
mitigate the current and future electoral trade-offs’ severity. First, they may use outreach, a 
set of political appeals, to assuage the short- and medium-term electoral trade-offs they face. 
Second, parties may effectuate policies that palliate or all together eradicate these underlying 
electoral trade-offs. They may also implement measures to alter the citizenship ratio itself.  
Changing The Nature of The Electoral Trade-Off: The Roles of Outreach And Policy 
The electoral trade-offs between support from core constituent and ethnic minorities 
are not immutable, but are contingent upon the specific nature of center-right party appeals as 
encompassed by its outreach strategy. In this context, outreach represents the set of appeals a 
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party makes in its capacity in the electorate, as an organization, and as a governing institution, 
to win the electoral support of a constituency. These tactics are further distinguished by their 
temporal horizons: some impact voters immediately, others more slowly and over a longer 
time frame. Engaging in outreach may thus represent a short-term strategy to win an election 
or a medium-term strategy to set the ground for new voters, with the choice in tactics 
reflecting these overarching goals.   
When pursued over the course of a political campaign, outreach represents an 
electoral strategy by which parties seek to increase its vote share among ethnic minorities 
while maintaining core voter support in the current election. The emergence and severity of 
this electoral trade-off depends on the extent that center-right party supporters view cultural 
diversity as inimical to national identity. The goal of outreach is thus two-fold. First, it 
explicitly targets ethnic minorities. These parties are well aware that their general appeals 
have been wholly ineffective. These forthright appeals signal to ethnic minorities that the 
party considers them full and equal members of the nation. Second, the party aims to 
influence how core voters perceive diversity to contain any political fallout resulting from 
appealing to ethnic minorities. By actively seeking to convince ordinary people of the 
advantages of cultural heterogeneity, as well as its compatibility with national identity, the 
party influences how diversity is perceived in the short-term (see e.g., Hebling et. al. 2010).  
The set of appeals that comprise this short-term form of outreach are defined by a 
common, short temporal horizon. These tactics are all expected to affect voters immediately, 
although they may differ in the effect’s certainty and duration. When engaging in outreach as 
a short-term strategy, parties employ those tactics that fulfill their function in the electorate 
or as an organization. With regards to the former, parties engage in tactics to increase ethnic 
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minority participation, such as mobilization of voters. Other tactics generate symbols of 
identification and loyalty in an effort to create and foster a sense of identification with the 
party (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002). Appeals to forge partisan ties would include those 
declarations made by the party, it candidates, and/or leadership that champion diversity or 
celebrate elements of non-majority culture. Visits to ethnic minority communities by party 
officials, and collaborations with such organizations as mosques or anti-racism groups 
represent two other tactics intended to increase the number of ethnic minorities that support 
the party.  
The party may also seek to improve its electoral performance among ethnic minorities, 
as well as stimulate turnout, through organizational tactics. Two of these methods speak to 
the fundamental functions performed by political parties: the selection of political elites, and 
the articulation of political interests. First, the nomination of ethnic minority candidates for 
parliament is one way by which the party may achieve both goals. Second, parties may adopt 
tactics of interest articulation and aggregation to win ethnic minority support. Parties may 
claim to represent the interests of ethnic minorities by promoting measures to end 
discrimination, to combat its effects, and to support the maintenance and practice of culture. 
Political campaigns offer parties many venues in which they may offer specific policy 
proposals in an effort to attract ethnic minority votes; however, only when these interests are 
aggregated with those of other constituents in the parties manifesto do these appeals credibly 
translate into policy outcomes. These programs provide a basis for governing (Dalton and 
Wattenberg 2002, 8), and the betrayal of such public pledges carry electoral and 
parliamentary costs (Budge 1987; Bowler 1990).   
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Other components of outreach aim to set the ground of for new voters and may not 
have an immediate impact on the composition of the party’s electoral coalition until the 
medium term. After all, the ability to be responsive to ethnic minorities, whether it is through 
programmatic accommodation or increased representation, often requires foresight. For 
instance, parties may seek to run more ethnic minorities as parliamentary candidates; 
however, they may be unable to implement this strategy if they count relatively few ethnic 
minorities among their members and only intermittingly recruit those with candidate 
potential.29 The party’s ability to attract and retain members, as well as garner more support 
for outreach among party members, often require that party leaders alter organizational 
structures and practices (Scarrow 1996, 46-47).    
Parties thus employ organizational tactics to increase responsiveness so as to attract 
and maintain minority support. One notable method is the creation of an internal minorities 
commission. These commissions have multiple purposes. Their objectives may include 
raising awareness among party members of the growing importance of ethnic electors, 
influence party policy, improve the image of the party among ethnic minorities, and facilitate 
the retention of those ethnic minorities who are already members (Anwar 2001, 541; Penninx 
et al. 1998, 471-472; Layton-Henry 1978, 275).  
The second strategy consists of the party enacting policies targeted toward ethnic 
minorities; it represents an electoral investment aiming to redefine constituencies. 
Specifically, these policies include those Koopmans et al. (2005) identify as comprising the 
universe of cross-nationally comparable policies that define citizenship. These policies can 
                                                
 
29 Trouw. 14 November 2002. “Beter zoeken naar allochtone politici; Kandidatenlijsten; VVD zal Hirsi Ali 
goed moeten begeleiden.” 
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be characterized by the extent to which they emphasize equality of access to the three 
categories of citizenship rights – civic-legal, political, and social – and the amount of cultural 
difference and group rights citizenship allows. The former ranges from those policies that 
favor ethnic bonds to those that emphasize civic rights. The cultural dimension extends from 
insistence on conformity to a single cultural model to culturally pluralist conceptions seeking 
to retain, or even stimulate, diversity (Koopmans et al. 2005, 14).  
By implementing these policies, the party may potentially achieve three goals. First, it 
reduces the size that the current trade-off between ethnic minority voters and more nativist 
core constituents would assume in future elections. Policies that improve the objective socio-
economic status of ethnic minorities and eliminate discrimination allow individual boundary 
crossing whereby individual ethnic minorities may enter into the nation unobstructed. 
Increase social mobility may reduce their level of difference from the majority population, 
while also facilitating a transfer of allegiance from center-left to center-right based on socio-
economic interests. Those policies that incorporate core cultural elements from certain ethnic 
minority groups affect the structure of the receiving society and blur boundaries between 
incoming groups and insiders (Zolberg and Woon 1999, 8-9). It paves the way for the 
redefinition of what is considered “normal” and part of the nation’s identity.  
Second, the party’s reputation may improve among ethnic minorities as a result of 
enacting these policies, which would reduce the future size of the trade-off between ethnic 
minorities and core constituents. In improving the party’s image in the eyes of these voters, 
they increase the number of expected votes they may expect to gain from ethnic minorities in 
the future. Reaping these types of benefits depend on the extent to which that ethnic 
minorities are cognizant of the policy, are able to assign credit to the correct party for its 
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implementation, and approve of the policy. For instance, if a party implements a policy that 
aims to improve the socio-economic status of ethnic minorities, but it frames its 
implementation as a way of reducing the threats to security posed by ethnic minorities, then 
the party will be unlikely to receive reputational gains (although the policy may achieve its 
stated goals of razing economic inequalities).  
Third, through naturalization policies, the party can control to a certain extent the 
profile of new electors. By stipulating certain requirements for citizenship those foreigners 
who acquire citizenship are more likely to possess those qualities that make them more likely 
to vote for the center-right (such limited welfare reliance) and less likely to divide these 
parties’ coalition. As a result, this strategy minimizes the trade-off between current 
immigrants and future citizens of immigrant descent, as well as its core clientele and ethnic 
minority voters.  
IV. Observable Implications 
This chapter has presented a theoretical framework for explaining variation in center-
right party outreach strategies toward ethnic minorities in Western Europe since 1970. 
Instead of viewing all immigrants the same, center-right parties, I argue, make distinctions 
between those with citizenship and those without. Specifically, center-right parties recognize 
the difference between foreigners and citizens in their minority policy, and this difference 
drives their outreach strategies while also helping to explain puzzling party behavior.  
While explanations for center-right party strategy toward immigrants abound, the 
exigencies created by changes in the legal status, and thus electoral power, of members in 
this population call for a new theory. Where a portion of the immigrant population are 
citizens and thus may vote in national elections, center-right parties may adopt distinct 
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positions on immigration and integration policies based of their target population. As a result 
of these distinctions, center-right parties face two challenges, in the form of an immediate 
electoral trade-off and an intertemporal trade-off. The severity of these trade-offs, in turn, 
varies with the relative number of ethnic minorities with citizenship to those without. When 
party leaders perceive these changes, they may reassess their current strategy toward ethnic 
minorities versus alternatives, and also seek to shape the citizenship ratio itself so as to 
mitigate the trade-offs they face.  
If these propositions are correct, we should observe the following: 
1. While citizenship status matters for the cent-right, it does not for the center-left. It 
follows that center-right and center-left parties ought to respond differently to 
features of the ethnic minority population, namely the size of the foreigner population. 
While a larger foreigner population translates into more outreach by the center-left, it 
provokes less outreach by the center-right.  
2. The larger the ethnic minority population with citizenship, the more likely that center-
right parties engage in outreach. An increasing tendency by center-right core 
constituents to view immigration as a threat to national identity, the sharper the 
electoral trade-off – despite the presence of a large minority population with 
citizenship. In turn, these conditions translate into a higher probability of center-right 
parties adopting a dual strategy of exclusive stances toward foreigners and inclusive 
positions toward citizens. 
3. If party leaders view a dual strategy as entailing an intertemporal trade-off, not just a 
trade-off in the distribution of electoral support, then party deliberations should frame 
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the choice as one between expected near term vote share and the prospect of long-
term vote-share. 
4. Outreach is more likely when the citizenship ratio is larger. In particular, given the 
conditions under which party leaders will perceive changes in the ratio, we should 
observe the following. The sharper the change in naturalization rates, the more likely 
party leaders are to change outreach strategies. The more the change in the citizenship 
ratio is characterized by positive growth, the higher the likelihood that parties will 
adopt programmatic tactics in the aims of reshaping constituencies.  
Having formulated and specified a theory of center-right party outreach, in Chapter 3 
I test the theory’s empirical claims and implications. First, a thorough analysis of survey data 
supports the claim that center-left partisans hold consistent views on issues regarding 
minorities and immigrants, whereas the opinion structure of center-right partisans differs 
based on citizenship status. Second, I use evidence of party strategy toward ethnic minorities 
in six Western European countries from 1970 through 2010 to test the effect of changes in 
the citizenship ratio on the likelihood and choice in the form of outreach. I also measure the 
explanatory power of my model against that of competing explanations. These cross-
sectional time-series analysis confirm that changes in the composition of the ethnic minority 
population better accounts for intertemporal variation in center-right party strategy.
 
 
Chapter 3: An Analysis of Ethnic Minority Outreach in Western Europe 
The tumultuous relationship between ethnic minorities and center-right parties across 
Western Europe is particularly evident during election campaigns. Since 1970, center-right 
politicians have proven willing to pursue a strategy portraying ethnic minorities as enemies 
in one election and friends in the next. In party programs and stump speeches, they have 
championed the ethnic and cultural diversity ushered in by post-war migration, only to decry 
its debilitating effect on the nation in a subsequent election. For instance, in France, the 
Gaullist Rally for the Republic’s (RPR) party manifesto in 1986 stated in no uncertain terms: 
“Our country does not want to become a multicultural society.”30 In stark contrast, the 2007 
website for the center-right party’s presidential candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy, prefaced his 
support for affirmative action policies by declaring: “We will not understand difference as a 
risk, but as a chance” (Simon 2007, 157-158). In the Netherlands, the center-right People’s 
Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) pronounced in its 1981 party manifesto that it was 
the party’s “duty” to see that ethnic minority groups “are not disadvantaged and are able to 
develop their own character and culture.”31 Such support for multiculturalism waned over the 
years. In 2003, the party effectively swept away all remaining vestiges of its previous 
position by denouncing multiculturalism for its elements of western “self-hate” in its party 
program (van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008, 406). Similar variation populates the histories 
                                                
 
30 Rassemblement Pour La Republique. 1986. Le Renouveau. Pacte R.P.R. Pour La France (Synthese des 
Propositions). Paris: RPR. 
31 VVD. 1981. Liberaal Manifest. Den Haag.  
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of the British Conservatives, Danish Conservatives, German Christian Democrats, and 
Swedish Moderates.  
In Chapter 2, I advanced an explanation for this puzzling variation based on the 
challenges center-right parties confront when they engage in outreach, most notably a 
potential trade-off between ethnic minority and core voter support. The emergence of such a 
trade-off is contingent on the degree to which cultivating and emphasizing ethnic minorities’ 
interests conflicts with the party’s ideological identity. Through the long-standing 
constituency ties it produces, party identity limits center-right parties’ ability to target certain 
segments of the ethnic minority population. For these parties, appealing to those perceived 
outside the national community, particularly non-citizens, generates an inverse relationship 
between gains in ethnic minority votes and loss in core clientele support. Two powerful 
implications follow. First, party leaders recognize the difference between ethnic minorities 
with citizenship and those without both in their immigration and integration policies and 
electoral strategy. Second, a booming ethnic minority population does not necessarily 
translate into more outreach. Instead, it is the change in the relative number of ethnic 
minority citizens to non-citizens, or citizenship ratio, which accounts for the degree to which 
center-right parties reach out to ethnic minorities.   
The goal of this chapter is to test this theory’s empirical claims and its implications 
for the puzzle examined here: the variation in degree to which center-right parties appeal to 
ethnic minorities in their electoral campaigns. To this end, I leverage survey data to 
corroborate the theory’s empirical claims about the variation in partisan attitudes and policy 
orientations toward immigrants and minorities. I then identify two observational 
determinants consistent with the proposed attitudinal mechanism: the change in the 
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naturalization rate and the size of the foreigner population. Drawing on evidence from six 
Western European countries – Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the 
UK – from 1970 through 2010, I perform a series of cross-sectional time-series analyses of 
outreach to assess the impact of these two variables on the observed strategies of center-right 
parties. I test their strength against the competing explanations reviewed in Chapter 1: party 
competition, institutions, and sociological conditions.  
Three critical points emerge from this analysis. First, center-right partisans’ attitudes 
and policy orientations differ markedly from those of center-left supporters, most notably 
with respect to those policies assisting foreign nationals.32 Second, a series of cross-sectional 
time-series analyses of mainstream parties’ outreach strategies empirically substantiates the 
hypothesized heterogeneity in responses by the center-right and center-left to features of the 
ethnic minority population. Third, changes in minorities’ citizenship status wield a powerful 
effect on center-right party strategy across Western Europe, persisting despite differences in 
electoral institutions, economic conditions, threat posed by the radical right, and openness of 
the citizenship regime.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section I examines partisans’ attitudes toward 
ethnic minorities and immigrants using as evidence Eurobarometer, International Social 
Survey Programme, and European Social Survey data. Section II describes the 
operationalization of the dependent and independent variables to be included in the statistical 
analysis. Section III tests two of the theory’s implications, namely that mainstream parties 
respond differently to characteristics of the ethnic minority population, and changes in the 
                                                
 
32 For ease of exposition, I use the terms “foreigner”, and “foreign citizens” to refer to ethnic minority non-
citizens.  
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composition of the ethnic minority population account for intertemporal variation in center-
right party strategy.  
I. Partisan Opinion Toward Minorities and Immigrants 
The goal of this section is to evaluate the empirical support for the attitudinal 
assumptions undergirding the proposed theoretical framework. The particular features of core 
constituents’ beliefs and policy preferences are presumed to constrain a party’s range of 
strategic responses to ethnic minorities in a specific way. Out of fear of core voter 
retribution, center-right parties will forgo targeting particular social groups and issuing 
certain appeals. Otherwise, these parties confront an electoral trade-off between gains in 
ethnic minority votes and loss in core clientele support. Yet what accounts for the ways in 
which appealing to ethnic minorities jeopardizes core support? In Chapter 2, I propose that 
the emergence and severity of an electoral trade-off in center-right party strategy is a function 
of these parties’ historic association with the nation. Specifically, the threat ethnic minorities 
pose to national identity and culture determines the degree to which appealing to ethnic 
minorities threatens the party’s level of support among core constituents. To appeal groups 
perceived outside of the national community is to reduce the party’s existing support. Ethnic 
minority groups may acquire “outsider” status by virtue of their perceptual distinctiveness, 
their salience, or, most simply and critically, their citizenship status. Given their 
internationalist provenance, center-left party leaders do not face a citizen-versus-foreigner 
constraint when considering reaching out to ethnic minorities. Put differently, while center-
left party leaders may lose constituent support as a result of appealing to certain ethnic 
minority groups, it is not the legal status of the targeted constituency that causes these 
defections. This argument produces the following observable implications:  
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1. Preferences for cultural unity should be more prevalent among partisans of the center-
right than center-left.      
2. The presence of diversity should be more likely to trigger feelings of threat among 
partisans of the center-right than center-left.       
3. Center-right partisans should be less likely to support those government policies 
directed toward non-nationals than those toward ethnic minorities more broadly.  
4. Center-left party constituents should hold consistent attitudes on pertaining to ethnic 
minorities and immigrants, regardless of the citizenship status of the reference group.    
I examine public opinion data to assess the degree to which these theoretical 
expectations are borne out.  
Data 
I draw on multiple surveys conducted between 1988 and 2008 to ensure that any 
evidence consistent with the theory is not an artifact of a particular survey or the product of 
context-specific factors, but rather results from time-invariant features of party identity. The 
analysis that follows draws primarily from five public opinion surveys: Eurobarometer 30 
(1988), Eurobarometer 53 (2000), the 2003 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), 
the 2002 European Social Survey (ESS), and the 2008 European Social Survey (ESS). These 
surveys were chosen based on their inclusion of theoretically relevant items that allow for 
more precise distinctions to be made across a variety of different categories of out-groups 
(e.g., foreigners, immigrants, ethnic minorities, and religious minorities). The Eurobarometer 
surveys were chosen for their series of questions regarding respondents’ attitudes toward 
minorities, described to respondents as ‘people who live in (OUR COUNTRY)’ who ‘come 
from different races, religions or cultures’ and ‘form different groups of varying sizes which 
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are more or less homogenous’, and immigrants, or ‘people who have come to live in (OUR 
COUNTRY) and who are not citizens of a Member State of the European Union’ 
(Eurobarometer 2000, 13).33 The ISSP survey, in turn, provides leverage on the role of non-
legal of markers difference by asking questions regarding what it constitutes to be a member 
of the nation. The 2002 European Social Survey includes a host of questions on immigration 
and national identity, while the 2008 release includes questions about extending rights and 
benefits to resident non-nationals. 
Views on Cultural Diversity 
To assess the relative preference for cultural unity among mainstream party 
supporters, I draw on an item from 2002 ESS. Respondents were asked if they agreed or 
disagreed with this statement: ‘It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same 
customs and traditions’. The response categories range from 1 to 5, where 1 is ‘strongly 
agree’ and 5 is ‘strongly disagree’. Although a fair share of center-left partisans agrees with 
this statement (41 percent), support is much higher among supporters of the center-right. 
Nearly 55 percent of center-right party identifiers agree with this item, compared to 24 
percent who disagree and 20 percent who are ambivalent or do not know.34 The mean value 
is 2.55 for center-right partisans and 2.93 for center-left supporters (p<0.01) The results of 
the adjusted Wald test indicate that these means are not statistically equivalent. Table 3.1 
presents the distribution of responses by party family.   
 
                                                
 
33 Eurobarometer 30 described immigrants as ‘people living in (country) who are neither (nationality) nor 
citizens of the EEC’. 
34 All data presented in this analysis has been weighted. For this particular set of question from the 2002 ESS 
survey, I weigh the sample by calculating an adjustment weight, equal to the product of the design and 
population weights.  
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Table 3.1 Preferences for cultural unity  
 Better for country if everyone shares customs and traditions Center-Left Center-Right 
Agree strongly 11% 16% 
Agree 30 39 
Neither agree nor disagree 21 20 
Disagree 31 22 
Disagree strongly 7 2 
Mean 2.93*** 2.55*** 
Source: 2002 European Social Survey. Question: Please tell me how much you agree or with this statement. It is better for a 
country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions. Note: Only respondents in Denmark, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom were included in this analysis.  
 I corroborate this finding with two additional measures. Drawing on Eurobarometer 
53 (2002), I gauge the degree to which center-right voters view various categories of ethnic 
minorities as the ‘other.’ Respondents were asked the same question about a series of 
potential out-groups: ‘Do you personally find the presence of people of another nationality 
(race/religion) disturbing?’. Figure 3.1 displays the level of agreement by party family. While 
the share of both groups answering in the affirmative is relatively low, a higher proportion of 
center-right partisans than center-left report being unsettled by the presence of members of 
each category (p < 0.01). Interestingly, a greater proportion of center-right supporters 
consider people from another nation to be more disturbing than people of another race or 
religion.  
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Figure 3.1 Percentage that find the presence of other people disturbing 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 53 (2000). Note: Only includes respondents in Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Question: Some people are disturbed by the opinions, customs and way of life of people 
different from themselves. Do you personally find the presence of people of another nationality/race/religion disturbing? 
Second, I use data from the 2003 ISSP to assess the assumption that center-right 
partisans conceive of national belonging in cultural, as well as legal, terms. Respondents 
were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: ‘It is impossible 
for people who do not share (Country’s) customs and traditions to become fully (country 
nationality)’. While there is widespread support for this statement, the level of agreement 
among the center-right (69 percent) is striking. While a narrow majority (52 percent) of 
center-left voters embracing the same view, a full 17 percentage points separates the two 
groups (p < 0.01).   
Variation in Immigration and Race Policy Orientations by Party Family 
To interrogate partisans’ attitudes toward policies affecting immigrants and minorities, 
I begin by examining two questions posed in the Eurobarometer 30 (1988) survey. 







0 5 10 15 20
Center-Right
Center-Left
Other Nation Other Race Religion
 
  91 
restricted?’. Figure 3.2 displays the distribution of responses. The mean responses for the 
center-left and center-right differ at statistically significant level of p < 0.05. The plot below 
clearly shows that while most center-left respondents leaned toward extending the rights of 
non-EC citizens, their counterparts on the center-right were inclined toward restricting their 
rights.  
Figure 3.2 Extension of rights to non-EC immigrants 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 30 (1988). Note: Includes Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. Question: Talking about these people living in (country) who are neither (Nationality) nor citizens of the 
European Community, do you think we should…extend their rights, restrict their rights, or leave things as they are? 
 
In the same survey, respondents in all four of our six countries of interest were later 
asked to what degree they agreed with the following statement, ‘The government should 
improve the social and economic position of minorities living in our country’. The mean 
response for both center-left and center-right identifiers was ‘Agree Somewhat’. As of 1988, 
there is a divide in partisan policy orientation based on the target of government action, 
minorities or immigrants.  
The 2008 ESS poses a similar question, asking participants when they think 
immigrants should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens. 
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Respondents were given these options: immediately on arrival; after living in the country for 
a year, whether or not they have worked; only after they have worked and paid taxes for at 
least a year; once they have become a [country] citizen; they should never get the same rights. 
Figure 3.3 presents the distribution of responses by party family. While the median 
preference is the same across party family, namely to allocate these rights and benefits 
‘benefits after the individual has already paid at least one year’s worth of taxes’, the 
distribution of responses is not. Notably, the interquartile range of center-right opinion is 
tightly compressed, whereas the center-left’s range from ‘after a year, whether or not they 
have worked’ to ‘once they have become a citizen’.  
Figure 3.3 Extension of right to social benefits and services 
 
Source: 2008 European Social Survey. Note: Includes Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. 
Question: Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the 
same rights to social benefits as citizens already living here? 
To investigate whether there is a difference in the structure of policy attitudes by 
partisanship as this previous analysis suggests, I conduct an exploratory factor analysis 
(principle components factoring with oblique rotation) using data from Eurobarometer 53 
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directed toward resident non-nationals and ethnic minorities. Note that this wave uses the 
same definitions of  ‘minorities’ and ‘immigrants’ Eurobarometer 30 (1988) employs. 
Respondents were asked if they tended to agree or disagree with the following questions 
regarding policies toward minority groups: ‘The authorities should make efforts to improve 
the situation of people from these minority groups’; ‘When hiring personnel, employers 
should only take account of qualifications, regardless of the person’s race, religion or 
culture’; and ‘Discrimination in the job market on grounds of a person’s race, religion or 
culture should be outlawed’. Respondents were then asked about their level of agreement 
with the following statements regarding immigrants: ‘Legally established immigrants from 
outside the European Union should have the same social rights as the (NATIONALITY) 
citizens’, and ‘Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have 
the right to bring members of their immediate family in (OUR COUNTRY).’ Table 3.2 
displays the percentage of respondents who agree with the statement by party family.  
Table 3.2 Policy orientations by party family, % agree 





Government should improve minority groups’ situation 55% 51% 
Only qualifications should be considered in hiring decisions, not 
race, religion or culture  81 77 
Discrimination on grounds of race, religion or culture should be 
outlawed 74 69 
Legal immigrants should have right to bring in members of 
immediate family 35 30 
Legal immigrants who are not citizens should have same rights as 
citizens 61 37 
Source: Eurobarometer 53 (2000). Note: Only includes respondents in Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
The exploratory factory analysis by party family reveals differences in the structure of 
attitudes by party family. Among the center-right partisans, questions regarding legal foreign 
residents formed its own dimension only slightly related to the questions regarding cultural, 
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religious, and racial minorities. The results for the center-left indicate that there is one 
dimension underlying their attitudes toward both groups (see Table 3.3). In each analysis, the 
principal axis has an eigenvalue above one.  
Table 3.3 Exploratory factor analysis of policy orientations  
    Center-Left Center-Right 
  








s Authorities should make effort to improve their situation 0.63 0.57 0.15 
When hiring personnel, employers should only take 
account of qualifications, regardless of the person's race, 
religion or culture 
0.63 0.79 0.08 
Discrimination in the job market on grounds of a person's 






s Legally established immigrants from outside the European 
Union should have the same social rights as the 
(NATIONALITY) citizens 
0.72 0.29 0.71 
Legally established immigrants from outside the European 
Union should have the right to bring members of their 
immediate family in (OUR COUNTRY) 
0.60 -.01 0.87 
 N 1,469 865  
 Eigenvalue 2.16 1.70 1.30 
  Explained Variance 0.43 0.34 0.26 
  Cronbach's alpha 0.72 0.59 0.56 
Source: Eurobarometer 53 (2000). Note: Only includes respondents in Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
Thus, I find that there is an important difference in the structure of center-left and 
center-right partisans’ attitudes toward government action to help immigrants and minorities. 
While the former holds consistent attitudes regardless of the intended beneficiary, the latter 
group’s opinions do vary systematically on the basis of the intended beneficiary. The next 
step is to see whether these micro-foundations of divisiveness affect party strategies.  
II. An Analysis of Variation in Outreach Strategies  
Having found empirical support for these premises regarding partisan opinion, I turn 
to their implications for variation in party strategy across and within six Western European 
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countries over time. To this end, I develop models of outreach strategies that allow us to test 
heterogeneity in party responses to their environment, and assess the impact of the 
citizenship ratio on center-right party outreach against three other factors: party competition, 
sociological conditions, and institutions. I discuss these independent and dependent variables 
below.  
Dependent Variable: Mainstream Party Outreach 
Although researchers have examined center-right parties’ anti-immigrant strategies 
(e.g.,van Spanje 2010; Meguid 2008; Thränhardt 1995) and decisions to play the ‘race card’ 
(Vautier 2009; Saggar 1998a), these analyses rarely recognize these parties’ efforts to appeal 
to ethnic minority voters. Moreover, the handful of studies that do investigate the effort by 
the mainstream center-right to incorporate ethnic minorities into their support coalition all 
focus on a single party (see e.g., Saggar 1998b, 1992; Rich 1988; Geisser and Soum 2008), 
thus limiting our ability to understand the general factors, if any, responsible for center-right 
parties’ change in tack.  
By contrast, I adopt a statistical approach that facilitates comparative analysis of 
mainstream parties’ outreach efforts across a variety of institutional and competitive contexts. 
What these parties say and do matter. Defined by their electoral dominance of the right 
ideological bloc, mainstream center-right parties are frequent government actors with a 
sizeable electorate. The stronger of these parties typically have greater media access, 
facilitating the communication of their message to the wider electorate (Meguid 2008, 46). 
Their status as governmental players means their programmatic stances may affect those of 
smaller parties jockeying to enter government. As a result, mainstream center-right parties 
are able to set the contours of public debate, influence individuals’ perceptions of minorities, 
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and shape how diversity is perceived. In fact, empirical analyses of public opinion toward 
immigrants attest to the powerful effect of situational triggers in translating the presence of 
diversity into feelings of threat (Hopkins 2010; Sniderman et al. 2004). The parties found 
most influential in stoking exclusionary reactions to immigrant minorities are not the 
incendiary radical-right but rather their staid, mainstream opponents (Bohman 2012; 
Helbling et al. 2011; Hopkins 2010; McLaren 2001).  
The analysis that follows includes variation in outreach strategies across six Western 
European countries and 130 national elections. Not only does this case selection provide 
maximum temporal and spatial variation the dependent variable – inclusive stances toward 
ethnic minorities – but also supplies variance on key environmental factors. The proportion 
of ethnic minorities with citizenship is high in the UK and the Netherlands, medium in 
France and Germany, and low in Denmark and Sweden. The electoral formulas in place 
range from majoritarian - France, Great Britain - to mixed - Germany - to proportional - 
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden.  
There is also temporal and spatial variation in the presence and electoral strength of 
radical right parties. In the Netherlands, the radical right competed at the national level since 
the early 1980s, even entering parliament in 1982, but it only truly became a political force in 
2002. By the same token, in 1994, the Danish radical right solidified its status as a major 
political actor after languishing in the background for more than a decade. The Swedish 
radical right broke through nationally in 1991, and its fortunes have since then vacillated 
wildly. Conversely, the radical right has largely been a non-issue in national politics for the 
German and British mainstream center-right, while its shadow has continuously loomed large 
over the French electoral landscape. This case selection thus allows us to account for 
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alternative explanations that privilege certain environmental features and competitive 
exigencies in addition to the theory advanced here. Table 3.4 summarizes the discussion 
above.  
Table 3.4 Case selection 









(% of Pop.) 
 1970 1980 1990 2000   2002 2008 
DK 11 6.6 7.6 13.0 8.8 PR 2.5 3.1 
FR 0.4 6.6 13.7 0.4 1.2 Majoritarian 4 4.1 
DE 0 0 3.2 0 1 Mixed 4.3 4.7 
NL 0 0.6 1.6 0 150 PR 4.8 6.7 
SE 0 0 2.6 0 11.2 PR 2.9 3.1 
UK 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.3 1 Majoritarian 6.5 7.9 
1Measured as vote share in national elections. Source: parties-and-elections.de 2 Measured as proportion of the population, 
aged 15 and older. Ethnic minorities with citizenship comprise first-generation migrants and second-generation migrant-
origin individuals from non-EU countries (Maxwell 2010). Source: European Social Survey 2002, 2008. 
I selected the mainstream parties from each country on the basis of their positions on 
the Left-Right ideological axis. Based on the expert survey party classification from Castles 
and Mair (1984, 83), I defined mainstream parties of the center-left as those parties with 
scores of 1.25 to 3.75 on a scale of 0 to 10. Their counterparts to the right are those parties 
with positions between 6.25 and 8.75. This procedure is consistent with Meguid (2005, 2008). 
Where more than one party met the same criterion in a given country, I chose the party with 
the highest electoral average from 1970 to 2010, and, using the secondary literature, strongest 
link to the nation. Thus, the Conservative People’s Party and the Moderates constitute the 
center-right as opposed to the Liberals in Denmark and Sweden, respectively. Table 3.5 
presents the mainstream parties included in this empirical analysis.  
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Table 3.5 Mainstream parties in analysis 
  Country Center-Left Center-Right 
Denmark SD KF 
France PS RPR/UMP 
Germany SPD CDU 
Netherlands PvdA VVD 
Sweden SAP M 
United Kingdom Labour Conservative 
Sources: Meguid (2005, 2008); Castles and Mair (1984). 
The next task is to measure these parties’ appeals during political campaigns, that is, 
the extent to which they engage in outreach as a short-term, electoral strategy. There are a 
variety of methods by which parties may appeal to a potential constituency. Empirically, the 
ways in which these parties have sought ethnic minority support are so diverse that they are 
difficult to operationalize. Party collaborations with community organizations, visits to areas 
with a high concentration of ethnic minorities, and features of diverse images in campaign 
materials all signal that the party welcomes ethnic minority support.  
Yet one method common to all parties is appealing to ethnic minorities in party 
manifestos. I thereby generate a standard indicator of mainstream parties’ positions toward 
ethnic minorities using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Volkens et al. 
2012; Klingemann 2006; Budge et al. 2001).35 These data use election manifestos published 
in the context of national election campaigns to code a party’s emphasis and positions on 56 
issues.36 The total number of manifesto sentences dedicated to each category is recorded as 
percentage of the total number of sentences in the manifesto.  
                                                
 
35 To maximize the number of observations, I include data from the 1968 national election in Sweden and the 
1969 election in the Federal Republic of Germany.  
36 With the exception of one issue category, ‘economic goals’, all categories allow for positional interpretation, 
with some divided into negative and positive formulation (Alonso and da Fonseca 2009, 8).  
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There are two key advantages to measuring party strategy with CMP data versus 
alternative sources, particularly those based on expert surveys. First, these data provide 
information for every mainstream party in the post-war period, whereas expert surveys are 
conducted less frequently. The extended scope of these data facilitates temporal analysis, 
which is critical to testing the theory’s central hypotheses. Second, this dataset includes 
theoretically relevant categories for our analysis by disaggregating the set of issues 
commonly subsumed by a higher-order ‘immigration’ or ‘immigrant integration’ category. 
Often, experts are asked to identify a party’s position on  ‘immigration issues’ as reflected by 
its positions on immigration control, or the regulation of the actual number of admissions 
(Money 1999). Scholars have then used these scores to measure a party’s position on 
integration and cultural diversity (see e.g., Van Spanje 2010). Yet in other expert datasets, 
the questionnaire employs such general language that the set of policies informing expert 
judgments remains unclear. For instance, one survey asked experts to place parties on a scale 
concerning “the programmes of the parties towards the immigration issue, which runs from 
not very restrictive concerning immigration (0) to very restrictive” (Lubbers 2001, 10). Later 
these data were presented as representing a party’s stance toward multiculturalism, a policy 
area concerned with the extension of cultural group recognition and rights to ethnic 
minorities (see e.g.,Van Spanje 2010). 
These data are not perfect. Critics challenge the use party programs to measure parties’ 
positions, charging voters rarely consult them (e.g., Kriesi et al. 2008). Others point to the 
lack of any measurement of uncertainty that accompanies these estimates of policy emphasis 
(Benoit and Laver 2007). Researchers are unable to distinguish between measurement error 
and real differences in policy positions (e.g., Benoit et al. 2009). Critical to this analysis, no 
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category directly measures a party’s position on immigration restrictions. As a result, the 
empirical investigation that follows only tests among potential determinants of adopting an 
inclusive stance on issues of diversity and favorable mentions toward ethnic minorities, 
leaving questions regarding the implementation of a dual strategy unanswered.  
To mitigate these shortcomings, I employ a measure of outreach consistent with 
dominant approaches in the literature (Helbling et al. 2011; Alonso and da Fonseca 2009, 
Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008). I construct an outreach indicator based on four coding 
categories that either address issues of cultural diversity linked to immigration or directly 
appeal to ethnic minorities.37 The four categories include two positive mentions – support for 
multiculturalism (variable 607) and favorable references to underprivileged minority groups 
(variable 705) – and two negative mentions – opposition to multiculturalism (variable 608) 
and support for a national(istic) way of life (variable 601).38  
My approach departs from Arzheimer and Carter (2006), Helbling et al. (2011), and 
Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008) in two respects. First, I exclude the category ‘support 
for law and order’ (variable 605) given that in addition to capturing immigration-related 
positions, it also includes issues with little or no connection to the immigration issue, such as 
funding police forces. Including this category in the measure would disproportionately 
depress parties’ outreach efforts (Alonso and da Fonseca 2009). Second, this measure omits 
‘national way of life: negative’ (variable 602). Theoretically, we would expect very few 
                                                
 
37 To ensure the validity of this measure, I checked the trajectory of the constructed indicator variable against 
contemporary news sources and secondary literature. It appears to capture whether or not the party did reach out 
to ethnic minorities, and the general level of its efforts.  
38 While underprivileged minorities also include the handicapped and homosexuals, Alonso and da Fonseca’s 
(2009) review of the coded manifestos and conversations with the CMP’s lead investigator confirm that the two 
most mentioned groups are immigrants and the handicapped (10).  
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mainstream parties to include statements in their manifestos ‘against patriotism and/or 
nationalism; opposition to the national state’ and voicing opposition to established national 
ideas. Empirically, the data supports this intuition. The mean difference between the support 
and opposition for national way of life was 0.12. Out of 148 observations, only in 12 
instances would the inclusion of the category ‘national way of life: negative’ alter a party’s 
position on the positive formulation of this issue.  
Researchers typically use these categories to construct a party’s position score, 
measured as the relative balance of pro and con text units, taken as proportion of all text units 
on the relevant subjects (Laver and Garry 2000, 628). While this operationalization does not 
capture the amount of emphasis a party placed on an issue, that is, its salience, it is 
independent of manifesto length, a bias introduced by most salience scores. To calculate this 
score, the difference between positive and negative mentions is divided by the sum of 
positive and negative mentions on the subject (Ray 2007, 16; see also Marks et al. 2007, 24). 
This score ranges from -1 – solely negative mentions or an entirely exclusive position – to 1 – 
purely positive mentions or an inclusive position. The position score is the dependent 
variable for the following analysis. 
Equation 3.1 
Position Score = (%  𝐏𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞  𝐒𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐬  !  %  𝐍𝐞𝐠𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞  𝐒𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐬)  
(%  𝐏𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞  𝐒𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐬!  %  𝐍𝐞𝐠𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞  𝐒𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐬)  
 
Figure 3.4 presents the trajectory of outreach strategy as measured by the salience 
score for the center-left and center-right parties included in this analysis. Consistent with the 
argument that the center-left seeks ethnic minority votes, the average position score for the 
center-left is higher than that of the center-right in all six countries. Yet there are instances 
when the center-right adopts a more inclusive position than the center-left, which contradicts 
the even stronger statement that it is always the center-left that pursue this strategy. These 
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graphs show that there is enough variation in the position of the center-right across time and 
space to warrant explanation. 
Figure 3.4 Position score of mainstream party outreach toward ethnic minorities, 1970-2010 
 
Source: Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2012). 
Independent Variables 
What factors affect the degree to which center-right parties stake inclusive positions 
toward ethnic minorities in an effort to win their votes? I begin by reviewing the two 
variables of interest for the theory advanced here, the change in the naturalization rate and 
the foreign population as a proportion of the total population. I then turn to existing 
explanations of a mainstream party’s choice to adopt inclusive or exclusive positions toward 
ethnic minorities and cultural diversity, and the three sets of variables they emphasize: party 
competition, sociological conditions, and institutions.  
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Features of the Ethnic Minority Population  
The argument of this dissertation is that the distinction between citizens and non-
citizens drives center-right parties’ positions on immigrant and minority policies and their 
outreach strategies. This constraint on the range of potential strategies is the product of party 
identity and the constituency it has established. Specifically, core voters’ distinct views and 
policy orientations toward minorities with citizenship and those without limit center-right 
parties from promoting the interests of non-citizens in an effort to cultivate their support. As 
our prior review of public opinion data demonstrates, center-left partisans do not make such 
distinctions. The center-left thus does not confront a citizen-foreigner trade-off.  
By specifying the constraints on center-right party outreach and their provenance, we 
are able to ascertain the specific factor accounting for variation in center-right party outreach 
strategy, and the feature of the ethnic minority population that will promote different 
responses by mainstream parties of the center-left and center-right. The central hypothesis is 
that changes in the citizenship ratio, the number of ethnic minorities with citizenship relative 
to those without, substantially affect center-right parties' outreach strategies. After all, growth 
in the number of eligible voters renders outreach a more attractive strategy than it was 
previously, and vice-versa.  
Given the attitudes and policy orientations among their core supporters, it follows that 
parties of the center-left and center-right ought to respond differently to the prevalence of 
foreigners, and changes in the citizenship ratio. First, the presence of a sizable foreigner 
population ought to provide incentives for the center-left to issue more inclusive appeals and 
the center-right to be less inclusive, even becoming exclusionary. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
ethnic minorities without citizenship tend to be less well integrated than those with 
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citizenship. Most countries require a minimum of five years residence and competency in the 
host language in order to become naturalized. Naturalized citizens tend to have better 
command of the host-country language, have higher socio-economic status, and are more 
accepted by their fellow citizens (see, e.g., OECD 2010; Howard 2009, 7-8; Hansen 1998; 
Bratsberg et al. 2002). Crucially, they also have the right to vote in national elections. For 
center-right partisans, a sizeable foreign population will likely evoke the specter of an alien 
“other” threatening the nation’s way of life and identity, thereby raising the costs of outreach 
for the center-right without any compensation by way of votes.  
Second, the direction and magnitude of change in the citizenship ratio over a discrete 
time period produce slightly different strategic responses from the center-right and center-left. 
For the center-right, the direction in which the ratio is moving reveals how many ethnic 
minorities may soon enter the electorate, with discontinuities providing the external stimuli 
that actors are able to perceive to initiate a change in party strategy (Harmel and Janda 1994; 
Deschouwer 1992). Not only would a sharp bump in the number of citizens indicate that 
there are more votes for the party to win, but, as argued in Chapter 2, is more likely that 
seismic shifts in citizenship acquisitions, not incremental gains, would garner party leaders’ 
attention. We thus expect larger changes in the number of citizens to foreigners are more 
likely to prompt center-right parties’ to adopt increasingly inclusive or exclusive positions 
toward ethnic minorities.  
Changes in the citizenship ratio have less clear implications for the center-left. Both 
the growth in the foreigner population and pool of naturalized citizens generate incentives for 
center-left parties to appeal to ethnic minorities. Disregarding the other conditions that raise 
the costs of outreach for center-left, we should expect center-left parties to select less 
 
  105 
inclusive positions in response to changes in the citizenship ratio only when both decreases in 
the number of naturalizations and the foreigner population are driving the ratio’s trajectory. 
Having identified the theory’s observable causal factors and their expected relationship to 
outreach, I turn to their measurement. 
CHANGE IN NATURALIZATION RATES. As argued in Chapter 2, the citizenship ratio’s 
variation is largely a product of elements: citizenship acquisitions and net migration. The key 
indicator of the change in the citizenship ratio is thus the naturalization rate: the relative 
number of citizenship acquisitions at the end of year t to foreigners at the beginning of year 
t.3940 Specifically, I use the change in the naturalization rate as a proxy for shifts in the 
citizenship ratio, measured as the difference between the naturalization rate at the end of the 
current election year and the previous year. Note that this variable is not a demographic 
feature, but rather a part of the institutional environment as both access to citizenship and 
grounds of entry, residence, and expulsion are within the purview of the state (Coleman 
2009; Howard 2009). 
                                                
 
39 Scholars have also used the saliency score to operationalize parties’ positions on a variety of dimensions. The 
saliency score comprises the percentage of positive statements to negative statements, and is measured by 
subtracting the total negative statements from the positive statements. This variable ranges from -100, 
representing manifestos exclusively dedicated to anti-immigrant issues, to 100, representing those exclusively 
dedicated to pro-immigrant issues. This operationalization has two shortcomings. First, it is sensitive to the 
length of the entire manifesto as these numbers represent the percentage of all manifesto sentences dedicated to 
the issue in question. Two parties devoting the same number of sentences to minority issues may receive 
different scores if one manifesto is longer. Second, it does not distinguish between manifestos failing to 
reference these issues and those that make an equal number of positive and negative mentions. The two would 
both receive a saliency score of zero. For these reasons, I have chosen to use the position score as my dependent 
variable. That said, the results that follow are models using the saliency score as the dependent variable. The 
consistency in findings is unsurprising given the strength of the empirical association between the saliency and 
positions scores (r = 0.77, p<0.01). 
40 In contrast, the ratio’s other constituent components – maturation of immigration process, status as a former 
colonial power, and foreign nationals’ access to social and political rights – only account for broad cross-
national differences in the size of the ratio (see e.g.,Coleman 2009).  
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Measures of citizenship acquisition, or the citizenship status of the foreigner 
population more generally, are absent from the statistical models analyzing party competition 
and immigration. To my knowledge, this study is the first to use a quantitative indicator of 
citizenship status to help account for parties’ positions on cultural diversity over a significant 
time span and across a large number of countries. These data are often excluded for two 
reasons. First, they are difficult to attain. Most cross-national datasets compiling these data, 
such as Eurostat, extend only for ten or twenty years. One must reference annual statistical 
yearbooks to gather most data prior to 1990. Second, these data are generated by national 
immigration rules and thus are not comparable (Coleman 2008). The quality of these data is 
also variable.   
I compensate for these deficiencies by gathering data produced by each country’s 
statistical body for the year in question, taking care to exclude those citizenship acquisitions 
due to adoption or to children of co-nationals born abroad.41 Although the methods by which 
countries attribute citizenship vary cross-nationally, this theory does not depend on the 
objective change in the ethnic minority population. Instead, what matters for the explanation 
presented here are party elites’ perceptions of the evolution in the ethnic minority population, 
measured and understood in categories relevant to them. Moreover, by using national 
statistical yearbooks as the source of my data, I capture the data available to elites at the time 
they make their strategic choices. This approach renders moot concerns about the accuracy of 
the data given that elites would reference these very data when seeking information on the 
                                                
 
41 In the West German case, the data provided by the national statistics institutes allows us to distinguish the 
number of citizenship acquisitions made by ethnic Germans Aussiedler. Given that the naturalization of ethnic 
Germans generates very different strategic considerations (see e.g.,Thränhardt 2002), and their inclusion in the 
naturalization rate distorts the actual pace by which the remaining Ausländer entered the electorate, the 
naturalization rate excludes those acquisitions from 1968 through 1999 and ex lege acquisitions since 2000.   
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demographic profile of the immigrant population, and they would be unlikely to be aware of 
these errors.  
For example, to identify the number of citizenship acquisitions in the Netherlands in 
1982, I reference Statistich zakboek 1984, the Dutch statistical yearbook published in 1983. 
These data indicate that as of January 1982, the resident foreign national population in the 
Netherlands numbered 537,600. At the end of 1982, 1,5310 individuals acquired Dutch 
citizenship, representing a naturalization rate of 2.85 (Centraal Bureau Voor De Statistiek 
1984). The naturalization rate for each country from 1970 through 2010 is presented in 
Figure 3.5. These graphs reveal that the naturalization rate and its change over a single year 
are highly variable.  
Figure 3.5 Naturalization Rate by Country, 1970 – 2010 
 
 
  108 
One potential criticism of this measure is that it may not accurately reflect ethnic 
minorities’ naturalization rates, but rather those of Western immigrants. While statistical 
bureaus often provide statistics on the previous nationality of individuals acquiring 
citizenship, they vary in their comprehensiveness. As a result, the rate of non-Western 
naturalization could not be consistently calculated. Figure 3.6 displays the total number of 
citizenship acquisitions in a year by foreigners of Western and non-Western origin.42 With 
the exception of Sweden, which experienced a good deal of Western naturalizations up until 
the mid-1980s, non-Western immigrants have represented a great deal more of the 
citizenship acquisitions in a given state than Western immigrants.  




                                                
 
42 “Western” countries comprise all OECD member-states; all other states are “non-Western.” 
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PERCENT FOREIGN. A key source of heterogeneity in party responses to features of the 
ethnic minority population is the response the prevalence of foreigners. To assess the degree 
to which center-right and center-left parties respond differently to the ethnic minority 
population on the basis of its legal status, I include the variable, the foreign population as a 
percentage of the total population. For the center-left, foreigners represent a pool of potential 
voters; their presence increases the payoffs associated with outreach. For the center-right, the 
presence of a large population of immigrants, who are visibly different in appearance, 
customs, and values, raise the costs of outreach by heightening the sense of threat that 
immigrants and their descendants pose to core constituents’ perception of the nation (Sides 
and Citrin 2007). According to the theory, this feature of the sociological environment should 
be positively correlated with outreach by the center-left and negatively associated with 
efforts by the center-right. This measure is the common operationalization of the immigrant 
population in empirical analyses of anti-immigration party support. Statistical yearbooks 
were also the source for this data. 
Sociological Conditions  
The vast literature on xenophobic politics has long sought to identify the conditions 
under which ethnic intolerance swells and the ‘demand’ for xenophobic politics emerges (see 
Mudde 2007 for a review). The dominant socio-structural explanations invoke economic and 
demographic conditions to explain widespread anti-immigrant sentiment. In particular, a 
society’s economic health and the prevalence of immigrants serve as key explanatory 
variables for the emergence or salience of anti-immigrant parties and politics (Givens 2005; 
Golder 2003; Swank and Betz 2003; Zimmerman 2003; Weyland 1999).  
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Grim economic conditions act to stimulate demand for anti-immigrant politics by 
generating conflict between natives and immigrants over resources, and facilitating the 
success of radical right parties. The first consequence is most likely to affect the center-left 
given the socio-economic composition of their electorate. Their voters are most likely to be 
competing with immigrants and minorities for low-wage jobs. The center-right will acutely 
experience the indirect effect of poor economic conditions, namely the success of the radical 
right (though see Ivarsflaten 2005). Thus, the general theoretical expectation is that 
mainstream parties will be more likely to adopt exclusionary positions toward immigrants 
during times of high unemployment and/or economic shrinkage, but for different reasons.  
Conversely, there are theoretical reasons to believe that during times of economic 
expansion center-right parties will be more likely to adopt inclusive stances toward ethnic 
minorities on the prodding of one of its key internal constituents, business. Neoclassical trade 
theory, when applied to immigration, suggests that economic expansion stimulates demand 
for immigrant labor, all other things held equal (Simon 1989). Businesses may pressure the 
center-right to be more inclusive to ethnic minorities to render the environment more 
receptive to increased migrant inflow. Alternatively, they may lobby for the center-right to be 
more inclusive to ethnic minorities to alter perceptions that the country is unwelcoming to 
immigrant minorities, a reputation that may deter the inflow of labor, especially of the high-
skilled type. For these reasons, we may expect higher levels of GDP to translate into more 
outreach by the center-right.  
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. Consistent with the literature on radical right parties (see e.g., 
Golder 2003; Jackman and Volpert 1996), I use the current level of GDP per capita and the 
current unemployment rate in a given election year to measure the state of the economy. GDP 
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per capita is reported at current purchasing power parity (PPP) in thousands of U.S. dollars, 
and, along with the unemployment rate, was obtained from the OECD statistical library.  
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND PERCENT FOREIGN. While the number of foreigners has 
long been predicted to influence the support for radical right parties, and by extension, anti-
immigrant politics, some claim that this relationship is contingent on the unemployment rate 
(Golder 2003). To account for this hypothesis, I interact percent foreign with the 
unemployment rate. 
Party Competition  
Characteristics of party competition are frequently touted as the principal determinant 
of center-right parties’ positioning on immigration and integration issues (e.g.,van Spanje 
2010; Norris 2005; Betz 2002). In response to a radical right threat, center-right parties shift 
to the right (Bale 2003; Norris 2005; Pettigrew 1998), and co-opt the neophyte’s positions 
and rhetoric to prevent voter defection (Minkenberg 2002; Downs 2001; Schain 1987). 
Proponents of this approach posit that the size of this effect is contingent on the electoral 
system, with higher district magnitude translating into greater potential to alter electoral 
outcomes (Golder 2003). Moreover, a party’s vulnerability to radical right influence is a 
function of its position on the left-right ideological continuum, with those further to the right 
most likely to react quickly and decisively so as to prevent voter flight (van Spanje 2010).  
RADICAL RIGHT THREAT. The radical right’s ability to exert this influence is 
conditional on its vote share (van Spanje 2010; Golder 2003). As a radical right party’s 
electoral performance improves, the literature predicts that the mainstream right will eschew 
appealing to the center and draw closer to its competitor. To test this hypothesis, I employ 
two measures of radical right influence: its vote share, lagged, and its current vote share. I 
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also interact the log of the median district with the vote share of the radical right to account 
for the proposed conditionality of its influence (Meguid 2008, 2005; Golder 2003). The 
expectation is that the radical right party’s vote share and consequent influence is positively 
correlated with district magnitude, with the marginal effect decreasing as the district 
magnitude becomes large.  
ELECTORAL SAFETY. To assess a party’s strategic flexibility, I also include the 
mainstream party’s vote share from the previous election. The prolific literature on political 
parties and elections posits that parties enjoying high vote share are able to engage in riskier 
strategies (e.g., Jacobs 2011; Garrett 1993; Keeler 1993). The extra votes provide parties 
with an electoral safety net, insulating them from electoral punishment. According to this 
argument, higher levels of previous vote share should facilitate center-right parties to adopt 
increasingly inclusive positions toward ethnic minorities.   
Institutions  
Electoral rules should exert an independent effect on party strategy toward ethnic 
minorities, particularly in its ability to the incentivize elites to construct broad coalitions, or 
mobilize select segments of the electorate. As discussed more fully in Chapter 1, the 
proportionality of the electoral system influences whether party leaders choose to adopt a 
persuasion strategy, or develop moderate programs aimed at attracting the greatest number of 
voters, or a mobilization strategy, or offer extreme programs that appeal to core constituents 
(Cox 2005). Chapter 1 also demonstrated that ethnic minorities do not constitute a “natural” 
center-right constituency; therefore, center-right party outreach constitutes a form of 
persuasion. When there are many seats to attain and they are allocated proportionally, parties 
only have to acquire small vote shares to win representation. They may then carve out 
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ideological niches and still gain representation. When parties vie for a single seat that is 
given to the plurality winner, they may win seats only if they can amass the largest shares of 
votes. For this reason, first-past-the-post (SMD) electoral systems are thought to facilitate the 
incorporation of immigrant groups in particular, as both parties seek to increase the size of 
their coalitions in order to win legislative representation (e.g., Dahl 1967; Holden 1966; 
Schattschneider 1942). 
Literature on the political incorporation of immigrants and their descendants in 
Western Europe have pointed to the openness of the citizenship regime to explain the 
willingness of mainstream parties to mobilize minority populations (e.g., da Fonseca 2011; 
Bird 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005). According to this view, party strategies may also be 
constrained by existing configurations of nationhood and citizenship. For instance, national 
citizenship regimes – defined as the institutions relating to the acquisition and expression of 
citizenship – are thought to shape popular attitudes toward ethnic minorities (Weldon 2006), 
and the type of identities ascribed to immigrants and their descendants (e.g., racial identities, 
ethnic and national identities, or policy-status identifiers) (Koopmans et al. 2005). One 
important measure is the legal requirements for citizenship and the degree to which they 
make it easy or difficult to acquire citizenship (e.g., Howard 2009; Koopmans et al. 2005). 
The easier it is to transform immigrants into citizens, the more likely center-right parties will 
have a constituency of large enough size to warrant attention, and the more inclusive their 
campaigns.  
ELECTORAL RULES. To account for the institutional incentives for elites to brandish 
broad, inclusive appeals or mobilize core clientele, scholars include in their statistical models 
the logged magnitude of the median legislator’s district. District magnitude is the critical 
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determinant in setting the level of proportionality. The more deputies that are to be elected in 
the district, the smaller the percentage of the vote that is necessary to win at least one more 
seat. These theories broadly predict that in proportional systems we should not see outreach 
whereas in majoritarian systems we should.  
CITIZENSHIP REGIME. The ease with which foreign residents can become citizens is 
hypothesized to affect political parties’ incentives to appeal to ethnic minorities (da Fonseca 
2011; Bird 2005). Where there are fewer obstacles to attaining citizenship, immigrants enjoy 
easy access to citizenship, and, crucially, national voting rights. I employ Howard’s (2009) 
citizenship policy index (CPI) to test if outreach strategy is affected by the degree to which 
countries are “liberal”, “medium” or “restrictive” in their granting of citizenship, measured 
on a scale of 0 (restrictive) to 6 (liberal).43 Each country receives a score for the set of 
policies in place during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Given that many citizenship policies 
did not begin to change until 1980 (Howard 2009), I apply the 1980 score to characterize the 
citizenship regime during the 1970s. Higher values on the citizenship policy index should 
translate into more positive positions toward ethnic minorities. This argument will most 
likely explain cross-national variation, although it may also provide leverage on temporal 
variation when citizenship policy has undergone substantial change. These hypotheses are 
summarized below in Table 3.6.  
  
                                                
 
43 Classification is calculated by summing these three components: attribution of jus soli, coded as 0 (not 
allowed) or 2 (allowed); residency requirements for naturalization, coded as 0 (at least 10 years), 1 (6–9 years), 
and 2 (5 years or less); and acceptance of dual citizenship for immigrants, coded as either 0 (naturalized citizens 
must relinquish their prior citizenship) or 2 (naturalized immigrants can retain their previous citizenship) 
(Howard 2006, 452).  
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Table 3.6 Independent variables and predicted effect on center-right outreach 
Class of Explanation Predicted Sign 
Ethnic Minority Population  
% Foreign - 
Change in Naturalization Rate + 
Sociological Conditions  
GDP + 
Unemployment - 
% Foreign x Unemployment - 
Party Competition  
Radical Right Vote Share - 
Radical Right Vote Share x District Magnitude - 
Mainstream Vote Share, Lagged + 
Institutions  
Log of Median District Magnitude - 
Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) + 
III. Models and Analyses 
I employ pooled cross-sectional time series (TSCS) analysis to assess the 
determinants of party outreach. To test statistically the claim that center-left and center-right 
parties respond differently to environmental, institutional, and competitive conditions, I 
estimate a fully interactive pooled-sample regression (Kam 2009; Kam and Franzese 2007). 
In each model, I interact the key independent variables with a Center-Left dummy, coded 0 
for parties of the center-right and 1 for those of the center-left, and check for party family 
heterogeneity via a simple t-test on the interaction terms (Kam 2009, 610). 
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Additionally, all models include a lagged dependent variable, trend variables by 
decade, panel-corrected standard errors, and country dummy variables (Wilson and Butler 
2007; Beck and Katz 1995, 1996). I take each in turn. First, it turns out that there is first-
order autocorrelation in each of my analyses, and so in each I have included lags of the 
dependent variable. Subsequent tests for serially correlated errors via the TSCS analogue of 
the standard Lagrange multiplier test show that the lagged dependent variable solved the 
problem (Wilson and Butler 2007). Second, each model comprises decade dummy variables 
to control for common effects in each decade, such as the oil shock in the 1970s that resulted 
in Germany, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and France ending or sharply reducing labor 
migration (Hansen 2003, 26). The decade dummy for the 2000s is the reference category 
against which other decade effects are compared, and thus is dropped in each case. I employ 
panel-corrected standard errors to account for contemporaneously correlated and panel 
heteroskedastic errors (Beck and Katz 1995, 1996). Finally, I include country dummy 
variables to minimize country-level heteroskedasticity and to account for unobserved 
country-level features, such as the distribution of voters’ preferences on the policy space.44 
The results of F-tests indicate that fixed-effects are appropriate for these data. The country 
dummy for France is dropped in each case. 
The analysis of outreach proceeds as follows. Model 1 tests the heterogeneity of 
center-left and center-right parties’ responses to characteristics of the ethnic minority 
                                                
 
44 Fixed-effects models cannot be used to investigate time-invariant causes of the dependent variables. 
Technically, those country-level features that remain unchanged over time are perfectly collinear with the 
dummies (Kohler and Kreuter 2009, 245). While a fixed effects model is an appropriate estimation strategy for 
reasons both theoretical – my primary variable of interest is the effect of the changing naturalization rate within 
units – and empirical – my errors are not correlated with my regressors - this method is ill suited for estimating 
the independent effect of average district magnitude. For this reason, the effect of the electoral formula is 
analyzed through its intervening effect on radical right party strength.   
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population, and Model 2 gauges the effect of sociological variables. I incorporate party 
competition variables in Models 3 and 4, while Models 5 and 6 assess the impact of 
institutional features. Model 7 incorporates variables from each class of explanation, and is 
represented by Equation 3.2 below. 
Equation 3.2 
Outreachi,t = β0 + β1CL + β1Outreachi,t-1 + β2(CL*Outreach)i,t-1  + β3∆ in Nat. Ratei, t 
+ β4(CL*∆ in Nat.Rate) i,t + β5%Foreigni,t + β6(CL*%Foreign)i,t 
+ β7Unemploymenti,t + β8(CL*Unemployment)i,t + β9Vote Sharei,t-1 
+ β10(CL*Vote Share) i,t-1+ β11Log Med. Districti, t+ β12(CL*Log Med.  
District)i,t+ β13Radical Right Votei,t-1 + β14(CL*Radical Right Vote)i,t-1     
+ β14(Log Median District*Radical Right Vote)i,t-1   
+ β15(CL*Log Median District*Radical Right Vote)i,t-1 
+ β16Citizenship Policy Indexi,t + β17(CL*Citizenship Policy Index)i,t 
+ β18-28COUNTRY DUMMIESi,t + β29-35DECADE DUMMIESi, t + εi,t. 
Results 
The results for the models testing the heterogeneous response and sociological 
hypotheses are presented in Table 3.7. The former model comprises Change in the 
Naturalization Rate and Percent Foreign, while the latter adds GDP, Unemployment, and an 
interaction between Percent Foreign and Unemployment. It is immediately evident that 
center-left and center-right parties will engage in outreach on the basis of different indicators. 
The coefficient on Change in the Naturalization Rate, the primary variable of interest, is 
significant and positive in both models. Specifically, it is 0.22 in both Model 1 and in the 
sociological model, Model 2; both coefficients have a p-value 0.00 (can reject the null). 
These results suggest that for the center-right, increases in the citizenship ratio correspond 
with more inclusive positions toward ethnic minorities. By contrast, center-left parties’ 
positions toward ethnic minorities rely significantly less on changes in the naturalization rate 
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(as demonstrated by the significant interaction between Center-Left and Change in the 
Naturalization Rate in both models). The size of the coefficient for the center-left in Model 1 
is 0.05 with a p-value of 0.15 (cannot reject the null), and 0.07 with a p-value of 0.07 in 
Model 2.45 
Turning to the size of the foreign population as a percentage of the national 
population, Percent Foreign, the results from Model 1 indicate that center-right parties do 
respond to the size of the non-national population whereas center-left parties do not. The 
results for the center-right show that 𝛽   =  -0.21, with a standard error of 0.08, and a resulting 
p-value of 0.01 (can reject the null); the analysis indicates that center-right parties adopt less 
inclusive positions toward ethnic minorities as the size of the non-national population grows. 
The interaction between Percent Foreign and Center-Left yields a coefficient of 0.21 that is 
statistically significant at the 0.10 level (p-value = 0.06), suggesting that the size of the 
foreigner population produces different effects for center-left parties. With the recoded 
center-left variable, the coefficient on Percent Foreign is statistically indistinguishable from 
zero. In this case, the center-left’s position toward ethnic minorities appears to be 
independent of the number of foreigners, as well as the change in the naturalization rate. 
The set of coefficients in the second column identifies the effect of Percent Foreign 
on center-right and center-left ethnic minority outreach conditional on the unemployment 
rate. Turning first to the center-right, we see that when Unemployment equals zero, the effect 
of Percent Foreign is negative and significant. Even when times are good, a large foreigner 
population still translates to the center-right adopting more exclusive positions on issues of 
                                                
 
45 Coefficients and p-values for the center-left can be acquired by simply recoding Center-Left to equal 1 for 
center-right parties and 0 for center-left parties, and then re-running the analyses with new interactions.  
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cultural diversity (as given by the coefficient -0.31 and with a p-value of 0.01). Once again, 
the effect of Percent Foreign is statistically different between the two mainstream party 
families, as evidenced by the significant interaction between Center-Left and Percent 
Foreign. Here, we do see that Percent Foreign wields a substantial impact on the center-
left’s position toward ethnic minorities. Its coefficient of 0.21 is statistically significant at a 
0.05 level. These findings suggest that under those conditions when economic competition 
between the center-left’s core constituents, the working class, and immigrants is minimal, 
center-left parties may approach a large immigrant population as pool of potential voters.   
Next, we see that while the effect of Percent Foreign on center-right party strategy is 
not conditional on Unemployment (as evidenced by the statistically insignificant interaction 
between Unemployment and Percent Foreign), it is for the center-left (as given by the 
significant interaction between Center-Left, Unemployment, and Percent Foreign). While the 
interaction term in the recoded model is negative and statistically significant (p-value = 
0.01), the estimated interaction coefficient is only -0.03. Moreover, graphing the marginal 
effect of Percent Foreign on center-left outreach across rising levels of Unemployment 
provides no evidence that the effect of the size of the foreign population influences center-
left outreach except for unemployment levels of 15 percent or higher.   
The results of Model 2 provide little support for the hypotheses linking economic 
conditions to the outreach strategies adopted by either mainstream party family. Indeed, the 
major takeaway from this model is that center-right outreach is not responsive to economic 
variables: not one of the three economic variables reaches standard levels of statistical 
significance. While GDP appears to have no effect on the inclusiveness of the center-left’s 
position toward minorities, the unemployment rate does under those conditions when Percent 
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Foreign equals zero. The coefficient on Unemployment is 0.16 and is only statistically 
significant at a 0.10 level.  
Table 3.7 Features of the ethnic minority population and economic conditions, DV = Positional score 
 Model 1 Model 2 
   
Center-Left -0.88 -1.85* 
 (0.76) (1.03) 
Position Score t-1 0.28*** 0.27** 
 (0.10) (0.11) 
Center-Left x Position Score t-1 -0.51*** -0.53*** 
 (0.16) (0.15) 
Ethnic Minority Population   
Change in Naturalization Rate 0.22*** 0.22*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Center-Left x Change in Naturalization Rate -0.16*** -0.15** 
 (0.05) (0.06) 
Percent Foreign -0.21** -0.31** 
 (0.08) (0.12) 
Center-Left x Percent Foreign 0.21* 0.52*** 
 (0.11) (0.13) 
Sociological Variables   
GDP/Capita (in thousands)  -0.00 
  (0.01) 
Center-Left x GDP/Capita (in thousands)   -0.07 
  (0.09) 
Unemployment  -0.07 
  (0.09) 
Center-Left x Unemployment  0.23** 
  (0.11) 
Unemployment x Percent Foreign  0.02 
  (0.02) 
Center-Left x Unemployment x Percent Foreign  -0.05** 
  (0.02) 
Constant 1.43*** 1.90** 
 (0.54) (0.80) 
   
Observations 93 93 
R-squared 0.59 0.62 
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Country dummies and trend variables excluded.  
 
Table 3.8 presents the results for the first party competition model, which includes the 
radical right vote share in the previous national election, Radical Right Vote Sharet-1, in 
addition to Change in the Naturalization Rate, and Percent Foreign. It appears that the 
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electoral performance of a far-right competitor has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on how inclusive the center-right is toward ethnic minorities, as evidenced by its 
coefficient, 0.06 (p-value = 0.01). The failure of the coefficient on the Radical Right Vote 
Sharet-1 and Center-Left interaction to reach conventional levels of statistical significance (p-
value = 0.39) suggests that previous electoral performance of the radical right vote wields the 
same impact on the inclusiveness of both center-left and center-right parties. Running 
separate sample estimations confirms this suspicion, as the coefficient on Radical Right Vote 
Sharet-1 in the center-left regression is 0.4 (p-value = 0.00). Contrary to what alternative 
explanations predict, the growing electoral strength of a radical right party prompts a more 
inclusive, not exclusive, stance by mainstream parties.  
What effect do features of the ethnic minority population have on center-right party 
outreach having now accounted for competitive exigencies? The findings from Model 3 show 
that the change in the citizenship ratio continues to have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on center-right outreach, with a coefficient of 0.29 and a p-value of 0.00. 
While the interaction between Change in the Naturalization Rate and Center-Left, (p-value = 
0.00) suggests that the center-left reacts differently to changes in the citizenship ratio, the 
coefficient for the center-left 0.10 (p-value = 0.06), indicates that the difference is in the size 
of the effect, not the direction. Turning to another feature of the ethnic minority population – 
Percent Foreign – it appears that the size of the foreign population no longer affects center-
right outreach as decisively as it did before; its coefficient is now 0.15 with a p-value of 0.10, 
respectively. Upon removing the economic variables, the effect of Percent Foreign on party 
strategy is statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
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 The second party competition model, Model 4, incorporates the party’s previous vote 
share, Vote Share t-1, to gauge the effect of electoral security on party strategy. The results are 
reported in the second column in Table 9. Upon accounting for the mainstream, center-right 
party’s previous electoral performance, the success (or lack thereof) of its radical right 
competitor no longer appears to have any bearing on the center-right’s decision to appeal to 
ethnic minorities. The lack of statistical significance of the interaction between Radical Right 
Vote Sharet-1 and Center-Left indicate that the mainstream center-left reacts similarly to it 
counterpart on the right when confronted by a far-right party. The coefficient on Radical 
Right Vote Sharet-1 for the center-left is small (0.03 + 0.01 = 0.04) and statistically significant 
at the 0.10 level.  
Whereas the actions of the radical right in the previous election left no impact on 
center-right parties, the same cannot be said about their own performance in the previous 
election. The party’s performance in the previous election, Vote Share t-1, yields the 
statistically significant coefficient of -0.04 (p-value = 0.00). Contrary to our expectations, 
stronger electoral showings by the center-right are followed by less inclusive positions, 
suggesting that ethnic minority outreach may be a strategy pursued by those parties on a 
losing streak desperately seeking to increase their vote share. The statistically significant 
coefficient on the interaction between Center-Left and Vote Share t-1 suggests that the center-
lefts’ previous performances have a different bearing on its position toward ethnic minorities 
and cultural diversity. Upon closer inspection, it appears that these parties’ previous electoral 
showings have no effect on how inclusive or exclusive they are toward ethnic minorities.  
Even as we take into account the competitive exigencies center-right parties confront, 
Change in the Naturalization Rate continues to impact their strategy (as evidenced by the 
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statistically significant coefficient of 0.26 with a p-value = 0.00). Percent Foreign continues 
to affect center-right party outreach, as demonstrated by its statistically significant -0.17 
coefficient (p-value = 0.04). Turning to the center-left, Change in the Naturalization Rate 
influences the degree of outreach, with a coefficient of 0.10 (p-value = 0.06), whereas 
Percent Foreign once again fails to influence the center-left’s stance toward cultural diversity 
and ethnic minorities.  
Table 3.8 Features of the ethnic minority population and party competition, DV = Positional score 
 Model 3 Model 4 
Center-Left -0.63 -1.93* 
 (0.87) (1.08) 
Position Score t-1 0.28*** 0.279*** 
 (0.10) (0.09) 
Center-Left x Position Score t-1 -0.47*** -0.47*** 
 (0.15) (0.16) 
Ethnic Minority Population 
Change in Naturalization Rate 0.29*** 0.26*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Center-Left x Change in Naturalization Rate -0.19*** -0.15** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Percent Foreign -0.16* -0.17** 
 (0.09) (0.08) 
Center-Left x Percent Foreign 0.19 0.20* 
 (0.11) (0.12) 
Party Competition Variables 
Radical Right Vote Share t-1 0.06*** 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Center-Left x Radical Right Vote Share t-1 -0.02 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Vote Share t-1  -0.04*** 
  (0.02) 
Center-Left x Vote Share t-1  0.04** 
  (0.02) 
Constant 0.68 1.964** 
 (0.67) (0.80) 
   
Observations 93 92 
R-squared 0.63 0.67 
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Country dummies and trend variables excluded.  
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The findings from the institutional models are displayed in Table 3.9. There is only 
partial support for the heterogeneity hypothesis with regards to the size of the foreigner 
population as the interaction between Center-Left and Percent Foreign achieves statistical 
significance in Model 6 alone. In Model 5, neither the center-left nor the center-right appears 
to adjust their position toward ethnic minorities. While the sign on the Percent Foreign 
coefficient is negative, as the theory predicts, its p-value is equal to 0.91.46 Analyzing the 
center-left alone, the coefficient on Percent Foreign is meager – 0.04 – and fails to reach 
statistical significance. Upon including the Citizenship Policy Index, Percent Foreign gains 
significance. The coefficient is -0.19 (p-value = 0.01), indicating that center-right parties 
adopt more exclusionary positions as the size of the foreigner population as a proportion of 
the national population grows. The Center-Left and Percent Foreign interaction is also 
significant, though only at p < 0.1. The difference in the way the two mainstream parties 
respond to this demographic feature appears to be in the willingness to react to this feature: 
the relationship between the center-left’s position and Percent Foreign is faint (-0.19 + 0.20 
= 0.01) and is statistically indistinguishable from zero (p-value = 0.91).  
These two models allow us to assess the more nuanced argument regarding the 
radical right’s impact on center-right parties’ positions toward ethnic minorities, namely that 
its influence is conditional on the permissiveness of the electoral system. In systems with 
larger median district magnitudes, parties are better able to win seats and to affect election 
outcomes (Golder 2003, 441).  
                                                
 
46 Diagnostic tests show that the variance inflation factor for Percent Foreign and Change in Naturalization 
Rate is well under 10, signifying that collinearity is not a problem.  
  
 
  125 
Table 3.9 Features of the ethnic minority population and institutional factors, DV = Positional score   
 Model 5 Model 6 
Center-Left -0.41 -1.44 
 (0.97) (1.23) 
Position Score t-1 0.21** 0.10 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Center-Left x Position Score t-1 -0.37** -0.30** 
 (0.15) (0.14) 
Ethnic Minority Population 
Change in Naturalization Rate 0.15** 0.17** 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Center-Left x Change in Naturalization Rate -0.12 -0.11 
 (0.09) (0.08) 
Percent Foreign -0.13 -0.19*** 
 (0.09) (0.07) 
Center-Left x Percent Foreign 0.17 0.20* 
 (0.12) (0.11) 
Institutional Factors 
Radical Right Vote Share 0.09*** 0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Center-Left x Radical Right Vote Share -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Log Median District Magnitude -0.11 -0.18 
 (0.20) (0.19) 
Center-Left x Log Median District Mag. -0.05 -0.00 
 (0.29) (0.28) 
Radical Right Vote Share x Log Median District Mag. -0.03*** -0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Center-Left x Radical Right Vote x Log Median District Mag. 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Citizenship Policy Index  -0.24*** 
  (0.08) 
Center-Left x Citizenship Policy Index  0.11 
  (0.10) 
   
Constant 0.41 2.63*** 
 (0.70) (0.87) 
   
Observations 93 93 
R-squared 0.68 0.72 
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Country dummies and trend variables excluded.  
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The expectation is that a rise in the median district magnitude increases the electoral 
threat posed by the radical right, with the marginal causal effect of a unit change in district 
magnitude declining when the district magnitude is large. Examining the effect of Radical 
Right Vote Sharet-1 on its own only reveals the effect of the radical right’s electoral 
performance in countries with single member districts. In countries with single-member 
districts, the radical right’s performance in the previous national election is met with more 
inclusive appeals by the center-right, as the effect of Radical Right Vote Sharet-1 is positive 
and significant (p < 0.001) in both Models 5 and 6. 
Turning to the evidence for the hypothesized conditional relationship, the statistically 
significant coefficient on the interaction between Radical Right Vote Sharet-1 and Logged 
Median District Magnitude in Models 5 and 6 suggests that there is a conditional relationship 
between the two variables. Yet to appreciate fully how the permissiveness of the electoral 
system influences the effect of radical right vote share on center-right party strategy, it is 
necessary to examine the full range of the conditional coefficients for Radical Right Vote 
Sharet-1. These are graphically illustrated for Model 5 in Figure 7 and Model 6 in Figure 8. 
The solid line indicates how the value of the estimated causal effect of Radical Right Vote 
Sharet-1 changes across the full range of values for Logged Median District Magnitude. The 
estimated causal effect of Radical Right Vote Sharet-1 is only significant when the upper and 
lower bounds of the confidence interval are above or below the zero line. Whereas the results 
from Model 3 indicated that Radical Right Vote Sharet-1 always encouraged center-right 
parties to adopt more inclusive stances, Figures 7 and 8 illustrate that this is not the case 
when the log of the district magnitude is equal to or greater than 2.1. The positive 
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relationship only holds in Denmark from 1968 through 1998, and the following countries for 
all years: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.  
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Figure 3.8 Marginal effect of radical right vote on center-right outreach from Model 6 
 
Turning to the center-left, the Center-Left and Radical Right Vote Sharet-1 interaction 
is insignificant in both models, suggesting that the tenor of the radical right’s relationship 
with the center-left in plurality systems is the same as it is with the center-right. Separate 
sample estimations reveal that the effect of Radical Right Vote Sharet-1 is positive in both 
models, but is only statistically significant in Model 5 (p-value = 0.04). The coefficient on 
the interaction of Center-Left, Radical Right Vote Sharet-1, and Logged Median District 
Magnitude in Model 5 has a p-value of 0.11 (cannot reject the null at conventional levels), 
suggesting that there is no heterogeneity in response across mainstream parties to the radical 
right’s vote share in the previous national election. Yet as Figure 9 shows, the effect of 
Radical Right Vote Sharet-1 is never significant in countries with a median district magnitude 
greater than one. Thus, only in France, Germany, and the UK does the prior performance of 
the radical right affect the center-left’s position toward ethnic minorities and diversity. For 
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Model 6, the Center-Left and Radical Right Vote Sharet-1 and Center-Left, Radical Right Vote 
Sharet-1 and Logged Median District Magnitude interactions produce statistically 
insignificant coefficients, the fact that the upper and lower confidence intervals in Figure 10 
are on opposite sides of the x-axis for all values of Logged Median District Magnitude 
indicates that the radical right does not affect the outreach positions of the center-left.       
Figure 3.9 Marginal effect of radical right vote on center-left outreach from Model 5 
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Figure 3.10 Marginal effect of radical right vote on center-left outreach from Model 6 
 
The findings for Model 6 provide strong evidence that the openness of the citizenship 
regime influences the outreach positions of both mainstream parties, although in the exact 
opposite way in which the literature predicts. As the coefficient of -0.24 on Citizenship 
Policy Index (p-value = 0.00) attests, it appears that as the ease by which individuals can 
acquire citizenship and level of culture rights increases, the center-right’s level of 
inclusiveness decreases, and vice-versa.47 Those countries exhibiting the former type of 
change include Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands, whereas the United Kingdom 
displays the latter. The results from the models using Center-Right as the dummy variable 
reveal that the Citizenship Policy Index is negatively related to center-left parties’ positions 
                                                
 
47 Slowly-moving variables in a fixed-effects model typically have high standard errors because they will be 
highly correlated with the fixed-effects (Wilson and Butler 2007). For this reason, including such variables in a 
fixed-effects model will make it hard for them to appear either substantively or statistically significant (Beck 
2001). Including the citizenship policy index thus raises the bar for confirming that its impact on party strategy 
exists (Wilson and Butler 2007). 
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toward ethnic minorities, although the effect is nearly half of that for the center-right (𝛽   =  -
0.13) and is only just barely statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value = 0.09).   
Having examined each class of explanation separately, Model 7, represented by 
Equation 3.2, incorporates variables from each class of explanation. The first column of 
Table 10 displays the results of the fully interactive model; the second and third columns 
show those for the center-left and center-right, respectively. I first assess the support for the 
heterogeneity hypothesis. I then evaluate followed the relative strength of the citizenship 
ratio hypothesis against those emphasizing sociological factors, features of party 
competition, and the institutional environment in accounting for center-right parties’ 
positions toward ethnic minorities and diversity. I take each in turn. 
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Table 3.10 Full model, DV = Positional score 
 Model 7 Center-Left Center-Right 
Center-Left -1.94   
 (1.38)   
Position Score t-1 0.09 -0.18 0.09 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) 
Center-Left x Position Score t-1 -0.27*   
 (0.15)   
Ethnic Minority Population   
Change in Naturalization Rate 0.18** 0.02 0.18** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Center-Left x Change in Naturalization Rate -0.16**   
 (0.08)   
Percent Foreign -0.22*** 0.01 -0.22*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Center-Left x Percent Foreign 0.23**   
 (0.11)   
Sociological Variables    
Unemployment 0.05 -0.05 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Center-Left x Unemployment -0.10**   
 (0.05)   
Party Competition Variables    
Vote Share t-1 -0.04*** -0.02 -0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Center-Left x Vote Share t-1 0.02   
 (0.02)   
Radical Right Vote Share t-1 0.03 0.06** 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Center-Left x Radical Right Vote Share t-1 0.03   
 (0.04)   
Institutional Factors   
Log Median District Magnitude -0.44*** -0.03 -0.44*** 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.21) 
Center-Left x Log Median District Magnitude 0.41   
 (0.34)   
Radical Right Vote Share t-1 x Log Median District Mag. -0.01 -0.20** -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Center-Left x Rad. Right Vote t-1 x Log Median District Mag. -0.01   
 (0.01)   
Citizenship Policy Index -0.27*** -0.12 -0.27*** 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) 
Center-Left x Citizenship Policy Index 0.14   
 (0.12)   
Constant 3.77*** 1.83** 3.77*** 
 (0.97) (0.88) (0.10) 
Observations 92 45 47 
R-squared 0.754 0.643 0.751 
Number of Parties 12 6 6 
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 The major claim advanced by the heterogeneity hypothesis is that the citizenship 
status of ethnic minorities matters for the center-right but it does not for the center-left. If this 
proposition is true, then the coefficients on two interactions, one between Center-Left and 
Change in Naturalization Rate and the other between Center-Left and Percent Foreign, 
ought to be statistically significant. There is one caveat to keep in mind when analyzing the 
results. The implications of changes to the naturalization rate for center-left strategy are not 
entirely clear. As previously discussed, under certain conditions, shifts in the citizenship ratio 
may elicit identical reactions from the left and the right. That said, the Center-Left and 
Change in Naturalization Rate interaction term is statistically significant at the more 
generous two-tailed p < 0.10. We see that the effect of Change in Naturalization Rate is 
positive and significant among center-right parties (as evidenced by the statistically 
significant coefficient of 0.18), whereas its effect is negligible among center-left parties (an 
estimated coefficient of 0.02) and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Further evidence 
for the heterogeneity hypothesis comes from the interaction between Center-Left and Percent 
Foreign, which is statistically significant at conventional levels of p < 0.05. Once again, the 
resulting effect is meager and statistically insignificant for the center-left (given by the 
estimated coefficient of 0.01, with s.e. = 0.07, and p-value = 0.89), but is strong and 
significant for the center-right (as demonstrated by the estimated coefficient of -0.22, with s.e. 
= 0.07, and p-value = 0.001). Center-right parties’ adopt positions on diversity and toward 
ethnic minorities based on features of the ethnic minority population, but center-left parties 
do not.   
In addition to supporting the citizenship ratio explanation of center-right outreach, the 
findings provide strong evidence for institutional accounts and mixed results for the theories 
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emphasizing sociological and party competition variables. For center-right parties, positive 
changes in the number of naturalizations correspond with more inclusive appeals. 
Conversely, they are more likely to issue exclusionary appeals in the presence of a large 
foreigner population, as the sociological theory predicts. Yet outreach appears impervious to 
Unemployment, Radical Right Vote Sharet-1, Radical Right Vote Sharet-1, and Logged Median 
District Magnitude. The party competition theory receives partial support as the Vote Sharet-1 
is statistically significant (𝛽   =  -0.04, with s.e. = 0.01, and p-value = 0.01). It appears that as 
the previous vote share of the center-right grows its position toward ethnic minorities and 
cultural diversity becomes more exclusionary. Once again, we see that the effect of the 
Citizenship Policy Index is negative and statistically significant. Center-right parties adopt 
more exclusionary positions when it becomes easier for foreigners to become citizens.  
IV. Conclusion 
By not recognizing citizenship status and only considering population levels rather 
than changes, the existing literature found little support connecting the features of the ethnic 
minority population to mainstream parties’ willingness to issue exclusionary or inclusionary 
appeals as an electoral strategy (see e.g., Bohman 2012; Van Spanje 2010). As a result, most 
analyses have privileged the exigencies of party competition, sociological conditions, and 
institutional settings, especially when explaining center-right parties’ susceptibility to 
‘contagion effects’ from the radical right. Yet as the analysis presented in this chapter shows, 
center-right parties’ positions toward ethnic minorities are not solely, or even, the product of 
competition with the right. Instead, their appeals correlate with a host of other factors, 
including changes in the naturalization rate. Indeed, this factor remained a critical 
determinant of center-right parties’ positions across a variety of model specifications.  
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The findings in this chapter also demonstrate that mainstream parties’ reactions to 
changes in the ethnic minority population are a product of core supporters’ attitudes and 
policy opinions. First, the prevalence of foreigners prompts more exclusionary positions 
among parties of the center-right while rarely eliciting a response by the center-left. Second, 
changes in the citizenship ratio had a limited impact on the strategic choices of the center-left 
and a consistent and substantial effect on the strategic orientation of the center-right. The 
literature’s reliance on pooled analyses may obscure these relationships. Because these 
factors do not appear to wield a substantial influence on center-left strategy, pooling center-
left and center-right parties with a common coefficient will produce a seemingly non-
substantive effect. 
Finally, the theory presented in Chapter 2 posits that partisan attitudes explain this 
difference in response; in turn, this chapter empirically substantiated this claim. Drawing on 
multiple public opinions surveys, I find that while partisans of both the left and right perceive 
the presence of ethnic minorities as a threat to national self-understanding, this tendency is 
more pronounced among those on the right. The data also show immigration and race policy 
orientations among core constituents of the center-right and center-left differ in a key respect. 
While center-left voters hold consistent attitudes toward government policies regardless of 
their intended beneficiaries’ legal status, center-right voters do not. Instead, they have 
divergent opinions toward government programs based on their target populations, with those 
aimed exclusively at non-nationals receiving substantially less support than those directed at 
ethnic minorities broadly.  
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
I. Puzzle and Argument 
This dissertation addresses several pressing questions regarding national identity and 
the democratic inclusion of underrepresented groups by explaining a puzzle in Western 
European politics: center-right parties’ attempts to win the votes of ethnic minorities, or non-
Western immigrants and their descendants. In the post-war period, Western Europe has 
experienced unrivaled levels of migration of non-European origin. In contrast to traditional 
settler societies, the countries of Europe have largely become countries of immigration 
unintentionally and reactively (Hollifield 1992). The challenges presented by the influx of 
millions of racially and religiously different immigrants are more pronounced in Europe due, 
in part, because of these countries’ more ethnoculturally rooted conceptions of nationhood.48 
Thus, immigrants not only potentially pose an economic threat to citizens, whether it be by 
pushing wages downward or competing with nationals for jobs, but their presence and 
seemingly increased demand for cultural recognition challenge the state’s dominant cultural 
self-conception: its national identity (see Koopmans et al. 2005). 
As the political guardians of national identity, center-right parties not only should 
ignore ethnic minority voters but also actively mobilize fear of minority populations for 
                                                
 
48 Even in France, considered the apotheosis of “civic” nationhood, more organic conceptions of nationhood 
emerge in public debates, such as during the Dreyfus affair (Zimmer 2003, 181), and by the frequent distinction 
made between immigrants and “Français de souche” (a person with only French ancestors—literally, “of French 
stock”). 
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electoral gain. In fact, scholars conclude that center-right parties use race and immigration to 
attract anti-immigrant voters while center-left parties adopt positions to appeal to immigrant 
voters (Messina 2006; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Money 1999). Yet center-right parties have 
fielded minority candidates, supported policies that deliver tangible benefits to minorities, 
and heavily recruited minorities into party membership. In light of the threat posed by far-
right parties and the unpopularity of ethnic minorities in many countries, this outreach 
presents a puzzle, namely when does a party attempt to expand its coalition to include a 
constituency that it previously marginalized? 
The literature provides few answers as scholars have largely focused on explaining 
the rise of the radical right and its consequent effects on mainstream parties’ strategies. To 
the extent they have examined mainstream parties’ attempts to incorporate minorities writ 
large, they have generated explanations emphasizing the institutional, competitive, and 
economic characteristics of the political environments in which parties compete. According 
to these theories, mainstream parties appeal to ethnic minorities, regardless of citizenship 
status, when radical right competitors are absent, the economy is strong, and both cultural 
and legal notions of citizenship are inclusive. Their efforts are always in pursuit of a pre-
defined goal: short-term vote maximization.  
This dissertation offers an alternative account. Its central argument focuses on parties’ 
challenge of retaining core voter support as they seek to include ethnic minorities among 
their electoral support. The origination and severity of this trade-off is a function a party’s 
historically rooted, ideological identity. The critical element for center-right parties is their 
association with the nation and reputation as its guardian. After all, center-right parties’ 
predecessors often transformed a population’s political allegiances, dress, manners, and daily 
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language, in essence, built a nation (Bell 2002, 198). As a result, to target and promote the 
interests of non-citizens, a group outside the nation, will cost them core voters’ support. By 
contrast, the citizen-non-citizen divide does not hamper center-left parties’ outreach 
strategies. While they undoubtedly face challenges in seek ethnic minorities’ support, it is not 
as a result of their positions toward foreigners as such.  
The source of the electoral trade-off provides the theoretical foundation for two 
empirical claims. First, rather than treat all ethnic minorities the same, center-right politicians 
distinguish between those ethnic minorities with citizenship and those without. While 
citizens may vote in national elections, foreigners cannot. Second, center-right parties 
distinguish between those ethnic minorities with citizenship and those without in their 
immigration and integration policies. They may then pair inclusive positions on policies 
targeting the former with restrictive positions on the latter, enabling them to expand and 
maintain their electoral base simultaneously. Yet in making this distinction, center-right 
parties introduce an intertemporal electoral trade-off, casting preserving their current 
coalition against capturing the support of ethnic minorities’ in the future. This dual strategy 
may thus increase their electoral performance in the short-term while costing them the 
support of a whole generation of voters, notably that of current non-citizens who naturalize 
later.  
Not all center-right parties face trade-offs of equal magnitude; their objective severity 
depends on both the relative number of ethnic minority citizens to non-citizens, and the 
movement of this ratio. While changes in the citizenship ratio alter the severity of the trade-
offs parties face, it is party leaders’ perceptions of the size and expectations of its trajectory 
that accounts for variation in their outreach strategies. Yet party leaders are not held hostage 
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by these trade-offs. Rather they may seek to change them by engaging in outreach and 
enacting policies of membership definition. Outreach is an electoral tactic by which parties 
seek to recast the benefits of diversity in order to win ethnic minority votes while precluding 
loss of core constituent support. Enacting policy is a long-term tactic aiming to reshape 
constituencies, potentially eliminating the very trade-offs they currently confront.  
II. Summary of Principal Findings 
This dissertation produced three central insights. First, center-right and center-left 
parties reach out to ethnic minorities under different conditions. Second, center-right parties’ 
efforts are not mere artifacts of their institutional, competitive, and economic environments; 
instead, changes in the naturalization rate, and thus the citizenship ratio, drive their outreach 
strategies. Third, this dissertation offers a theoretical rationale for parties to adopt longer time 
horizons. I take each in turn.   
As developed in Chapter 2, engaging in ethnic minority outreach poses distinct 
challenges for mainstream center-right and center-left parties. Their difficulties stem from 
their ideological identities. Center-right parties’ philosophical link to national self-
understanding defines which strategies are at their disposal. Its principal effect is to prohibit 
center-right parties’ to appeal to ethnic minorities without citizenship.  Conversely, center-
left parties’ are not constrained in their ability to appeal to ethnic minorities on the basis of 
their citizenship status. Thus, their outreach strategies should be unaffected by this feature of 
the ethnic minority population.  
The cross-sectional time-series analyses conducted in Chapter 3 largely confirm this 
prediction. Across six countries, and a variety of institutional, competitive, and sociological 
environments, center-right parties levels of outreach are consistently responsive to changes in 
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the naturalization rate whereas the center-left parties’ efforts are not. In fact, the degree to 
which center-left parties engage in outreach appears to be largely immune to features of the 
ethnic minority population. The use of fully interactive models allowed us to identify this 
significant difference, suggesting that the use of pooled models may have obscured the 
relationship between characteristics of the ethnic minority population and party strategy.  
Two other important results regarding the determinants of center-right parties’ 
strategies emerged in Chapter 3. First, as briefly mentioned above, precipitous increases in 
the number of citizenship acquisitions relative to changes in the size of the foreigner 
population are a consistently powerful predictor of center-right parties’ level of outreach. 
Second, the presence and performance of radical right parties had no statistically significant 
effect on center-right parties’ outreach strategies. Instead, these actors had far more impact 
on center-left parties. This finding stands in stark contrast to the literature’s firm conclusion 
that these competitors exert a contagion effect on center-right parties’ strategies. 
Finally, this dissertation provided a theoretical framework to account for the dizzying 
array of tactics center-right parties deploy as part of their minority strategy. The key to 
understanding the welter of tactics observed is in recognizing that center-right parties’ 
positions on immigration and integration policies aimed primarily at ethnic minority denizens 
are not necessarily indicative of their stances on policies targeting ethnic minority citizens. 
Instead, they may treat their positions on immigration and integration policies as strategic 
complements. Immigration is an issue the center-right “owns” and it is the strategic tool 
center-right parties use to mobilize their base (Bowler 1990; Meguid 2008). Yet they may  
marshal support for restrictive immigration and integration policies toward foreigners with 
inclusive positions on policies affecting ethnic minorities broadly. Essentially, strategically 
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employing both immigration and ethnic relations policies allows the party to mobilize its 
base and pursue new voters simultaneously. Enacting this dual strategy, however, introduces 
a intertemporal trade-off between maintaining its present coalition and securing the support 
ethnic minorities – a growing constituency – in the future. In such instances, center-right 
parties enact policies that seek to redefine constituencies, and potentially, the nation.  
III. Further Work 
There are parts of this project that deserve further exploration to contribute to a 
literature on party competition and immigrant incorporation. I outline some of these 
possibilities below.  
Further work is needed to understand the conditions under which parties will adopt 
longer time horizons and seek to shape the nature of the electoral trade-offs they face. Do the 
demographic considerations encompassed by the concept of the citizenship ratio affect the 
policies parties adopt? Moreover, do party leaders act in anticipation of demographic trends? 
While this dissertation provides a theoretical basis to suggest that the answer to both 
questions is yes, it does not systematically develop nor test this part of the theory’s 
observational implications. Important headway in this area is being made with regards to the 
political use of integration tests as a means of controlling immigration (Goodman 2011). A 
study such as this one could greatly benefit from these considerations when examining 
antidiscrimination policies.  
This dissertation also leaves unexplored how parties transform immigrants into 
citizens. It gives little insight into how and these parties target specific groups over time or 
the processes by which they form these strategies. What internal and external factors affect 
these strategies’ development? On a related note, future work could focus on party leaders’ 
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constraints and their effect on the final form and timing of outreach. In this project, party 
leaders operate in a vacuum; they are free to implement any strategy they choose. This 
scenario is undoubtedly false. Future work should examine how institutions, competition, and 
prior decisions shape party leaders’ ability to pursue outreach as well as implement long-term 
strategies.  
Other lines of inquiry could focus on the effects of these strategies’ effectiveness, 
both in terms of winning ethnic minorities’ votes, and staving off any core constituent 
exodus. First, little is known about the conditions under which, if at all, party appeals 
successfully capture ethnic minority support. For instance, while it is well established that 
ethnic minorities overwhelmingly vote for parties of the Left, the source of this support is 
unclear. There is little evidence that it is their positions on policies of special concern to 
ethnic minorities. Numerous scholars emphasize that ethnic minorities are concerned with the 
same core issues that preoccupy natives (Messina 2007; Brouard and Tiberj 2005). Indeed, 
polls conducted in Britain from 1983 through 1997 consistently show that mainstream 
political and social issues, such as unemployment, education or health, are ranked higher by 
ethnic minorities than mother tongue teaching or immigration (Saggar, 2000, 32, quoted in 
Sobolewska 2005, 199). As Sobolewska (2005) notes,  
“Strikingly, the notable proximity of the Labour Party on ethnic 
minorities’ view of equal opportunities for themselves does not benefit this 
party in any significant way. On the contrary, this issue seems to be the least 
important for party loyalty” (2005, 207).   
Similarly, in France, Brouard and Tiberj (2005) show natives and first-, second-, and 
third-generation citizens of North African, African, and Turkish have very similar concerns. 
The concerns voiced by ethnic minorities diverged from those expressed by natives on only 
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one issue, immigrant integration (2005, 50). While natives did not mention it, ethnic 
minorities ranked it fifth.  
The answer may lie in the rhetoric and actions of the center-right. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, the Dutch VVD’s loss in minority support following their attack on 
multiculturalism in 2004. Moreover, upon finding little ethnic minority support for the 
French UMP, scholars Brouard and Tiberj(2005) remarked:  
“It appears that the signs sent to populations from immigrant backgrounds by 
the Raffarin government (UMP) have hardly had an influence: the 
appointment of a Muslim prefecture, the project of integration contract, the 
creation of the CFCM (French Council of the Muslim Faith), and many 
‘specific’ measures that have had at the end, a weak electoral yield” (55). 
Yet while then-Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, had yet to refer to immigrant youth 
as “scum” and suggest that the suburbs needed to be cleaned by a Kärcher, a well-known 
brand of high pressure cleaning equipment, his other remarks had already tarnished the 
party’s reputation among certain segments of the minority population. These examples 
suggest that perhaps symbolism may be more important than substantive policy in shaping 
voters’ preferences.   
Second, it is known whether parties are able to shape partisans’ views on diversity, 
and, if so, which tactics, such as public pronouncements and policy offerings, are most 
successful in influencing these views. To answer this question, operationalization and 
measurement of party strategy must improve beyond today’s blunt measures. Improved 
measures would capture important empirical nuances and incorporate tactics beyond 
programmatic appeals. Such advancements would allow us to pinpoint which tactics are most 
effective in shaping public opinion, as well as answer other pressing research questions.  
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IV. Conclusion 
Post-war migration has ushered in an age of diversity in Western Europe (Bleich 
2003, 1-2). In fact, it is this consequence of immigration – cultural and ethnic diversity – that 
arguably captures the majority of political and public attention (see e.g., Koopmans et al. 
2005; Bleich 2003). The effects of this cultural and ethnic diversity are wide-ranging. 
Champions and detractors may both point to indisputable advantages and challenges 
generated by diversity, which, in turn, may be invoked to heighten or mediate negative out-
group feelings. 
What is of interest in this dissertation is how political parties grapple with diversity-
related issues, such as the rising number of ethnic and racial minorities and state regulation of 
cultural difference. These concerns are unlikely to fade away soon as they persist in the 
absence of their cause: large-scale immigration. The critical difference is that issues of ethnic 
diversity not only target immigrants, but citizens, that is, ostensible members of the nation 
(Bleich 2003; Crowley 2001). In this dissertation, I demonstrated how mainstream center-
right parties’ decisions to emphasize the advantages of diversity as well as its disadvantages 
can be explained systematically by understanding how politicians see the complexity of the 
ethnic minority population in light of their goals. In doing so, we gain better understanding of 
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